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Abstract
Over the past decade, investigations in diﬀerent ﬁelds have focused on studying and under-
standing real networks, ranging from biological to social to technological. These networks,
called complex networks, exhibit common topological features, such as a heavy-tailed degree
distribution and the small world eﬀect. In this thesis we address two interesting aspects of
complex, and more speciﬁcally, social networks: (1) users’ privacy, and the vulnerability of a
network to user identiﬁcation, and (2) dynamics, or the evolution of the network over time.
For this purpose, we base our contributions on a central tool in the study of graphs and
complex networks: graph sampling. We conjecture that each network snapshot can be treated
as a sample from an underlying network. Using this, a sampling process can be viewed as a
way to observe dynamic networks, and to model the similarity of two correlated graphs by
assuming that the graphs are samples from an underlying generator graph.
We take the thesis in two directions. For the ﬁrst, we focus on the privacy problem in
social networks. There have been hot debates on the extent to which the release of anonymized
information to the public can leak personally identiﬁable information (PII). Recent works have
shown methods that are able to infer true user identities, under certain conditions and by
relying on side information. Our approach to this problem relies on the graph structure,
where we investigate the feasibility of de-anonymizing an unlabeled social network by using
the structural similarity to an auxiliary network. We propose a model where the two partially
overlapping networks of interest are considered samples of an underlying graph.
Using such a model, ﬁrst, we propose a theoretical framework for the de-anonymization
problem, we obtain minimal conditions under which de-anonymization is feasible, and we
establish a threshold on the similarity of the two networks above which anonymity could be
lost. Then, we propose a novel algorithm based on a Bayesian framework, which is capable
of matching two graphs of thousands of nodes - with no side information other than network
structures. Our method has several potential applications, e.g., inferring user identities in
an anonymized network by using a similar public network, cross-referencing dictionaries of
diﬀerent languages, correlating data from diﬀerent domains, etc. We also introduce a novel
privacy-preserving mechanism for social recommender systems, where users can receive accu-
rate recommendations while hiding their proﬁles from an untrusted recommender server.
For the second direction of this work, we focus on models for network growth, more specif-
ically for network densiﬁcation, by using a sampling process. The densiﬁcation phenomenon
has been recently observed in various real networks, and we argue that it can be explained
simply through the way we observe (sample) the networks. We introduce a process of sam-
pling the edges of a ﬁxed graph, which results in the super-linear growth of edges versus nodes
and the increase of the average degree as the network evolves.
Keywords. network dynamics, network privacy, random graphs, graph sampling, graph
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Re´sume´
Au cours de la dernie`re de´cennie, les recherches dans diﬀe´rents domaines ont porte´ sur l’e´tude
et la compre´hension des re´seaux re´elles, de biologique a` sociaux a` technologiques. Ces re´seaux,
appele´s re´seaux complexes, pre´sentent des caracte´ristiques topologiques communes, comme
une distribution des degre´s a` queue lourde et l’eﬀet petit monde. Dans cette the`se, nous
abordons deux aspects inte´ressants de ces re´seaux, et plus particulie`rement les re´seaux so-
ciaux: (1) la vie prive´e des utilisateurs, et la vulne´rabilite´ d’un re´seau a` l’identiﬁcation des
utilisateurs, et (2) la dynamique, ou l’e´volution du re´seau au ﬁl du temps.
Pour ce faire, nous basons nos contributions sur un outil central dans l’e´tude des graphes
et des re´seaux complexes: l’e´chantillonnage des graphes. Nous conjecturons que chaque in-
stantane´ d’un re´seau peut eˆtre conside´re´ comme un e´chantillon d’un re´seau sous-jacent. Avec
cela, un processus d’e´chantillonnage peut eˆtre conside´re´ comme un moyen d’observer des
re´seaux dynamiques, et de mode´liser la similarite´ de deux graphes corre´le´s en supposant que
les graphes sont des e´chantillons provenant d’un graphe sous-jacent qui les ge´ne`re.
Cette the`se contient deux parties. Dans une premie`re partie, nous nous concentrons sur le
proble`me de la vie prive´e dans les re´seaux sociaux. Plusieurs e´tudes ont montre´ que la diﬀusion
public d’informations anonymes peut divulguer des informations personnelles identiﬁables
(PII). Des recherches re´centes ont de´veloppe´ plusieures me´thodes aﬁn de de´duire l’identite´
des utilisateurs en utilisant des informations auxiliaires. Notre approche a` ce proble`me repose
sur la structure du graphe, ou` nous e´tudions la possibilite´ de pre´server l’anonymat dans un
re´seau sociale en utilisant la similarite´ structurelle a` un re´seau auxiliaire. Nous proposons un
mode`le ou` les deux re´seaux se recouvrant partiellement sont conside´re´s comme des e´chantillons
d’un graphe sous-jacent.
En utilisant un tel mode`le, nous proposons d’abord un cadre the´orique pour le prob-
le`me de de-anonymisation. Nous obtenons des conditions minimales dans lesquelles la de-
anonymisation est possible, et nous e´tablissons un seuil sur la similitude des deux re´seaux
au-dessus duquel l’anonymat pourrait eˆtre perdue. Ensuite, nous proposons un nouvel algo-
rithme reposant sur un cadre baye´sien, qui est capable d’apparier deux graphes de milliers
de nœuds - sans aucune autre information que les structures des re´seaux. Notre me´thode a
plusieurs applications potentielles, par exemple, re´ve´ler les identite´s des utilisateurs dans un
re´seau anonyme en utilisant un re´seau public similaire, le recoupement des dictionnaires de
langues diﬀe´rentes, ou la corre´lation des donne´es provenant de diﬀe´rents domaines. En outre,
nous introduisons un nouveau me´canisme pour pre´server la vie prive´e dans les syste`mes de
recommandation, ou` les utilisateurs peuvent recevoir des recommandations pre´cises, tout en
cachant leurs proﬁls aux serveurs de recommandation non se´curise´s.
Dans une deuxie`me partie, nous nous concentrons sur les mode`les de croissance du re´seau,
plus spe´ciﬁquement pour la densiﬁcation du re´seau, en utilisant un processus d’e´chantillonnage.
Le phe´nome`ne de densiﬁcation a e´te´ re´cemment observe´ dans divers re´seaux re´els, et nous
v
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croyons que cela peut s’expliquer simplement par la fac¸on dont nous observons les re´seaux.
Nous introduisons un processus qui consiste a` pre´lever un e´chantillon des areˆtes d’un graphe
ﬁxe, ce qui entraˆıne la croissance super-line´aire des areˆtes contre des nœuds et l’augmentation
du degre´ moyen comme le re´seau e´volue.
Mots Cle´s. dynamique de re´seaux, protection de la vie prive´e, graphes ale´atoires, echan-
tillonnage de graphes, couplage des graphes, re´seaux sociaux, syste`mes de recommandation,
de-anonymisation, densiﬁcation
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, the study of real-world networks has gained particular attention in
the research community. The empirical study of various types of networks, ranging from
social to technological to biological, has led to a unifying theme known as complex networks.
Surprisingly, many of these networks exhibit common topological features, such as heavy-
tailed degree distribution, high clustering, community structure, and the small-world eﬀect.
These features incite the scientiﬁc community to seek models to explain the properties and
dynamics of such networks. Surveys in this area include the works of Albert and Barabasi
[6], Newman [81], and Boccaletti [14], and some prominent works include those of Watts and
Strogatz [102], Willinger et al. [65], and Kleinberg [48]. Thanks to the accessibility of high
computational power and due to the growing availability of large-scale network data, it is
now feasible to investigate and analyze large networks, and to propose models and methods
in order to address diﬀerent characteristics and challenges inherent to such networks.
Among various types of complex networks, social networks have gained particular attention
in the research community due to their massive popularity, rapid growth and commercial
potential. The emergence of immense social networks with millions of users, such as Facebook,
Twitter, Flickr, and Linkedin, has led to a new era in which human communication is not
restricted to one-to-one interactions. Instead, information sharing and communications ﬂow
are accomplished via a dynamic network of user relationships.
1.1 Privacy in Social Networks
With the rapid growth of social networks , the sharing of sensitive information about users
and their relations in the networks has become an accelerating trend. There are many reasons
social network data are shared between organizations or even released into the public domain
by network owners and social network operators. First, this information is very valuable for
scientiﬁc purposes: the modest number of publicly available datasets has led to a broad vari-
ety of research projects and results. For example (and without any claim to exhaustiveness),
promising research directions in this area include probabilistic modeling of network proper-
ties and dynamics (as cited above), real-data measurement and analysis [72, 71, 50, 20], and
developing scalable algorithms to navigate and infer data from large-scale networks [55, 60].
Obviously, this requires great care in order to avoid the accidental release of sensitive in-
formation about individual users. As AOL’s public relations disaster a few years ago [1]
illustrates, simply anonymizing user identities is not suﬃcient to prevent an attacker from
identifying individual users through other means. Second, online social networks are increas-
ingly integrated with other services on the web, which requires a certain amount of sharing
between organizations (e.g., Facebook third-party applications and Facebook connect func-
tion on third-party websites). Third, it has been recognized that social network information
has a strong potential for marketing purposes (e.g., for churn prediction [93] or for targeted
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advertisement [43]). In all of these areas lurks the risk of accidental or deliberate violations
of user privacy.
Users, often willingly, share personal identifying information about themselves, without a
clue of who can access this information. In information systems, privacy in general refers to
the ability of the users to control the spread of their personally identiﬁable information (PII).
PII refers to the information that can be used either by itself or in combination with other
PIIs to uniquely identify an individual, such as name, birth date, contact information, social
security number, driver’s license number, etc. Obviously, a na¨ıve release of network data
including users’ PII is a privacy violation and should be avoided. Hence, network operators
generally apply privacy-preserving measures before releasing network data. In the context of
social networks, several works address this privacy issue [36, 51, 21], propose mechanisms to
preserve users’ privacy [107, 37, 41, 73], and suggest the vulnerability of social networks to
diﬀerent attacks [49, 105].
Anonymity refers to the state of an individual’s personally identiﬁable information be-
ing publicly unknown1. Using this notion, a well-established privacy-preserving method is
anonymization, where user identities are replaced with random unique identiﬁers. Anonymiza-
tion is assumed to be equivalent to hiding PII for an individual user, and thus known as a
privacy-preserving technique. However, recent works [78, 76, 75] have shown that a large-
scale re-identiﬁcation of social networks is possible even if the data is anonymized, and that
assuming a ﬁxed set of attributes as users’ PII and hiding them might not be suﬃcient to
preserve their identities. In other words, it is hard to deﬁne a ﬁxed set of attributes as iden-
tifying, and that any information that distinguishes one person from another can be used for
re-identifying anonymous data [79]. Thus, although some information might be unidentify-
ing itself, it can be identifying in combination with others. This motivates a novel research
direction, where re-identiﬁcation is done without access to users’ information, rather through
the use of side information about the user. Such information spans from the local structure
of social networks, to web browsing history, to search histories, etc.
Recent works have shown methods that are able to infer the true user identities under
certain conditions, by relying on side information [78, 7, 105]. This process is called de-
anonymization. Basically, an attacker relies on some side information obtained from other
(e.g., publicly available) resources, in order to reveal the identities of users in an anonymized
network. This is indeed an obvious privacy breach, as revealing the identities exposes personal
information about the users.
Several works have recently looked into network de-anonymization and investigated the
success or failure of diﬀerent existing or proposed de-anonymization techniques on real-
network data. Most of the works in this area focus on proposing algorithms and methods for
de-anonymizing networks, tested on various real datasets of online networks [68, 77]. Works in
this category propose algorithms for either de-anonymizing specific users in publicly available
network data [7], or de-anonymizing a fraction of all users in a network [105]. A major chal-
lenge in all these scenarios is scalability. Recently, algorithms applicable for de-anonymizing
a large proportion of users in large networks have been introduced [78, 77]. These algorithms
rely on a seed set of already revealed node pairs and use the initial seeds to propagate among
all nodes and infer all user identities.
In this thesis, our approach to the privacy problem in social networks is from an adversary’s
1In many cases anonymity has been assumed to be equivalent to privacy. A formal definition of different
privacy notions can be found in [87].
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point of view: We look at the de-anonymization of (almost) all users of an anonymized
network, by using no side information other than the structural similarity to a known labeled
network. As shown in the following chapters, this is equivalent to matching the nodes of
two similar (correlated) graphs, by relying only on graph structures. We refer to this as
approximate graph matching, a concept which has been used in other ﬁelds such as pattern
recognition and image processing as well.
As a complementary work, we also investigate the privacy problem in social recommender
systems. This is further elaborated in the end of this chapter, and also Chapter 6.
1.1.1 Approximate Graph Matching
We comment on the notion of approximate graph matching used in this thesis. Graph match-
ing refers to a collection of methods that compare two or several graphs by their structure,
i.e., without reference to any vertex or edge labels. For example, in computer vision, a picture
can be represented compactly by a graph describing a set of image segments and their relative
positions to each other. This graph can then be used to ﬁnd qualitatively similar pictures in
a database, where each picture is also represented as such a segment graph [103, 104]. Such
a graph is unlabeled, i.e., represents an equivalence class of isomorphic graphs.
The problem of graph matching is similar to the classic graph isomorphism problem.
Suppose we have two unlabeled copies G1,2 of a graph and need to identify its isomorphisms.
This is equivalent to ﬁnding a bijection of their vertex sets V1,2 under which the two edge sets
are equal. This bijection is unique if and only if the graph is asymmetric. It is known from the
theory of random graphs that the class of asymmetric graphs is large [16]2, which suggests
that reasonably dense graphs tend to be asymmetric. But the problem of identifying the
correct bijection is NP [30] in general, and therefore (almost certainly) cannot be computed
in polynomial time.
In many practical applications of graph matching, we need to match similar, but not
necessarily identical graphs. In the example from computer vision, the query image might be
slightly diﬀerent from a target image in the database, which results in small diﬀerences in the
segment graphs; we do not want this to prevent a match in the database. For this reason,
there has been considerable interest in approximate graph matching [35, 98].
In the context of social networks privacy, we show that a de-anonymization problem can
be expressed as an approximate graph matching problem, with the goal being to match the
nodes of two structurally similar (but not identical) large graphs, and thus to re-identify the
nodes of the anonymized graph. This is of course a NP hard problem, and we elaborate on
our approach further below.
1.2 Dynamics of Social Networks
Various works model the behavior of social networks and their underlying properties. Some
signiﬁcant advances in this ﬁeld include Kleinberg’s works on navigability, link prediction,
group formation, and on anonymity in social networks [48, 66, 8, 7], the works of Leskovec
et al. on densiﬁcation, on the evolution of real graphs, and on the patterns of inﬂuence
in recommendation networks [63, 61, 57, 54, 58, 64], Newman’s work on the structure of
2In the sense that the threshold function for asymmetry in the G(n, p) random graph model is only p =
log(n)/n [16, 44].
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
growing social networks [45], the studies of online social networks by Kumar et al. [9, 47],
and Barabasi’s works on scale-free networks and preferential attachment model [11, 10, 47].
Most of the works on complex networks focus on static scenarios. Recently, the investi-
gation of the dynamics of social networks and their growth over time has gained attention as
well. With the increasing availability of network data, data mining and analysis has become
a promising direction to investigate the dynamics of such networks [33, 72], and to answer
questions such as: How does a social network evolve over time? How does the network struc-
ture change? What can we say about the dynamics of edges and nodes of the social graph?
Answers to these questions shed light on the evolution of social and, in general, complex net-
works, and they help us understand the network dynamics over time. Besides investigating
network features by using real data, another direction of work is the development of plausible
mathematical models that can explain or capture the observed properties. Several models
have been proposed to capture social networks evolution [56, 83, 32, 52, 26].
Our contribution to this rich body of work includes a novel explanation for the densification
phenomenon in complex networks. Densiﬁcation is a phenomenon recently observed in the
evolution of social networks by Leskovec et al. in [63, 61]. They investigated several complex
and social networks, and observed that as the network evolves over time, the number of
edges grows faster than the number of nodes, and the average degree increases over time.
They propose a growth model called forest fire model that explains densiﬁcation as a result
of network growth, and the tendency of newly arrived nodes to generate more links to the
existing nodes. Densiﬁcation is a surprising phenomenon: Traditionally, in the study of the
evolution of networks, the average degree was assumed to be ﬁxed, and independent of the
network size, whereas this recent ﬁnding suggests that a node is likely to generate more links
when it arrives later in the process. In other words, the average number of connections of an
individual increases as the size of the global network increases! This being counter-intuitive,
we seek an alternative explanation for densiﬁcation. We elaborate on our contribution in the
end of this chapter.
1.3 Edge Sampling
Graph sampling is a mathematically tractable yet eﬃcient method for social networks analysis.
Taking samples of a large graph is an established method for acquiring a representative sample
of the graph. In many real scenarios, the graph is huge, and many known algorithms for
computing interesting graph measures (such as shortest path, centrality, betweenness, degree
distribution, and clustering coeﬃcient) are impractical for large graphs. Hence, the need to
use graph sampling in practical scenarios, in order to estimate the properties of the original
graph based on the samples.
Diﬀerent sampling methods are proposed in the literature, and their performance in es-
timating various parameters of the original graph are evaluated [59, 101, 92, 91]. Some of
these methods include sampling from the edges, sampling nodes, frontier sampling, and graph
traversal techniques such as random walks, breadth-ﬁrst search, and depth-ﬁrst search. The
choice of the sampling technique heavily depends on the application. For instance, as shown
in [101], neither of the state-of-the-art graph sampling algorithms estimate well both clus-
tering coeﬃcient and degree distribution. Moreover, they show that the eﬃciency of each
method also depends on the social network dataset. Recently, and with the growth of social
networks, researchers have adopted the traditional sampling methods and proposed sampling
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algorithms for unbiased sampling of online social networks [100, 31].
In this thesis, we use graph sampling as a way to model an observed instance of a network.
Note that in this work we do not intend to estimate properties of the original graph from
the sampled graph. Instead, we suggest that an observed graph can be a sample of a hidden
ﬁxed underlying graph. In other words, we assume that there exists a hidden ﬁxed network
of all possibly existing connections in the background, and each graph that we observe is
just a sample of this underlying graph. The intuition behind our approach is that in many
social networks, e.g., online social networks, e-mail networks, recommendation networks, etc.,
usually only a portion of the whole network is observable, obtained either through crawling
techniques from the web, or as publicly available data. This can be treated as a sample of an
underlying hidden network.
More speciﬁcally, we introduce a simple model called edge sampling : Assuming we have
a ﬁxed underlying graph, to obtain the sampled graph, we sample each edge with some ﬁxed
probability independent of all other edges. Doing this, each sampling of the underlying graph
yields one realization of the sampled graph.
We use the edge sampling model introduced above in the two core parts of this thesis,
namely the privacy and dynamics of social networks, as follows:
Structural Similarity We use the sampling model as a way to model the structural similar-
ity between two graphs. As described above (and further elaborated in the contributions
section), our de-anonymization problem can be expressed as the problem of matching
two structurally similar graphs. To model the notion of similarity, we assume the two
graphs are edge-sampled from an underlying graph, where the sampling probability s
(for each edge) controls the structural similarity of the two graphs. In the case of a
social network, the underlying graph corresponds to the true relationships between in-
dividuals, and the two sampled graphs correspond to incomplete manifestations of the
underlying graph (e.g., observable interactions between people, such as phone calls and
e-mails), or observations of the same network at diﬀerent points in time. Notice that s
controls the correlation between the two graphs: For s = 1, the two graphs are identical
and equal to the underlying graph, whereas for smaller s, the graphs overlap, and the
amount of overlap depends on s.
Network Evolution We use the edge sampling model as a way to observe dynamic networks
and to model network growth. The intuition behind this choice of sampling method is
the following: We argue that in many empirical studies of complex networks, it is the
links (or edges) that are observed directly, and the nodes (or vertices) are only revealed
indirectly through the observation of links. For example, most studies of e-mail networks
are based on a log of e-mail messages. An e-mail message exchanged between two e-
mail addresses a and b is taken as evidence of a social link (a, b). At the same time,
this message reveals the nodes a and b if these nodes were not already known. We
believe that the direct observation of edges, which at the same time gradually reveals
the nodes, is a feature of most empirical studies of complex networks. The whole social
communications graph is not totally revealed, and what we observe is just a sample of
an underlying hidden graph.
Using this intuition, we argue that network growth is at least partially explained by the
gradual observation of nodes and links that exist permanently “in the background”. In
other words, there exists a ﬁxed underlying network that is not directly observable. For
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example, this network might represent the people in a large organization, and the social
and professional ties that bind them. An edge of this network can be observed only once
this edge “ﬁres” (is sampled), e.g., a message is sent over this edge. We believe that in
many situations, it is reasonable to assume that such a hidden network exists, which
changes on a time-scale much longer than the sampling process. The network growth
can then be modeled as a direct consequence of the edge sampling process, i.e., each
snapshot of the network corresponds to a graph sampled from the underlying graph and
a diﬀerent edge-sampling probability.
We further elaborate on the use of the sampling model in the corresponding chapters.
1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, we address two fundamental issues in the analysis of social and complex net-
works: (1) privacy, and (2) dynamics. We make the following contributions:
De-Anonymizing Social Networks We investigate the problem of de-anonymizing the
users of a social network and show that anonymization is not suﬃcient to keep the
network private. Our contributions are two-fold:
1. We answer the following question: Can we assume that a suﬃciently sparse network
is inherently anonymous, in the sense that even with unlimited computational
power, de-anonymization is impossible? We consider the scenario where an attacker
has access to (1) the target network, an unlabeled graph of social network users,
and (2) an auxiliary labeled graph of the same users, where the user relationships
(edges) are correlated, but not equal, with the other graph. We ascertain the
conditions under which we can establish a perfect matching between the nodes
of the two graphs, thus de-anonymize the unlabeled graph. Our approach is to
introduce a random graph model for this version of the de-anonymization problem;
this model is parameterized by the expected node degree and a similarity parameter
that controls the correlation between the two graphs over the same vertex set.
We ﬁnd on these parameters simple conditions that delineate the boundary of
privacy, and we show that the mean node degree need grow only slightly faster
than log n with network size n for nodes to be identiﬁable. Our results have policy
implications on sharing anonymized network information [86].
2. We consider the same settings as above and propose an eﬃcient and scalable al-
gorithm to ﬁnd the correct matching between the nodes. Although approximate
graph matching for small networks has received considerable attention in the liter-
ature, heuristics for large-scale matching have appeared only recently and require
an initial seed set of known pairs of corresponding nodes. We present a new graph
matching algorithm that relies on a probabilistic model of the two graphs to be
matched. This allows us to develop a clean Bayesian framework and to express
graph matching as a bipartite matching problem. We construct an algorithm that
builds the map incrementally and without any initial seed set. Our method is the
ﬁrst to express approximate graph matching of large graphs in a statistical frame-
work and can be used to de-anonymize social networks, as well as several other
graph matching applications [85].
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Dynamics of Social Networks We provide a novel explanation for a recently observed
phenomenon in the evolution of social and complex networks: Network densification
occurs when the number of edges grows much faster than the number of nodes as the
network evolves over time. In our approach, we use an interesting observation of how
real network data is gathered and used: in many empirical studies we observe edges, and
nodes are inferred only indirectly through the edges. Leveraging on this, we propose
a new model called edge sampling to explain how densiﬁcation arises. Our model is
innovative, as we consider a ﬁxed underlying graph and a process that discovers this
graph by probabilistically sampling its edges. We show that this model possesses several
interesting features and, in particular, that edges and nodes discovered can exhibit
densiﬁcation. Moreover, we show that there is a direct relationship between densiﬁcation
and the underlying graph possessing a heavy-tailed degree distribution. In other words,
that almost all real graphs densify, because they have a skewed degree distribution.
Our theoretical ﬁndings are supported by numerical evaluations of the model, together
with performance evaluation on real data. Our results show that densiﬁcation can be
explained as an observation bias, rather than being a real network property, and that
edge sampling is indeed a plausible alternative explanation for densiﬁcation [84].
Privacy-Preserving Social Recommender Systems We propose a novel method for pri-
vacy preservation in collaborative ﬁltering recommendation systems. We address the
problem of protecting the users’ privacy in the presence of an untrusted central server,
where the server has access to user proﬁles. To avoid privacy violation, we propose a
mechanism where users store an oﬄine proﬁle locally, hidden from the server, and an
online proﬁle on the server from which the server generates the recommendations. The
online proﬁles of diﬀerent users are frequently synchronized with their oﬄine versions
in an independent and distributed way. Using a graph theoretic approach, we develop
a model where over time each user randomly contacts other users and modiﬁes his own
oﬄine proﬁle through a process known as aggregation. To evaluate the privacy of the
system, we apply our model to the Netﬂix prize dataset to investigate the privacy-
accuracy tradeoﬀ for diﬀerent aggregation types. We show that such a mechanism leads
to a high level of privacy through a proper choice of aggregation functions but has a
marginal negative eﬀect on the accuracy of the recommendation system [97].
1.5 Thesis Outline
The thesis has three parts.
Part I, which contains the main body of this work, is devoted to the de-anonymization
of social networks. In Chapter 2 we explain the de-anonymization problem, express de-
anonymization as a graph matching problem, and survey the related work in the subject. In
Chapter 3 we present our theoretical approach to the matching problem, introduce the model
for generating two similar graphs, and - via a rigorous proof - derive the conditions on the
network parameters under which de-anonymization is feasible. In Chapter 4 we propose an
iterative Bayesian method for the eﬃcient matching of large sparse graphs, and thus network
de-anonymization.
In Part II (Chapter 5) we introduce our innovative model to explain network evolution,
and more speciﬁcally, network densiﬁcation. Finally, in Part III (Chapter 6) we propose a
novel privacy-preserving algorithm for collaborative ﬁltering social recommender systems.

Part I
Models for Matching Large
Networks
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2 Network De-Anonymization
The emergence of online social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace and Linkedin
with hundreds of millions of users implies that an unprecedented amount of user data is now
in the hands of the providers of such services. Not surprisingly, the fair use of this information,
the appropriate notions of privacy and security, and the technical and legal tools to control
its sharing and dissemination have become controversial and hotly debated problems in the
scientiﬁc community and beyond. A major issue that arises as a result of the popularity
of online social networks is users’ privacy. Many online, and almost all oﬄine networks
(e.g, phone calls, e-mail networks, etc.) provide their users with some privacy measures.
More speciﬁcally, the access to users’ identities and their relationships is restricted to prevent
attackers from fetching sensitive information about network users.
In order to protect users’ privacy and preserve their personally identiﬁable information,
network owners anonymize the network through replacing users’ identities with random unique
identiﬁers, before the release of the data for research or marketing purposes. However, recently
it has been shown that even anonymized users could be re-identiﬁed through relying on
auxiliary information obtained from an external source. It is clear that the availability of side
information (e.g., class labels for users such as from demographic information, or richer link
information such as directed interactions, time stamps) can further aide an attacker for the
re-identiﬁcation of users. This motivates us to explore the anonymity of social networks and
to investigate the robustness of anonymized network data to de-anonymization attacks.
In the current chapter and also Chapters 3 and 4, we highlight our approach and contribu-
tions to the network de-anonymization problem. We investigate a realistic scenario where we
assume that the only exposed information is the structure of an anonymized social network,
and our goal is to de-anonymize all users in the network by using auxiliary information, and
yet only structural information, from some other publicly available social graph. We elaborate
on this in the next section.
2.1 Network De-Anonymization: a Matching Problem
The following important observation is behind our approach: In most real cases, although
nodes are anonymized in the released data of social networks, the structure of the graph is
preserved. Network owners and operators usually anonymize users’ data yet preserve the
relationships between anonymous users, in order that the fully anonymized graph can still be
used for research or application purposes. This is equivalent to having access to an unlabeled
graph. Furthermore, we assume that an attacker has access to a similar but labeled network,
in which user identities are known. Such a network can be obtained for example from public
data (e.g., through mining a public social network on the web), or inferred from other sources.
This type of attack is also considered in [78].
To give a concrete example, we ask whether it would be safe for an academic institution
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to release a database of anonymized e-mail or call logs, if an attacker has available to him a
correlated but highly incomplete set of likely social links between the staﬀ and students of
that institution (e.g., by mining the public website of groups, departments, and so on). Could
an attacker use this incomplete side information to reverse-engineer the anonymized identities
in the database, and therefore the communication pattern of this university? More generally,
most of us have many diﬀerent online identities that are in diﬀerent hands, and the social
links in these diﬀerent domains are probably not completely identical, but correlated. For
instance, notice that in many online social networks, there are proﬁles that exist in several
networks, e.g., a user with a proﬁle on Facebook and Twitter, or a user is a member of two
local networks such as a phone network and e-mail network in an organization. It is true that
such networks exhibit similar structural properties, although the edge sets of the two graphs
do not match perfectly (e.g., I do not have the exact same friend list in Twitter and Facebook,
but my friend lists overlap).
Here, we assume that the attacker only has the graph structure for the re-identiﬁcation
of nodes. Our goal is to establish a mapping between the nodes of two structurally similar
graphs, and thus introducing a way to re-identify nodes in an anonymized network by using
the known identities of the other network. We can summarize our de-anonymization problem
as finding the correct mapping between the nodes of two structurally similar graphs without
relying on node identities, which we call approximate graph matching.
In this dissertation, we explore the problem of approximate graph matching explained
above. Although we explain the problem for the speciﬁc case of network de-anonymization,
our results in this thesis can be applied in general to any kind of approximate graph matching
problem, in which we intend to match the nodes of two similar graphs by using only their
structures. In order to model the similarity of two networks, we use the notion of graph
sampling introduced in Chapter 1 to develop a model of similar or correlated graphs. We
elaborate on this in Chapters 3 and 4.
Our contributions fall into two categories, which include the core part of the thesis in the
next two chapters:
1. Theoretical aspect of graph matching : We assess the feasibility of graph matching by
using only network structures, and we establish fundamental conditions (depending on
graph structures) for matching to be feasible in theory (Chapter 3).
2. Algorithmic aspect of graph matching : We propose a clean statistical framework, to-
gether with an iterative algorithm for matching two large correlated sparse graphs
(Chapter 4).
2.2 Related Work
We brieﬂy summarize the related work in network de-anonymization and approximate graph
matching. The works can be categorized as follows:
1. Research works relevant to network modeling with direct application for de-anonymizing
users in social networks.
2. Research works in the area of graph isomorphism and approximate graph matching,
mostly from applications in machine learning and pattern recognition problems.
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In the ﬁrst category, in [78], Narayanan et al. propose a novel algorithm, based purely on
network topology, for de-anonymizing social networks. Their work is closest to our work in
problem settings, where they use structural information to de-anonymize graphs of a very
large size. Their method uses the cosine similarity between nodes and introduces a propa-
gation algorithm to match all nodes. In a similar work [76], Narayanan et al. introduce a
new simulated annealing-based weighted graph matching algorithm for the seeding step of
de-anonymization; they also show how to combine de-anonymization with link prediction. In
addition to the graph structures, both approaches above depend on the extraction of a small
subset of correctly mapped nodes, used as seeds for mapping the remaining nodes. Further-
more, their method requires backtracking and revisiting the mapped nodes, through visual
inspection or manual interventions.
Also in [77] and [75], Narayanan et al. present de-anonymization methodologies for sparse
micro-data to de-anonymize movie viewing records in the Netﬂix Prize dataset and to identify
authors based on their writing style through comparison with a corpus of texts of known
authorship.
Backstrom et al. introduce active and passive attacks for the de-anonymization of social
networks [7]. They show how target users can be identiﬁed in a very large network by
identifying a neighborhood subgraph around the user using only network structure. They
investigate the eﬀectiveness of these attacks both theoretically and empirically. A limitation
of active attacks is the necessity of creating fake (dummy) nodes in the social network before
its release (which is of course a strong limitation in practice), while passive attacks are capable
of re-identifying only a limited number of users, but without the need for fake nodes. Thus,
the method works best for the de-anonymization of specific users within the network, or a
small fraction of all users. A similar attack model is analyzed in [40], where an attacker is
allowed to issue queries that reveal a k-hop subgraph around a target node; they analyze the
privacy risk to the identity of the target node and to the presence of speciﬁc links, both using
random graph models and real data.
Wondracek et al. [105] introduce a de-anonymization technique based on group member-
ship information of individuals in social networks. They show that information about the
group memberships of a user is often suﬃcient to uniquely identify this user, or at least to
signiﬁcantly reduce the set of possible candidates and to assess the feasibility of the attack
both theoretically and empirically.
In the second category, mainly in the area of pattern recognition and machine learning,
several techniques have been proposed for exact and approximate graph matching. In [82],
Cordella et al. propose a so-called VF algorithm as a solution for exact subgraph matching,
or subgraph isomorphism, exhibiting less complexity compared to the famous Ullmann back-
tracking algorithm [99]. In [98], Tian and Patel suggest an approximate graph matching tool
(TALE) through a novel indexing method that incorporates graph structural information in
a hybrid index structure. Some other methods, proposed for approximate graph matching
and used mainly for matching patterns or images, include random walks on graphs [35], using
EM algorithm and singular value decomposition [67], and the Bayesian edit-distance criterion
[95, 74]. Hancock et al. study graph matching in pattern recognition area in several works
[28, 38, 106, 27]. Although in some of these works the structural information for matching
graphs is used, the approximate matching problem in such cases is generally deﬁned as node
mismatches or inconsistencies of node attributes. Also, because of the complexity of ma-
trix manipulation and computation of complex probability distributions, such methods are
generally not feasible for application to large networks.
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Some of the works in the second category speciﬁcally focus on a Bayesian approach to
graph matching [103, 104, 89, 12]. In most of these approaches, the goal is to match a source
graph to one of the multiple correlated target graphs, thus diﬀering from our approach to
match all users of two correlated networks.
Our contribution to this existing body of work is (i) to introduce a mathematically
tractable, parsimonious model for the problem of matching two similar graphs and to derive
asymptotic bounds in terms of fundamental parameters for network anonymity, independently
of speciﬁc algorithms, and (ii) to propose a novel algorithm for graph matching - based on a
Bayesian framework for computing the likelihood of matching for two graphs - that iteratively
maps nodes using only structural properties of the graphs and without any prior information
of any previously mapped nodes.
3 A Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, we pursue a theoretical approach to the matching problem, and formulate the
vulnerability of a network to de-anonymization as a function of its structural similarity with
an auxiliary network.
In the literature, we still lack a thorough understanding of the conditions under which
de-anonymization is feasible. We want to be able to ascertain when a network’s anonymity
can be guaranteed, given the side information and computational resources available to an
attacker. In this work, we make a step in this direction. We study a challenging version
(from the perspective of an attacker) of the matching problem, where the attacker has no
side information about nodes in the network to be attacked, other than network structure,
speciﬁcally a correlated version of the edge set of that network obtained from other sources.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst work to pursue a theoretical treatment
of network de-anonymization problem, and in particular, to consider its feasibility for large
networks. Our contributions in this chapter are three-fold: (1) We explore fundamental
limits for de-anonymization regardless of the speciﬁc algorithm employed, and investigate the
relationship between network parameters and the possibility of guaranteeing anonymity in
such networks. (2) We introduce a mathematically tractable model that captures the notion
of correlated networks, and uses the idea of graph sampling to control the structural similarity
of two graphs. This model is based on random graphs, and can be viewed as a generalization
of the classical automorphism group problem for random graphs [16, chapter 9]. Finally,
(3) we prove that a surprisingly simple and mild condition on the scaling of the expected
degree with the number of nodes is suﬃcient for de-anonymization to be feasible, with strong
implications on privacy.
To summarize, in this chapter we introduce a probabilistic model based on random graphs
for the de-anonymization problem and prove that using such a model, and under plausible
conditions, all nodes of the network can be de-anonymized with high probability. Hereafter,
we elaborate on our motivation and approach. Our key result is that under surprisingly mild
conditions on the model parameters, depending on the extent of the overlap between the two
graphs, it is possible to establish a perfect mapping between the nodes of the two graphs as
the number of nodes grows large.
Our results for approximate graph matching not only exhibit the risk of a privacy breach
in the release of even the most basic information about real networks (i.e., only anonymized
users and their links), but can have useful applications as well. If matching is feasible, we
can combine several “noisy” public (anonymized) versions of social networks obtained from
diﬀerent sources into a more precise, combined network. In another scenario, suppose we have
the call graph between all the phone numbers in an organization, and the graph of e-mail
exchanges between e-mail addresses in this same organization. We could then establish the
correspondence between phone numbers and e-mail addresses solely through the structure of
the two social networks (which we expect to be similar but not exactly equal).
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We should emphasize that this chapter only addresses the feasibility of de-anonymization.
This amounts to establishing that there exists a cost function over the two graphs, such that
minimizing this function ﬁnds the correct matching with high probability. We do not address
the computational complexity of this process. We defer the algorithmic aspect of the matching
problem, i.e., how to ﬁnd this correct mapping, to Chapter 4.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we formally deﬁne the
de-anonymization problem, introduce a mathematical model for approximate graph matching,
and deﬁne the error measure used in the matching problem. Section 3.2 is the core of this
chapter where we prove that in our model, perfect matching is feasible under mild conditions
on the expected degree of the graphs and on their similarity. In Section 3.3 we discuss
numerical experiments using social network data to justify the assumptions in our model.
Finally, in Section 3.4 we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the result.
3.1 Problem Definition
We deﬁne the problem of matching the vertex sets of two graphs. To model the structural
similarity of the two graphs, we use the idea of edge sampling introduced in Chapter 1.
Furthermore, we assume that the underlying graph is a realization of the class of random
graphs G(n, p), and call our model G(n, p; s) model, where s corresponds to the edge sampling
probability. The G(n, p; s) random graph model generates two similar graphs G1,2 over the
same vertex set. As mentioned before, the goal is to match the vertices of two unlabeled
graphs whose edge sets are correlated but not necessarily equal. The basis for our model is
its parsimony and symmetric structure, ingredients for its mathematical tractability.
As mentioned earlier, the model assumes that the observed networks G1,2 are incomplete
manifestations of a true underlying network G of relationships. For example, the edges of
G might represent the true relationships between a set of people, while G1,2 capture the
observable interactions between these people, such as communications (e-mail, phone calls,
proximity, and so on), or “friend”-relationships in a social network. G1,2 might alternatively
represent observations of the same network at diﬀerent points in time.
To elaborate on this, let G = (V,E) be a generator graph with vertex set V and edge
set E. We assume here that G is an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph G(n, p) with n nodes, where
every edge exists with identical probability p, independently of all the other edges. For a fixed
realization of G = G(n, p), we generate two graphs G1,2 = (V,E1,2) by sampling the vertex
set E twice. More precisely, each edge e ∈ E is in the edge set of E1,2 with probability s,
independently of everything else. As a result, the sample graphs G1,2 are themselves Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi random graph G(n, ps), but their edge sets are correlated, in that the existence of an
edge in E1 implies that the existence of this edge in E2 is more likely than unconditionally
(provided p < 1 and s > 0) (see Fig. 3.1). The G(n, p) model has been widely used in the
study of complex and social networks [15, 46, 80, 5], which makes it a plausible candidate for
the study of the approximate matching problem.
Our goal is to determine whether it is possible to ﬁnd the correct mapping between the
nodes of G1 and G2, assuming we only see unlabeled versions of these two graphs (and without
access to the generator G). This is equivalent to the assumption that the two graphs have
diﬀerent vertex label sets that contain no information about the graphs, such as random labels
allocated in an anonymization procedure. Using this model, our problem can be viewed as
the generalization of the classic automorphism group problem in random graphs. We discuss
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Figure 3.1: Sampling process applied to the underlying graph G, resulting in the two sampled
graphs G1 and G2 to be matched.
this and also the eﬀect of the choice of other graph models at the end of Section 3.2 and also
in Section 3.4.
We formally deﬁne the graph matching problem as follows. We assume that G1,2 are only
available in unlabeled form (or equivalently, with two arbitrary and unknown sets of labels).
Let π denote a permutation on V , i.e., one way of mapping vertices from G1 onto G2. The
number of such permutations is n!. The identity permutation, denoted by π0, is the correct
mapping between the nodes of G1 and G2. We seek an error (cost) function over the set of
permutations, which succeeds if it is uniquely minimized by π0.
Therefore, to solve the matching problem, we are interested in showing the following:
Among all possible permutations between the two vertex sets, the identity permutation π0
is the permutation that minimizes a cost function, giving the node matching between the two
graphs.
The cost function should measure to what extent the structures of graphs G1 and G2
resemble each other under a given permutation. The structural diﬀerence can be viewed as
the diﬀerence between the corresponding edge sets. This idea has also been investigated in
the ﬁeld of pattern recognition where the edge-consistency of two graph patterns (in matching
a data graph to a model graph) is used to obtain the correspondence errors [74, 67].
We introduce the cost function as the error measure for edge-inconsistency, considering
only the structures of two graphs G1(V,E1) and G2(V,E2). The matching error ∆ can be
generally deﬁned as
∆π =
∑
e∈E1
1{π(e)/∈E2} +
∑
e∈E2
1{π−1(e)/∈E1}, (3.1)
where 1{A} denotes the indicator function. In other words, permutation π deﬁnes a mapping
between the nodes of G1 and G2, and ∆ counts the number of edges that exist in one graph
with the corresponding edges not existing in the other graph under matching π. This is the
simplest error function that can be assumed for such a setting when comparing the structures
of two graphs. Although this cost function not necessarily optimal (depending on the graph
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model) nor computationally eﬃcient, it lend itself to probablistic analysis. It is now suﬃcient
to ﬁnd the condition under which, among all possible mappings, the identity mapping π0
minimizes the error function. This condition is indeed a threshold on sampling probability,
as we would expect the matching to be easier for highly overlapping graphs, and vice versa.
Speciﬁcally, we prove below that if the sampling probability s is beyond some threshold, as n
grows large, the identity permutation π0 minimizes the error function (3.1). In other words,
for s larger than this threshold, if we enumerate all permutations and assume n! possible
mappings for the two graphs, the permutation that gives the minimum error will be the
correct mapping between the nodes.
We reiterate that in this chapter we do not address the algorithmic aspects of de-anonymization,
including the computational complexity of enumerating all mappings and computing their er-
ror. Instead, we next show conditions on the model parameters such that minimizing the
error function is almost surely equivalent to identifying the correct mapping using only the
structures of the two sampled graphs, i.e., we show that de-anonymization is feasible, and it
is not possible to guarantee anonymity.
3.2 Conditions for Perfect Matching
Following the model introduced in Section 3.1, we state the main theorem of this chapter,
followed by its proof.
Theorem 3.2.1 For the G(n, p; s) matching problem with s = ω(1/n) and p→ 0, if
ps · s2 = 8log n
n
+ ω(n−1), (3.2)
then the identity permutation π0 minimizes the error criterion (3.1) a.a.s
1, yielding perfect
matching of the vertex sets of G1 and G2.
2
Proof We denote by ∆0 the error induced by the identity permutation and ∆π the error
induced by the permutation π. Figure 3.2 depicts two possible mappings between the same
G1 and G2 shown in Figure 3.1 corresponding to the identity mapping π0 and a permutation
π2 (in which all nodes are ﬁxed except two) respectively, together with their error.
To show the result, we deﬁne Πk on V as the set of all permutations that ﬁx n−k nodes and
permute k nodes, calling them an order-k permutation. The number of such permutations,
referred to as “rencontre numbers”, is as follows [94]:
|Πk| = R(n, n− k) =
(
n
k
)
· (!k), (3.3)
where !k is the subfactorial of k, denoting the number of permutations of k objects in which no
object appears in its natural place. It is easily veriﬁed that R(n, n−k) can be upper-bounded
as follows:
|Πk| =
(
n
k
)
· (!k) ≤
(
n
k
)
·
(
k!
2
)
≤ nk. (3.4)
1a.a.s: asymptotically almost surely, i.e., with probability going to 1 as the number of nodes n goes to
infinity. In general, asymptotic refers to the behavior for n→∞.
2We use the standard asymptotic notation (o, O, ω, Ω, and θ).
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The random variables introduced below are indexed by n, which we omit unless required
by the context. We deﬁne
Sk =
∑
π∈Πk
1{∆pi≤∆0}.
Sk counts the number of order-k permutations for which the number of matching errors is
at most that of the identity permutation. Thus, S =
∑n
k=2 Sk is the total number of false
matches. The expected number of errors can be computed as:
E [S] =
n∑
k=2
E [Sk] =
n∑
k=2
∑
π∈Πk
E
[
1{∆pi≤∆0}
]
=
n∑
k=2
∑
π∈Πk
P {∆π −∆0 ≤ 0} ,
where the expectation is over G(n, p; s).
Figure 3.2: The identity permutation π0 versus a permutation π2 ∈ Π2 that mismatches k = 2
vertices for mapping G1 to G2. The error in each case corresponds to the number of edges in
one graph with the mapped edge not existing in the other graph. Thus, ∆0 = 8 and ∆π2 = 10,
where ∆0 is the edge diﬀerence as a result of the sampling process, and ∆π2 is induced by
both the sampling process and the wrong mapping of two nodes in π2.
S counts the total number of non-identity permutations that minimize the error, and we
need to show that with high probability no such permutations exist. By the First Moment
Method (following Markov’s inequality), since S is a non-negative integer-valued random
variable, to show that P {S = 0} → 1, it suﬃces to show that E[S]→ 0.
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Using this method and substituting (3.4) in the above, it is then suﬃcient to show that
E [S] ≤
n∑
k=2
nk max
π∈Πk
P {∆π −∆0 ≤ 0} → 0. (3.5)
We bound the error probability for a ﬁxed order-k permutation π, i.e., we bound the
probability term in (3.5). For permutation π, let Vπ be the set of vertices for which v 6= π(v),
and let Eπ = Vπ × V , i.e., the set of possible edges between one or two vertices mismatched
under π. Note that every edge satisfying e 6= π(e) is in Eπ. The inverse is not true, because
transpositions in π (a pair (u, v) such that π(u) = v and π(v) = u) induce invariant edges.
The cardinality ek of Eπ is
ek = |Eπ| =
(
k
2
)
+ k(n− k),
where the ﬁrst term is the number of unordered node pairs both in Vπ, and the second term
is the number of unordered node pairs with one node in Vπ.
As every edge e in the complement of Eπ (i.e., in (V × V )−Eπ) is by deﬁnition invariant
under π, they contribute equally to ∆0 and ∆π. Therefore, we can write ∆π−∆0 = Xπ−Yπ,
where
Xπ =
∑
e∈Epi
|1{e∈E1pi} − 1{π(e)∈E2pi}|,
Yπ =
∑
e∈Epi
|1{e∈E1pi} − 1{e∈E2pi}|, (3.6)
with E1,2π = Eπ ∩ E(G1,2), i.e., the set of edges in G1,2 incident to at least one mismatched
vertex. Here, Yπ is the number of errors for the identity permutation within the set Eπ, i.e.,
the number of sampling errors within Eπ. Note that Xπ and Yπ are not independent, because
they are functions of the same random sets E1,2π .
Yπ counts the number of edges in Eπ that are sampled in only one of G1,2, i.e., the number
of sampling errors under the identity permutation. The probability for each possible edge to
be in E(G) and exactly one of G1,2 is 2ps(1 − s). Thus Yπ is binomial with probability
2ps(1− s).
For Xπ, we need to proceed more carefully. Assume π has φ ≥ 0 transpositions. First,
note that each transposition in π induces one invariant edge e = π(e) = π−1(e) in Eπ (such
an edge contributes to Xπ with probability 2ps(1− s)).
The remaining ek − φ edges are not invariant under π. Each pair of such edges (e, π(e))
contributes 1 to Xπ if e ∈ G1 and π(e) 6∈ G2 or vice versa (cf. (3.6)). The probability for
exactly one of two different edges in Eπ to be sampled is 2ps(1 − ps). Note that the terms
in (3.6) are dependent, because conditional on |1{e∈E1pi} − 1{π(e)∈E2pi}| = 1, at least one of e
or π(e) is present in the generator G. Thus, the conditional probability of an adjacent pair
(either (π−1(e), e) or (π(e), π(π(e))) contributing 1 to (3.6) is s(1 − ps). We conservatively
ignore this positive correlation and stochastically lower-bound Xπ by assuming that each pair
of edges (e, π(e)) contributes an i.i.d. Bernoulli with parameter 2ps(1− ps) to (3.6).
Thus, Xπ is stochastically lower-bounded by the sum of two independent binomials
Bi (ek − φ, 2ps(1− ps)) + Bi (φ, 2ps(1− s)), where φ is the number of transpositions in π.
By deﬁnition, a transposition can occur only between two vertices that are both in Vπ. Hence,
φ ≤ ⌊k/2⌋ ≤ k/2.
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Thus, we have
Xπ
(stoch.)
≥ Bi (ek − ⌊k/2⌋, 2ps(1 − ps)) (3.7)
Yπ ∼ Bi (ek, 2ps(1− s)) . (3.8)
We upper-bound the probability of the event {Xπ − Yπ ≤ 0} using the following lemma,
which holds regardless of dependence between Xπ and Yπ:
Lemma 3.2.1 Let X1 and X2 be two binomial random variables with means λ1 and λ2, where
λ2 > λ1. Then,
P {X2 −X1 ≤ 0} ≤ 2 exp
(
−1
8
(λ2 − λ1)2
λ2
)
. (3.9)
Proof Let X1 and X2 be two binomial random variables with means λ1 and λ2. The
probability of the event {X2 −X1 ≤ 0} can be upper-bounded as follows:
P {X2 −X1 ≤ 0} ≤ P {X1 ≥ x}+ P {X2 ≤ x} , (3.10)
for any x.
We now ﬁnd an upper-bound for the right-hand side of (3.10). We use the Chernoﬀ
bounds for the binomial random variables X1 and X2 using the following theorem [44]:
If X ∈ Bi (n, p) and λ = np, then,
P {X > λ+ t} ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2 (λ+ t/3)
)
, t ≥ 0; (3.11)
P {X < λ− t} ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2λ
)
, t ≥ 0. (3.12)
We upper-bound P {X1 ≥ x} and P {X2 ≤ x} using (3.11) and (3.12) (for two arbitrary
positive values of t1 and t2 respectively). We set x = (λ1 + λ2)/2 , and thus t1 = t2 =
(λ2 − λ1)/2. Using λ2 > λ1 allows to bound the two exponents as follows:
P {X1 ≥ x} ≤ exp
(
−1
8
(λ2 − λ1)2
λ1 + (λ2 − λ1)/6
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
(λ2 − λ1)2
λ2
)
, (3.13)
and
P {X2 ≤ x} ≤ exp
(
−1
8
(λ2 − λ1)2
λ2
)
. (3.14)
This completes the proof. 
Now let λπ and λ0 denote the means of Xπ and Yπ respectively, with values,
λπ = 2ps(1− ps)(ek − k/2) (3.15)
λ0 = 2psek(1− s). (3.16)
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Since 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and ek ≃ k(n − k/2), to satisfy λπ > λ0 we need to have,
2ps(1− ps)(k(n− k/2) − k/2) > 2psk(n − k/2)(1 − s)
=⇒ s >
(
1−ps
1−p
) 1
2n− k , (3.17)
which will be satisﬁed for s = ω(1/n) and p→ 0.
Thus, using the above lemma, we obtain,
P {Xπ − Yπ ≤ 0} ≤ 2 exp
− 18 (λπ − λ0)2λπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(n,p,k)
 . (3.18)
Since ps→ 0, substituting (3.15) and (3.16) in (3.18) yields:
f(n, p, k) =
1
8
(2ps ((ek − k/2) − (ek − eks)))2
2ps (ek − k/2)
=
ps
4
((k/2) ((2n− k)s− 1))2
(k/2) (2n− k − 1)
For s = ω(1/n) we have (2n− k)s = ω(1). Thus,
f(n, p, k) ≃ ps
4
(k/2) ((2n− k)s)2
(2n − k)
≃ ps
4
s2 k (n− k/2) . (3.19)
Using (3.4), (3.5), (3.18) and (3.19), we have,
E [S] ≤ 2
n∑
k=2
nk · exp(−f(n, p, k))
(a)≃ 2
n∑
k=2
nk exp
(
−k
(
n− k
2
)
ps
4
· s2
)
(b)
≤ 2
∞∑
k=2
exp
(
k
(
log n− nps
8
· s2
))
, (3.20)
where (a) is derived using (3.19), and (b) uses k ≤ n. The geometric series goes to zero if the
ﬁrst term goes to zero, which is implied by the condition in the statement of the theorem.
This completes the proof. 
A more direct approach to prove the result would be to try to condition on a property of
the underlying graph G and/or of G1,2 that is both asymptotically almost sure, and for which
one could show that uniformly over all permutations π, the number of errors is higher than
for the identity π0. It is diﬃcult to identify such a property that would make the second part
of the problem tractable. Instead, we show the result using a method commonly employed in
the random graph literature [16, 44], which allows us to analyze a ﬁxed permutation π over
the full probability space G(n, p; s).
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A remarkable aspect of our result is that for ﬁxed similarity parameter s, the condition
is ps = 8c log n/n for some c(s) > 1. As expected, c(s) = 1/s2 is monotonically decreasing
in (0, 1), and c(1) = 1. Thus, for an overall edge sampling probability ps of a bit larger than
8 log n/n, with high probability the identity permutation minimizes the error function and
yields the correct mapping. Note that the threshold for the connectivity of G1,2 = G(n, ps)
(and for the disappearance of isolated vertices) is ps = log n/n [16, 44]. It is obvious that it is
impossible to perfectly match a pair of graphs G1,2 when at least one of them possesses more
than one isolated vertex (as these necessarily give rise to multiple permutations with equal
error counts). Therefore, ps = log n/n is a lower bound for zero-error graph matching using
any technique (i.e., any cost function). Our bound for G(n, p; s) matching is therefore tight,
up to a constant function of s.
For the case of s = 1, the approximate graph matching problem is equivalent to the
classical automorphism group problem for random graphs [16]. Speciﬁcally, it is known that
G(n, p) is asymmetric (has an automorphism group of size one) for p = log n/n+ ω(1). This
suggests that the constant c(s) in our result can be improved upon through more reﬁned
bounding techniques. Indeed, we use relatively loose bounds in several places: in particular,
we underestimate the mean of Xπ quite signiﬁcantly by ignoring the positive correlation
(within each cycle of π) in the terms of (3.6); also, we assume the worst-case dependence
between Xπ and Yπ in (3.10), even though they are in reality positively correlated through
the generator G. These bounds are suﬃcient to show the asymptotic result to within a
constant, but more precise techniques akin to those used to show the classical automorphism
result may allow to go further. Another obvious extension of our work would employ other
generator graph structures such as random regular graphs, small world models, or scale free
graphs.
In the following, we further strengthen our results for G(n, p), allowing a small node
mismatch to occur. We show that allowing a small error in matching nodes contributes to a
lower threshold for sampling probability.
3.2.1 Allowing a Fraction of Node Mismatches
In this section, we address the same problem, with the new assumption of letting an ǫ-fraction
of nodes to be mismatched, where epsilon is an arbitrary positive constant less than 1. We
show that tolerating this small error in matching the two graphs, a looser bound (or lower
threshold) for the sampling probability will be achieved. In the following, we show that in
this case, it is suﬃcient for the overall sampling probability ps to be above the threshold
of 8 log n/n by ω(n−2), so that the identity permutation yields the best matching.
Corollary 3.2.1 Consider the random graph G(n, p), and sample its edges twice indepen-
dently with probability s to obtain two sampled versions G1 and G2. For
ps · s2 = 8log n
n
+ ω(n−1),
the identity permutation π0 minimizes the error criterion (3.1) a.a.s., if we allow an ǫ-fraction
of the nodes to be mismatched, where ǫ is an arbitrary constant between zero and 1.
Proof We now tolerate an ǫ-fraction mismatch in the nodes. Thus, for an order-k per-
mutation πk which permutes k nodes, we have k/n < ǫ. So for the permutations contributing
24 Chapter 3. A Theoretical Framework
to the matching error, k should be larger than ǫn. This requires the same analysis as above,
with the only diﬀerence that in the sum in (3.20), k starts from ǫn, which yields:
E [S] ≤
n∑
k=ǫn
(n)kP {Xπ −X0 < 0}
≤ 2
n∑
k=ǫn
nk exp
(
−k
(
n− k
2
)
ps
4
· s2
)
≤ 2
∞∑
k=ǫn
exp
(
k
(
log n− nps
8
· s2
))
=⇒ exp
(
ǫn2
8
(
8 log n
n
− ps s2
))
→ 0 (3.21)
The term above goes to zero if the condition of the corollary holds. 
Note that the result does not depend on ǫ, and holds regardless of the fraction of nodes
chosen. The above result is worth considering when compared with Theorem 3.2.1. Here we
show that allowing a positive fraction of nodes to be mismatched, the threshold for matching
becomes lower (ω(n−2) rather than ω(n−1)). In other words, a small error in matching
yields an improvement to the threshold required for sampling probability. However, this
improvement is not signiﬁcant as it does not change the dominant factor (8 log n/n).
3.2.2 Different sampling rates
Hereby, we generalize the sampling model, allowing G1 and G2 to be edge-sampled with
diﬀerent sampling rates s1 and s2. We would call this a G(n, p; s1, s2) model. This would
cover more realistic graphs, e.g., as in observing G1 and G2 from an underlying graph over
diﬀerent time spans (both being sampled from the same graph), resulting in one graph being
denser than the other (diﬀerent average degrees). We show that we can still ﬁnd the condi-
tions for perfect matching, and we derive a more general result depending on both sampling
probabilities.
Theorem 3.2.2 For the G(n, p; s1, s2) matching problem with
s1s2
s1+s2
= ω(1/n) and p→ 0, if
p
(
s1 + s2
2
) (
2s1s2
s1 + s2
)2
= 8
log n
n
+ ω(n−1), (3.22)
then the identity permutation π0 minimizes the error criterion a.a.s, yielding perfect matching
of the vertex sets of G1 and G2.
Proof The proof would be very similar to the proof of (3.2.1). The only diﬀerence arises
when estimating the random variables Xπ and Yπ, since the probability of the possible edges
would now depend on s1 in G1, and s2 in G2, respectively.
More speciﬁcally, the probability for each possible edge to be in E(G) and exactly one of
G1,2 would be ps1(1−s2)+ps2(1−s1). Thus Yπ is binomial with probability p(s1+s2−2s1s2).
For Xπ, we should again consider the transposition, assuming φ ≥ 0 transpositions exist.
Each transposition in π induces one invariant edge e = π(e) = π−1(e) in Eπ, and such an
edge contributes to Xπ with probability ps1(1− s2) + ps2(1− s1) in this case. As before, the
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remaining ek − φ edges contribute to Xπ, now with probability ps1(1 − ps2) + ps2(1 − ps1),
and we ignore the positive correlation of the edges.
Thus, Xπ is stochastically lower-bounded by the sum of two independent binomials
Bi (ek − φ, p(s1 + s2 − 2ps1s2))+Bi (φ, p(s1 + s2 − 2s1s2)), where φ is the number of trans-
positions in π. We lower-bound φ by k/2 and have,
Xπ
(stoch.)
≥ Bi (ek − ⌊k/2⌋, p(s1 + s2 − 2ps1s2)) (3.23)
Yπ ∼ Bi (ek, p(s1 + s2 − 2s1s2)) . (3.24)
The means of Xπ and Yπ are as follows:
λπ = p(s1 + s2 − 2ps1s2)(ek − k/2) (3.25)
λ0 = p(s1 + s2 − 2s1s2)ek. (3.26)
We will now use Lemma (3.2.1). Since 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and ek ≃ k(n − k/2), to
satisfy λπ > λ0 we need to have,
p(s1 + s2 − 2ps1s2)(k(n − k/2) − k/2) > p(s1 + s2 − 2s1s2)k(n − k/2)
=⇒ s1s2
s1 + s2
>
1
2 ((2n − k)(1− p) + p) , (3.27)
which will be satisﬁed for s1s2s1+s2 = ω(1/n) and p→ 0.
Thus, using Lemma (3.2.1), we obtain,
P {Xπ − Yπ ≤ 0} ≤ 2 exp
− 18 (λπ − λ0)2λπ︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(n,p,k)
 . (3.28)
where,
f(n, p, k) =
1
8
(p ((s1 + s2)(ek − k/2 − ek) + 2s1s2ek))2
p(s1 + s2)(ek − k/2)
=
p(s1 + s2)
8
·
(
(k/2)
(
(2n − k)
(
2s1s2
s1 + s2
)
− 1
))2
(k/2) (2n− k − 1)
For s1s2s1+s2 = ω(1/n), we have (2n − k)
(
s1s2
s1+s2
)
= ω(1). Thus,
f(n, p, k) ≃ p(s1 + s2)
8
(k/2)
(
(2n− k)
(
2s1s2
s1 + s2
))2
(2n− k)
≃ p
(
s1 + s2
2
) (
s1s2
s1 + s2
)2
k (n− k/2) . (3.29)
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Finally, using (3.4), (3.5), and (3.29), we have,
E [S] ≤ 2
n∑
k=2
nk · exp(−f(n, p, k))
(a)≃ 2
n∑
k=2
nk exp
(
−k
(
n− k
2
)
p
(
s1 + s2
2
) (
s1s2
s1 + s2
)2)
(b)
≤ 2
∞∑
k=2
exp
(
k
(
log n− np(s1 + s2)
4
·
(
s1s2
s1 + s2
)2))
, (3.30)
where (a) is derived using (3.29), and (b) uses k ≤ n. The geometric series goes to zero if the
ﬁrst term goes to zero, which is implied by the condition in the statement of the theorem.
This completes the proof. 
The above result establishes the condition for the average sampling rate of the two graphs,
i.e., p(s1 + s2)/2, so that perfect matching is feasible. Note that for s1 = s2 = s, the same
result as in (3.2.1) holds.
3.3 On the Similarity of Real Networks
To be mathematically tractable and parsimonious, our model inevitably embodies several
strong assumptions: (i) the underlying graph is a G = G(n, p) random graph, and the edge
sets of the “visible” graphs G1,2 are sampled (ii) independently and (iii) with identical prob-
ability s from G. Despite these assumptions, we believe that our model and our result on
anonymity conditions have implications for real networks and scenarios. Although we are
unable to explore the validity of our assumptions in full generality, we wish at least to pro-
vide some evidence to justify them. First, it is fairly clear that the underlying graph of a
social network would possess a structure very diﬀerent from a G(n, p), as demonstrated in
many studies illustrating fascinating properties such as skewed degree distributions and the
small-world eﬀect. However, we conjecture that de-anonymizing two networks sampled from
a random graph is harder than more “structured”networks. A random graph is in some sense
“maximally uniform”, and we therefore believe that for other, more realistic hidden graphs G,
de-anonymization might in fact be possible under even weaker conditions. This is of course
a promising and fascinating area for further research. Second, we consider de-anonymization
successful if the error function ∆(.) has a unique minimum at π0. We argue that this function
is not too sensitive to a non-uniform sampling process over the edge set (i.e., assuming each
edge e is sampled with its own sampling rate s(e)), provided the sampling process is similar in
both graphs, and uncorrelated across edges. This is because the impact of this non-uniformity
on X0 and Xπ above would cancel out to a certain extent. On the other hand, if the sampling
process to obtain the two samples G1 and G2 were very diﬀerent, then this could make de-
anonymization much harder. For example, if the sampling rate over some subset of vertices
were atypically large in G1 compared to the rest, but atypically large for a different subset
in G2, then these two high-rate subsets would be likely to be falsely matched. Therefore, it
appears that de-anonymization would be quite sensitive to such diﬀerences in the sampling
process for G1 and G2.
While we have not quantiﬁed the above argument, it did lead us to explore the stability of
the sampling process through some numerical experiments. In order to motivate and illustrate
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Figure 3.3: Estimated average edge overlap among overlapped nodes for EPFL internal net-
work, as a function of window size and distance.
the concept of similarity between networks, and also verify the assumption of independence
in sampling the edges, we present an example of a real social network: an e-mail graph, in
which nodes represent e-mail addresses and edges represent message exchanges. The network
evolves in time through the observation of new messages that are exchanged.
We consider a dataset of e-mail messages collected at the mail server of EPFL. The
dataset includes logs of e-mail exchanges among users on a weekly basis for a period of 75
weeks. In our dataset, the e-mail exchanges among EPFL users is considered (i.e., internal
EPFL network). The dataset includes snapshots of the network aggregated by week, such
that timestamps are in the timescale of weeks (i.e., all messages sent in a particular week have
the same timestamp). Using such dataset, we construct the e-mail network of each week for
the internal EPFL network.
Having introduced the above, we investigate the similarity between diﬀerent snapshots
of the network, each being a sample of an underlying hidden e-mail network. Note that in
order to map real data to our sampling model, the existence of a hidden underlying graph
(including all possible e-mail exchanges over all times) is inevitable - to which we do not have
access. However, measuring the amount of edge overlap between diﬀerent snapshots gives
us an estimation of the similarity degree between diﬀerent network samples, or whether the
graphs are the outcome of similar sampling processes. Also, since two network snapshots
do not contain the same number of nodes necessarily, we estimate the edge overlap as the
proportion of edges among overlapped nodes that exist in both graphs.
To accomplish the above, we need to pick two networks to be compared. We randomly
choose a starting timestamp ts (week number) in the entire dataset, and construct the ﬁrst
graph starting from ts accumulated over a window size of τ weeks. For the second graph,
we build it starting from timestamp ts + τ + t− 1, again accumulated over a window size of
τ , where t denotes the time distance between the two graphs (in weeks). In other words, τ
corresponds to the density of the graph (the larger it is, the denser the graph will be), and t
implies the time distance between diﬀerent samples. As an example, τ = 1, t = 1 corresponds
to the e-mail network of two consecutive snapshots (each consisting of e-mail exchanges over
a one-week period), whereas τ = 2, t = 3 corresponds to two graphs, each consisting of e-mail
exchanges over a period of τ = 2 weeks, with a time distance of t = 3 weeks. Finally, for
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Figure 3.4: The CDF of the p-values of the Pearson’s Chi-Square test for independence, for
1) random adjacent edge pairs (top curve), 2) random edge pairs in the entire graph (bottom
curve). Using α = 0.05, the test veriﬁes the statistical equivalence of edge pairs in the EPFL
dataset.
each value of τ and t, we repeat the random choice of the networks 30 times and compute the
average.
Figure 3.3 depicts the estimated average edge overlap as a function of the windows size
and time distance. It can be observed that the estimated edge overlap is quite signiﬁcant, and
it also exhibits a small increase as τ increases and t decreases, which matches intuition since
it is expected that two larger and denser networks have more overlap, and as the samples
are farther apart the overlap decreases. However, this change is small over a wide span of
the density and distance values. Thus, the graph similarity is fairly robust over diﬀerent
densities and distances. The experiment shows that two graphs sampled from a hidden
underlying graph (a hidden overall e-mail network in this case) are similar in structure (even
if the sampling processes are non-uniform), with the sampling process being quite stable over
diﬀerent intervals.
Finally, we verify the assumption of independent edge sampling in our model, through
looking at the correlation among the edges. In general, the emergence of an edge might
correlate with the existence of other edges. In order to investigate how far the independence
assumption is from reality, we examine edge correlation in the EPFL internal network. To
do so, we choose a random pair of edges from the ﬁnal accumulated graph (i.e., τ = 75),
and examine their joint appearance in 75 weekly snapshots. We use the Chi-Square test for
independence to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the appearance
of the two edges. We assume a null hypothesis that two randomly chosen edges e1 and e2
appear independently, and use the Pearson χ2 test to decide whether we should reject the
null hypothesis, separately for each set of 75 edge pair appearances. We compute the χ2
test statistics of each sample set of 75 weeks as X2 =
∑ (Oi,j−Ei,j)2
Ei,j
, i, j = 0, 1, where i
denotes the existence (1) or non-existence (0) mode of e1 (similarly j = 0, 1 for e2), Oi,j is the
observed frequency count of e1 at mode i and e2 at mode j, and Ei,j = ni ∗ nj/n, ni being
the total number of sampled observations of e1 at mode i (similarly nj for e2 at mode j)
and n being the total number of samples (75). The p-value is calculated as P
{
X2 ≤ χ2(1)},
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Figure 3.5: The CDF of the p-values of the Pearson’s Chi-Square test for independence, for 1)
random chain of three edges (top curve), 2) random triple edges in the entire graph (bottom
curve). Using α = 0.05, the test veriﬁes the statistical equivalence of triple edges in the EPFL
dataset.
where χ2(1) is a Chi-Square random variable with one degree of freedom, as the number of
bins for each categorial variable equals 2. We derive the p-value of the test and reject the
independence hypothesis if the p-value is smaller than the signiﬁcance level (α = 0.05 in our
tests). Repeating this for a large number of random edge pairs (800 in our experiments), we
ﬁnd that 93% of the edge pairs are statistically indistinguishable (p-value > α = 0.05).
To strengthen our test even further, we do the same experiment above, by choosing random
pairs of adjacent edges - i.e., edges incident to the same node - thinking that such edges
might express a high correlation. We ﬁnd that even in this case, most edge pairs (72%) are
statistically independent. Figure 3.4 depicts the CDF of p-values found for each selected pair
over 75 weeks, for both experiments. The plot clearly shows that in most cases, p-value is
greater than α, as mentioned above.
Finally, we repeat the above experiments for triple edges , i.e. choosing three random
edges in the accumulated graph, the null hypothesis being that three randomly chosen edges
e1, e2 and e3 appear independently. Again, we consider two cases, one where the edges are
chosen randomly in the entire graph, and the other further correlated version where the edges
are sampled from the set of 3-chains in the graph, i.e. paths of length 3. Figure 3.5 depicts
the CDF of the p-values for each selected triple over 75 weeks, for both experiments, repeated
1000 times. It is observed that 81% of the random triple edges are independent. Further, for
the correlated chain of edges, we observe that 50% of the random 3-chains are statistically
indistinguishable. Further experiments show that as the number of randomly chosen edges
increases, there will be a higher dependence for their joint appearance, as expected.
Our results suggest that the independence assumption clearly does not hold generally, but
many small sets of edges do behave independently. To what extent the i.i.d. assumption built
into our model is realistic, in the sense that it would correctly predict the boundary of privacy
in real networks, is a subject of further investigation.
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3.4 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter, we considered the privacy issue in social networks and investigated the possi-
bility of de-anonymization from a mathematical perspective. We deﬁned the problem in the
context of approximate graph matching, with the goal of ﬁnding the correct mapping between
the node sets of two structurally similar graphs. Using ideas from graph sampling in modeling
evolution of networks, we proposed a probabilistic model to derive two sampled versions of an
underlying graph as “noisy” versions of the networks to be matched. Elaborating our model
for the case of random graphs, we proved that using the simplest matching criterion based
only on network topology, a perfect matching between the nodes can be established with high
probability as the network size grows large, under simple conditions for the sampling process.
More speciﬁcally, we proved that a surprisingly mild condition on the scaling of the expected
degree with the number of nodes is suﬃcient for de-anonymization to be feasible. For this, we
expressed lower bounds for the sampling probability, or more intuitively, the extent of overlap
in the edges of two graphs, so that it yields perfect matching. We also proved that a smaller
threshold for sampling probability is required in the case of a fraction of node mismatches,
which further strengthens our results.
Two conditions in our theorem are s = ω(1/n) and ps→ 0. How these parameters relate
to real networks is of course a crucial and interesting question. Social networks tend to be
sparse (p → 0), and a reasonable assumption may be to assume a ﬁxed average node degree
(p = c/n), as the number of contacts is usually the result of local interactions that should not
be inﬂuenced by the rest of the network3. The scaling of s is more debatable, as it depends
on the nature of the two networks. If G1 and G2 capture the social interactions between a set
of people using diﬀerent methods (e.g., e-mail and phone calls), then it would make sense to
postulate a constant s independent of the size of the network, as the choice of method (i.e.,
generating a link) would be a purely local one, and therefore not inﬂuenced by the rest of the
network. However, more cross-domain data should be studied to verify this.
Our result shows that given a speciﬁc cost function ∆(.), a pair of correlated graphs can be
perfectly matched under certain conditions. An interesting question would be the converse:
can we ﬁnd conditions such that no cost function could give a match? In the G(n, p; s) model,
it is straightforward to show such a converse of the form ps = o(log n/n), as alluded to before.
In this case, G1 and G2 would have isolated vertices a.a.s., and obviously no method would
be able to determine the correct matching among these. More precise converses, as well as
variations of our model (e.g., assuming other generator graphs G) are the topic of future work.
Our work implies the feasibility of de-anonymization of a target network by using the
structural similarity of a known auxiliary network, and raises privacy concerns about sharing
the simplest topological information of users with partners and third-party applications. One
consequence of our work might be guidelines on how to release or share only sampled versions
of networks, by enforcing the sparsity constraint to guarantee anonymity. This would be
promising provided such a thinned-out network would still provide enough information for
the task at hand.
In future, we intend to generalize our approach to a broader class of graphs. As discussed
above, we conjecture that in some sense, a random graph as the generator G may be more
3Note however that recent work on network densification [62] observes a dependence of the form p = cnα−2,
for some α > 1, i.e., an average degree that grows as nα−1 with the size of the network. While the underlying
causes of densification are still being debated [84], it is still the case that p → 0. Note that for fixed s, a
network densifying in this way would always be non-anonymous, as nα−2 = ω(logn/n).
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diﬃcult than a more “structured” graph. On the other hand, the i.i.d. sampling process
in our model is an idealistic assumption, and the impact of relaxing it should be explored.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while this work proves the existence of the perfect
matching using the proposed error function, the algorithmic complexity of searching in such
a vast space should be explored, which is addressed in the following chapter.
Publication [86]
Pedram Pedarsani and Matthias Grossglauser. On the Privacy of Anonymized Net-
works. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery and data mining, KDD ’11, pages 1235–1243, 2011.

4 An Iterative Bayesian Method for
Graph Matching
This chapter explores the algorithmic aspect of the approximate graph matching problem
described in Chapter 3. We demonstrated that by only using the structures of two similar
networks, it is possible to infer the correct mapping between the nodes, under mild conditions
on their similarity and the graph parameters. Our proof assumed an adversary with inﬁnite
computational power, who enumerates all possible n! mappings, computes a cost function for
each mapping, and reports back the mapping with minimum cost as the correct mapping. We
showed that for a random graph model with large number of nodes, this mapping with high
probability corresponds to the correct mapping.
However, although the approach above proves the feasibility of matching two similar
graphs, in practice we need methods for finding this correct mapping efficiently. In other
words, so far, we have shown that network anonymity cannot guarantee privacy. However,
we still have not demonstrated a method for building the actual mapping between the nodes
of the two graphs. Notice that even if the structures of the graphs are exactly the same,
the matching problem is still intractable in practice, as it is similar to the classical graph
isomorphism problem.
The graph isomorphism problem is NP, and matching two similar but not necessarily iden-
tical graphs is at least as hard. This suggests that we have no hope of matching large graphs.
Fortunately, it turns out that many realistic graphs have features that help graph matching.
For example, in pioneering work [78], Narayanan and Shmatikov devise a graph matching al-
gorithm that succeeds in de-anonymizing a social network with millions of nodes, based on an
initial seed set of mapped nodes. Essentially, such methods exploit label-independent features
of nodes that make these nodes easy to identify in both graphs. Such features include the
node degree, the clustering coeﬃcient, or the volume (number of edges) in a neighborhood
around the node.
The algorithm in [78] starts from an initial seed set of mapped node pairs, which may
be obtained manually or through heuristics (e.g., identifying cliques in both graphs). The
algorithm then attempts to identify pairs of unmapped nodes that are neighbors of several
seed nodes; among these pairs, it chooses the one that is best according to a heuristic, and
adds it to the seed set. The algorithm then proceeds iteratively until the whole network is
matched, or the process dies out. This requires (i) a seed set of suﬃcient size1, and (ii) a
suﬃciently dense graph for the process to percolate.
In this work, we propose an algorithm for approximate graph matching that relies on a
rigorous statistical model to infer the node map. The main advantages of this algorithm are
the following:
1Note that in their algorithm, if the seed nodes are all at distance ≥ 3 of each other, the process cannot
start, as there is no candidate node that has more than one mapped neighbor.
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• Starting from scratch: The algorithm does not require an initial seed set of mapped
node pairs as input. The same statistical framework is used to build the map from start
to ﬁnish.
• Sparse graphs: Our approach is particularly well suited to match sparse graphs. The
algorithm is able to make progress even if the mapped nodes are far from each other.
• Confidence metric: Our method maintains an estimate of the likelihood of every
mapped node pair. While this is used by the algorithm to build the map, it is also a
very useful output for some applications, as it essentially provides a level of conﬁdence
for each mapped pair.
Our statistical framework and associated inference algorithm is based on the observation
that in many real networks, some nodes possess features that make them stand out from the
majority of other nodes; these nodes are much easier to map correctly than an average node.
This suggests an incremental mapping process, where we ﬁrst try to map the easiest nodes.
Each node has some ﬁngerprint capturing label-independent metrics of interest. The matching
relies on a cost function over ﬁngerprints. Of course, errors are always possible, given that
the two graphs are similar, but not identical. We deal with this by matching several node
pairs at once through a maximum bipartite matching, rather than matching one node pair at
a time. This is because the former takes into account the costs between all possible pairs in
the set. Each iteration of the algorithm matches a set of nodes, whose size doubles in each
iteration.
The second key contribution concerns the choice of ﬁngerprint and the cost function used
in the bipartite matching. We develop a probabilistic generative model for the two graphs
that we are trying to match. This allows us to embed the matching problem into a clean
Bayesian framework, which leads to a cost function over node pairs which can be interpreted
as the log-likelihood of a correct match given the ﬁngerprints of the two nodes.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we formally deﬁne the problem.
Section 4.2 describes the Bayesian framework underlying our matching algorithm, which is
developed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 reports experimental results over a social network mined
from e-mail exchanges. Section 4.5 contains a short conclusion.
4.1 Problem Definition
We use a similar problem setting as in Chapter 3. We consider the problem of matching
the vertex sets of two graphs. Let G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) denote two graphs with
the same number of nodes, |V1| = |V2| = n, but diﬀerent edge sets. Let π : V1 → V2 be a
mapping that establishes a one-to-one correspondence between nodes of G1 and G2. Assume
there exists a correct mapping π0 between u1 ∈ V1 and u2 ∈ V2. The problem we consider is
determining π0 using as input only G1,2 and no other labeling information.
Finding the correct mapping strongly depends on its relationship to the structure of G1,2.
For example, the correct mapping cannot be attained if one of the edge sets has no (or very
few) edges, since no structural information remains to be explored. Moreover, the problem
is hard even if the two graphs are structurally the same, since this reduces to ﬁnding an
isomorphism between the two graphs, a well-known NP problem.
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For ease of notation, and without loss of generality, we assume from now on that V1 =
V2 = V , and that the true mapping is given by the identity. However, it is important to note
that this notational assumption is not visible to the matching algorithm.
4.2 General Method for Graph Matching
As shown in Chapter 3, conceptually, matching two graphs can be cast as minimizing a cost
function over all n! possible matchings π of the vertex sets of the two graphs G1,2 [86]. As
the computational cost is prohibitive for graphs of non-trivial size, we seek a method to
reduce the search space for π. We achieve this by building π in log2 n phases. In each phase
τ = 0, . . . , log2 n− 1, we double the number of mapped nodes, which we refer to as anchors,
from the previous phase, until we have mapped every node. We let Sτ denote the set of
anchors produced at the end of phase τ . As will become clear, this map is not necessarily
monotonically increasing, in that Sτ ⊂ Sτ+1 need not be true: a node pair can be an anchor
in one phase, but be unmapped at a later phase.
We reduce the complexity of the problem by summarizing the structure of the two graphs
G1,2 as a set of (label-independent) attributes for each node. Then we rely on these node
attributes to match 2τ nodes in each phase τ , used as anchors for the next phase, where
this matching is only a function of the attributes. We call the set of attributes of a node its
fingerprint, and rely on a cost function over pairs of ﬁngerprints to compute the matching.
The matching algorithm is described in detail in the next section; in this section, we deﬁne
the node ﬁngerprints, and the probabilistic model that yields the cost function over pairs of
ﬁngerprints, and its Bayesian interpretation.
To model the similarity of two graphs G1,2, we use the graph sampling idea introduced
in Chapter 1, and used in Chapter 2. The ultimate goal is to obtain a measure of similarity
between two node ﬁngerprints. We assume that the observable graphs G1,2 are obtained
through a sampling process on a (ﬁxed) generator graph G = (V,E). The choice of G is
arbitrary, and we make no assumption on the structure of G. As shown later, the only
information used from G are its degree and distance distributions. Our Bayesian framework
is general, independent of the choice of the sampling process. However, we still need to choose
a sampling process in order to rigorously measure the similarity of node ﬁngerprints. We again
consider the edge sampling process introduced in Chapter 1 to generate G1 and G2 from the
ﬁxed graph G, with sampling probabilities s1 and s2 respectively. We elaborate further on
this choice in Section 4.2.3.
In the following, we ﬁrst formalize the computation of likelihoods and describe one step
of this iterative procedure assuming some nodes have already been mapped. We present the
complete iterative algorithm that incrementally increases the set of mapped nodes in Section
4.3. As later discussed, the ﬁrst phase of the algorithm requires no knowledge of any anchor
nodes.
4.2.1 Pair-Wise Likelihoods
Consider the two observed graphs G1 and G2 and two nodes u1 ∈ V1 and u2 ∈ V2 with their
ﬁngerprints
Fu1 = [X11,X12, . . . ,X1,ℓ,X1,ℓ+1, . . . ,X1,ℓ+m]
Fu2 = [X21,X22, . . . ,X2,ℓ,X2,ℓ+1 . . . ,X2,ℓ+m] , (4.1)
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where each component provides structural evidence for the similarity of u1 and u2. More
speciﬁcally, the components 1, . . . , ℓ are absolute attributes, in that they depend only on the
graphs G1 and G2, respectively. They may include local graph statistics around node u1,2,
such as the node degree, the clustering coeﬃcient, or the density of some neighborhood. For
example, suppose X11 and X21 represent the degrees of nodes u1 and u2. If the two degrees
are quite similar, this is stronger evidence that u1 and u2 are referring to the same underlying
node u ∈ G; if they diﬀer, u1,2 should most likely not be matched.
A key idea in our method is to rely on anchor nodes from the previous phase to obtain
additional node attributes for the current phase. In this way, the matching of nodes in
later phases can build on nodes matched earlier. The components ℓ + 1, . . . ,m, with m =
|Sτ−1| = 2τ−1 are relative attributes, which depend both on G1,2 and the anchors Sτ−1 from
the previous phase. They may include diﬀerent distance metrics between u1,2 and each anchor,
such as hop distance or resistor distance. If two nodes u1,2 have similar distances from a set of
anchors, this is strong evidence that they match, provided the anchors themselves are matched
correctly. Finally, we denote by Xi = (X1i,X2i) a pair of corresponding attributes in G1 and
G2.
We now turn to the ﬁngerprint cost function for such a pair of nodes u1,2. Recall that
the matching algorithm has no information about the meaning of a node label u1 and u2.
We model this by assuming that the matching algorithm is looking at two randomly chosen
nodes U1,2, which are independent uniform random variables over [1, n]. It can only rely on
the ﬁngerprints of the two nodes U1,2 to decide whether in fact U1 = U2 (match) or not.
In other words, U1,2 are endowed with a uniform prior distribution
2. The cost is then the
log-likelihood of U1 = U2 given the two ﬁngerprints, which we write as
r(u1, u2) = P [U1 = U2|Fu1 , Fu2 ] . (4.2)
Note that in the absence of any node attributes, the probability that two random labels in
G1 and G2, respectively, correspond to the same node in G is given by 1/n. Thus, the prior
P [U1 = U2] = 1/n.
Using Bayes’ rule and the observation above, we can rewrite (4.2) to obtain:
r(u1, u2) =
P [Fu1 , Fu2 |U1 = U2] 1/n
P [Fu1 , Fu2 |U1 = U2] 1/n+ P [Fu1 , Fu2 |U1 6= U2] (1− 1/n)
. (4.3)
Of course, diﬀerent node attributes may be correlated in complicated ways, depending on the
underlying generator G. For example, a high-degree node would have, on average, smaller
distances to other nodes in the graph than a low-degree node. However, in large sparse
graphs, these correlations can be expected to be quite weak. We therefore assume that pairs
of corresponding attributes of two nodes U1 and U2 are conditionally independent, given
either U1 = U2 or U1 6= U2. In other words, we assume that P [X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m|U1 = U2] =∏ℓ+m
i=1 P [Xi|U1 = U2] and that P [X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m|U1 6= U2] =
∏ℓ+m
i=1 P [Xi|U1 6= U2], where Xi
is a pair of corresponding node attributes. For the latter case U1 6= U2, this is because the
attributes stem from two random, but diﬀerent nodes inG; for the case U1 = U2, this embodies
the assumption that the edge sampling process acts on each attribute pair independently (but
the attributes within the pair are - possibly strongly - correlated in this case).
2Of course, other priors are possible, e.g., if additional side information about nodes is available, such as
from additional node attributes.
4.2. General Method for Graph Matching 37
We hereby provide a more in-depth discussion for the validity of our assumption. As will
become clear later, the absolute attribute we use is node degree, and the relative attributes are
the distances to anchors. The assumption states that if we know that the two nodes are the
same or diﬀerent, then the degree and all distance pairs of attributes are independent. The
intuition behind this assumption is that (i) a pair of degree and pair of distance attributes can
be assumed independent as they are fundamentally diﬀerent structural characteristics, and
(ii) two or more pairs of distance attributes can be assumed independent as the anchors are
chosen from the whole node set of the graph, and based only on their priors. This assumption
is reasonable especially for large networks.
The notion of pair is important here. We do not claim that individual attributes of two
diﬀerent nodes are independent, which would certainly not be accurate for the case U1 = U2.
However, diﬀerent pairs are conditionally independent. Finally, we also do not assume that
attribute pairs are independent (not conditionally), which is also not accurate for the following
reason.
Assume edge sampling parameter s = 1 such that G1 and G2 are identical. In this case,
if we know that X1k 6= X2k for some k, then we can conclude that u1i 6= u2j, and therefore
X1k′ 6= X2k′ for some other k′ is very likely. If we see that X1k = X2k for some k, then
u1i = u2j is very likely, and thus X1k′ = X2k′ for some other k
′ is also very likely. This
implies that the diﬀerent attributes are strongly correlated when considered unconditionally,
as knowledge of what happens with attribute k has a decisive inﬂuence on what happens with
another attribute k′. Thus, we only assume conditional independence, which as discussed
above, is relatively reasonable.
Under this assumption, we can factor the evidence in (4.3) and obtain
r(u1, u2) =
1/n
∏ℓ+m
i=1 P [Xi|U1 = U2]
1/n
∏ℓ+m
i=1 P [Xi|U1 = U2] + (1− 1/n)
∏ℓ+m
i=1 P [Xi|U1 6= U2]
. (4.4)
where Xi = (X1i,X2i) is a pair of corresponding attributes.
In order to apply equation (4.4) we need to determine P [Xi|U1 = U2] and P [Xi|U1 6= U2]
for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ +m. Note that this probability depends on the sampling process, as the
sampling process transforms attributes of G. Let pi(y) denote the probability distribution
associated with attribute i in the ﬁxed graph G, thus, pi(y) = P [Yi = y], for some node
u ∈ V . Similarly, let qi(x, y) denote the probability function of attribute i after the sampling
process has been applied to G given that the same attribute has value y in G, thus, qi(x, y) =
P [X1i = x|Yi = y], for some u ∈ V . Using these two models together with the fact that G1
and G2 are independent samples from the sampling process and by applying the law of total
probability, we obtain
P [Xi|U1 = U2] =
∑
y
qi(x1i, y)qi(x2i, y)pi(y). (4.5)
Likewise, for the case u1 and u2 do not correspond to the same node in G, we have,
P [Xi|U1 6= U2] =
(∑
y
qi(x1i, y)pi(y)
)(∑
y
qi(x2i, y)pi(y)
)
. (4.6)
Finally, using the Bayesian framework above ((4.4)), together with the models for how
the sampling process transforms given attributes (qi(x, y), and using (4.5) and (4.6)), we can
precisely compute the likelihood that a given pair of nodes is correctly mapped given their
ﬁngerprints.
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4.2.2 Anchor Mismatch
The approach above allows for the set of anchor nodes mapped in the previous phase to be
used to compute likelihoods for the ﬁngerprints of unmapped nodes. However, anchors are
subject to matching errors. If we do not take this into account, we may overestimate the
likelihoods. Therefore, we reﬁne our probabilistic model to account for the possibility of false
matches among anchor pairs.
Recall that Xℓ+1, . . . ,Xℓ+m depend on the anchor pairs. For example, Xℓ+i is the distance
from u1 and u2 to the i-th anchor pair w1i and w2i, respectively.
LetMi be an indicator random variable taking value 1 if anchor pair ℓ+i has been correctly
mapped and 0 otherwise. We now revisit (4.5), and assume that if Mi = 0, the distribution of
the corresponding attribute pair is as if U1 6= U2. In other words, we assume that the distance
pair from a node (u1 = u2 or u1 6= u2) to two different anchors is independent, in analogy to
the assumption on the distance pair from two diﬀerent nodes u1 6= u2 to a correctly matched
anchor pair. Thus, we have
P [Xℓ+i|U1 = U2,Mi = 0] =
(∑
y
qℓ+i(x1(ℓ+i), y)pℓ+i(y)
)(∑
y
qℓ+i(x2(ℓ+i), y)pℓ+i(y)
)
(4.7)
Note that this is the same as the conditional probability given that U1 6= U2 (see (4.6)). We
also assume that a correctly or incorrectly mapped anchor does not change the conditional
probability when U1 6= U2. Thus,
P [Xℓ+i|U1 6= U2,Mi] = P [Xℓ+i|U1 6= U2] (4.8)
as in (4.6).
In order to compute the overall pairwise likelihood, we redeﬁne the likelihood function of
equation (4.2) to also depend on anchors being correctly mapped. Thus,
r(u1, u2) = P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m,M1, . . . ,Mm] (4.9)
= P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ, (Xℓ+1,M1), . . . , (Xℓ+m,Mm)] .
As before, we apply Bayes’ rule together with conditional independence between attributes
pairs to obtain
r(u1, u2) =
A
A+B
(4.10)
where,
A = 1/n
ℓ∏
i=1
P [Xi|U1 = U2]
ℓ+m∏
i=ℓ+1
s.t. Mi=1
P [Xi|U1 = U2], (4.11)
and
B = (1− 1/n)
ℓ∏
i=1
P [Xi|U1 6= U2]
ℓ+m∏
i=ℓ+1
s.t. Mi=1
P [Xi|U1 6= U2]. (4.12)
Note that all the factors, where Mi = 0, appear both in the numerator and denominator (in
A and B) and therefore cancel out. Moreover, equation (4.10) is for a given vector of Mi
values.
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Finally, note that Mi, i = 1, . . . ,m are not observable random variables, since we do not
know if an anchor was correctly or incorrectly mapped. Therefore, we marginalize all variables
Mi to obtain
P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m] =
∑
b=(0,1)m
m∏
i=1
(P [Mi = bi])
· P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m,M1, . . . ,Mm], (4.13)
where b is a bit vector of size m, bi corresponds to the i-th bit in the vector, and the sum is
over all bit vectors of size m. Note that the sum is over an exponentially large set, which is
prohibitive. Fortunately, a crude sampling-based estimator of (4.13) does suﬃciently well for
our purposes (See Appendix 4.A).
Finally, we require the prior on Mi in (4.13). Fortunately, this can be obtained as a
byproduct of the previous phase: for an anchor pair (w1i, w2i) matched in the previous phase,
we equate its posterior r(wi1, wi2) with the prior P [Mi = 1], as this is the likelihood that
anchors w1i and w2i were correctly mapped. We discuss this procedure in more detail in
Section 4.3.
U1 = U2(X11, X21) (X1i, X2i) Mi
i > 1
2τ−1
Figure 4.1: Bayesian network for graph matching at phase τ .
4.2.3 Models for Sampled Degree and Distance
The methodology described so far is general, in that we have not yet speciﬁed the distributions
of speciﬁc attributes that determine the ﬁngerprints of nodes. However, these models are
needed in order to compute the likelihood function. From now on, we will use the node
degree as the only absolute attribute, and hop distance as the relative attribute.
In the following, X1 = (X11,X21) is the degree pair of u1,2, and Xi = (X1i,X2i), i > 1 is
the distance pair to anchor pair i3. Figure 4.1 depicts the Bayesian network of the formulation
as described in Section 4.2.2.
The aforementioned methodology requires a probabilistic model for the node attributes
that determine the ﬁngerprint of nodes. In particular, we need probabilistic models that
represent the node attributes in G and also after the sampling process, that is, in G1 and
G2. Note that these models are represented in equations (4.5) and (4.6). As we will use
only degree and distance in the ﬁngerprint of a node, we require models only for these two
attributes.
As mentioned earlier, we consider the edge sampling process. Under the edge sampling
process, we can now determine a model for degree and distance on the sampled graph given
their values in the original graph G. Recall that qi(x, y) denotes the probability that attribute
i has value x in the sampled graph, given that it has value y in the original graph G. Let
3More precisely, with (w1i, w2i) the i-th anchor pair, X1i is the graph distance in G1 to w1i (and analogously
for X2i).
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i = 1 denote the node degree. As the edge sampling process samples each edge independently
with probability s, q1(x, y) follows a binomial distribution with parameter s and y, i.e.,
q1(x, y) = Bi (x, y, s) =
(
y
x
)
sx(1− s)y−x
Finally, note that p1(y) denotes the degree distribution of G, i.e., the probability of sampling
a degree y from G. We comment on the choice of the underlying degree distribution in
Section 4.4.
The model for distances under edge sampling requires a more careful treatment as this
has not been studied in the literature. Consider two adjacent nodes u and v in G. We will
assume that the distance between u and v after sampling follows a geometric distribution.
In particular, let Zu,v denote a geometric random variable with parameter α for the distance
between nodes u and v after sampling. We provide an intuitive argument for this model. In
a well-connected graph G, (i) paths of diﬀerent lengths 1, 2, 3, . . . tend to exist between two
adjacent nodes, and (ii) sampling is likely to preserve a path of length ℓ between two nodes
with the same probability α for all path lengths. Note that the number of paths of length ℓ
between two nodes is likely to increase with ℓ. Thus, although a path of higher length is more
likely to be destroyed by the edge sampling process, the larger number of paths might oﬀset
this probability.
Using the above assumption, a distance 1 would be preserved in the sampled graph with
probability α, a distance two would emerge between two adjacent nodes in G with probability
α(1 − α), and so forth. Thus, the sampled distance Zu,v between two adjacent nodes u and
v in G has a probability distribution of the form P [Zu,v = ℓ] = α(1 − α)(ℓ−1), ℓ = 1, 2, . . ..
which is a geometric distribution with parameter α. The same argument can now be extended
to nodes at any distances. Let u and v have a shortest path of length y in G with the path
(u = u0, u1, . . . , ui, ui+1, . . . , uy = v). Thus, their distance after sampling can be written as
Zu,v = Zu0,u1 + · · ·+Zui,ui+1 + · · ·+Zuy−1,uy , where the random variable Zui,ui+1 denotes the
distance after sampling for each adjacent pair in the path. We now make an assumption that
Zi,i+1 are independent for all i. Thus, we have the sum of independent geometric random
variables with parameter α, which can be expressed as a negative binomial random variable
with parameters y and α, denoted by NBi ().
Let X1i for i > 1 denote the distance from node u to an anchor node i − 1 in G1. Then
qi(x, y) is the probability of observing distance x between a node and the (i − 1)-th anchor
node in the sampled graph, given that their distance in the underlying graph is y. Thus, we
have
qi(x, y) = NBi (x, y, α) =
(
x− 1
y − 1
)
αy(1− α)(x−y), x ≥ y, j = 1, 2. (4.14)
We set the parameter α = s, where s is the sampling probability of the edge sampling process.
As described above, edge sampling tends to preserve paths of diﬀerent lengths with the same
probability, thus using the probability of preserving a single edge (s) as α could be a reasonable
assumption. Finally, pi(y) for i > 1 corresponds to the distance distribution of G, i.e., the
probability that two given nodes are at distance y in G. We comment on the choice of the
underlying distance distribution in Section 4.4.
Note that we investigated the assumption of the geometric distance distribution for ad-
jacent nodes, and negative binomial distribution for larger distances after sampling, via ex-
periments on real data. We did several experiments on an e-mail network dataset, as we
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will introduce in Section 4.4. Our ﬁndings suggest that this assumption holds for real social
networks, and that paths of diﬀerent lengths exist between adjacent nodes and the choice of
s for the geometric parameter is indeed reasonable.
4.3 Matching algorithm
The matching algorithm receives as input two graphs G1 and G2, with the same number
of nodes and models for distance and degree as described in Section 4.2.3. The output of
the algorithm is a matching π between all nodes such that π(u1) = u2 where u1 ∈ V1 and
u2 ∈ V2. The algorithm is iterative and at each phase it considers a set of candidate nodes to
be matched, denoted by
V τ1 = {u11, u12, . . . , u1nτ }, u1i ∈ V1
V τ2 = {u21, u22, . . . , u2nτ }, u2i ∈ V2
where nτ is the size of the candidate set in the τ -th phase, τ = 0, 1, . . . , log2 n− 1, and more
speciﬁcally, nτ = 2
τ+1. In particular, in phase τ , the set of candidate nodes are simply the
nτ nodes with the largest degrees in their respective graph, thus d(uki) ≥ d(ukj), i ≤ j, where
d(u) is the degree of node u.
We elaborate on one phase of the algorithm. At phase τ , we consider a set of m = 2τ−1
anchors (previously mapped node pairs) Sτ−1 = {(w11, w21), . . . , (w1m, w2m)}. Note that
we set m = 0 in the ﬁrst phase (τ = 0), and the algorithm requires no prior knowledge
of anchor nodes. For each of the n2τ node pairs (u1i, u2j) in the candidate set, we use the
Bayesian framework described in Section 4.2 to compute their matching likelihood r(u1i, u2j)
by using their ﬁngerprints. In particular, as discussed in Section 4.2.3, we use as evidence
the degree pair (d(u1i), d(u2j)) and m distance pairs (x(u1i, w1k), x(u2j , w2k)), k = 1, . . . ,m,
where x(u, v) is the distance between nodes u and v in their respective graph.
Assuming that pair-wise matchings of nodes are independent, the likelihood terms r(u1i, u2j)
can be factorized, and the probability of a particular mapping π is given by the product of
all pair-wise likelihoods under that mapping, i.e.,
Pπ(V
τ
1 , V
τ
2 ) =
nτ∏
i
r(u1i, π(u1i)), (4.15)
We seek the most likely mapping π∗ = argmaxπ Pπ(V
τ
1 , V
τ
2 ), i.e., the mapping that maxi-
mizes the product in (4.15) in the τ -th phase. Taking the logarithm of each likelihood term
r(u1i, u2j), the problem reduces to maximizing the sum of log-likelihoods for all node pairs:
π∗ = argmax
π
nτ∑
i
log r(u1i, π(u1i))
This problem can then be solved by using the Hungarian algorithm for maximum weighted
bipartite matching [30].
Finally, the matching results from phase τ are used to construct the set of anchor node
pairs Sτ (the nodes that were mapped with highest likelihoods) for the next phase, where
|Sτ | = 2τ . In other words, half of the mapped node pairs are considered as anchors for the
next phase τ + 1. This increases the size of the ﬁngerprint of each node in the candidate set
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with more distance attributes. As nτ = 2
τ+1, the size of the candidate set of nodes is also
doubled in subsequent phases.
The intuition for choosing half of mapped pairs as anchors is that matching errors tend
to increase in the ordered (high-to-low likelihood) sequence of mapped pairs. In particular, it
is not even guaranteed that a candidate node u1i ∈ V τ1 has a correct match in V τ2 , and this
gives rise to more uncertainty in matching low-likelihood pairs. Thus, we use only the top
half of matching pairs as anchors of the next phase, aiming to increase the conﬁdence of the
matching. A detailed description of the matching algorithm follows:
1. Input: two graphs G1 and G2, with node sets V1 and V2, both of size n, and models for
degree and distance.
2. Sort the nodes in each graph by degree in descending order. Let V ′1 and V
′
2 be the list
of nodes in descending order by degree.
3. Set τ = 0 and m = 0. Set the anchor set as Sτ−1 = ∅.
4. Set the size of the candidate set to be mapped as nτ = 2
τ+1. If nτ > n, set nτ = n.
5. Denote the candidate sets as V τ1 = V
′
1(1 : nτ ) and V
τ
2 = V
′
2(1 : nτ ), as the list of the
ﬁrst nτ nodes in V
′
1 and V
′
2 , respectively.
6. For each node u1i ∈ V τ1 and u2j ∈ V τ2 , compute a ﬁngerprint vector as
Fu1i = [du1i , x(u1i, w11), . . . , x(u1i, w1m)]
Fu2j =
[
du2j , x(u2j , w21), . . . , x(u2i, w2m)
]
,
where i, j = 1, . . . , nτ and (w1k, w2k) ∈ Sτ−1, k = 1, . . . ,m.
7. For each pair of nodes (u1i, u2j) ∈ V τ1 ×V τ2 , compute the matching likelihood r(u1i, u2j),
i.e., P [u1i = u2j |Fu1i , Fu2j ], using (4.13). Construct the complete weighted bipartite
graph G(V τ1 , V
τ
2 , E), where E includes n
2
τ edges between all node pairs (u1i, u2j) ∈
V τ1 × V τ2 , with the edge weights equal to r(u1i, u2j).
8. Solve the maximum weighted bipartite matching using the Hungarian algorithm [30].
The output is the matching π of size nτ with the maximum sum of the log-likelihoods.
9. Sort the matched pairs (u, π(u)) by the descending order of their matching likelihood.
Let Sτ be the set of nτ/2 = 2
τ node pairs with highest likelihoods. Set m = |Sτ |.
10. If nτ = n, stop. Else, increment τ . Go to step 4.
Note that the algorithm starts with the two highest degree nodes in each graph (nτ = 2),
computes node ﬁngerprints based only on their degrees, and matches them using the bipartite
matching. Next, half of the matched nodes (i.e., 1 node), are considered as anchors, and the
size of the candidate set is doubled to nτ = 4. Thus, at the second phase, four nodes are
matched by using the distance to one anchor from the previous round, and their degrees.
Again, half of the matched nodes (i.e., 2 nodes), are considered as anchors for the next round,
and the size of the candidate set is increased to nτ = 8. This process continues, and at each
phase, nτ nodes are matched using nτ/4 anchors, until all nodes are mapped. Notice that
the matched nodes at each phase, though being considered as anchors for the next phase, are
4.3. Matching algorithm 43
themselves still in the candidate sets V τ1 and V
τ
2 . This allows for a node to change its mapping
during the execution of the algorithm. This is useful because a node wrongly mapped in an
early phase might be correctly mapped in a subsequent phase when more evidence (in terms
of distance to anchors) is available.
4.3.1 Complexity of the Matching Algorithm
We comment on the complexity of diﬀerent steps of the algorithm, and how we derive the
overall complexity.
• Steps 1, 3, 4 and 5 are computed in constant time, and sorting nodes in step 2 can be
done in O(n log n).
• We precompute all distance pairs of attributes x(u1i, w1l) and x(u2j , w2l), which neces-
sitates the computation of all pair-wise distances in the two graphs. In real graphs the
number of edges is usually given by k = O(n log n). A shortest path algorithm over
all node pairs is O(n(k + n log n)), which in this case would be O(n2 log n). Using this
precomputation, step 6 would take O(n) time, due to the growing size of anchor set
with n (in the last iteration).
• It is shown in Appendix 4.A that (4.16) can be computed in O(m), where m is the size
of the anchor set. At each phase, we need to compute the likelihoods for n2τ node pairs.
Considering nτ = O(n) in the last phase of the algorithm, and since the number of
anchors grows up to nτ/4, the construction of the bipartite graph in step 7 is of O(n
3).
• The Hungarian algorithm for maximum weighted bipartite matching works in O(n(k+
n log n)), where k is the number of edges in the bipartite graph. Thus, for the complete
bipartite graph with k = n2, the time complexity of the algorithm in step 8 is O(n3).
• Based on the above, the overall complexity of each phase is dominated by steps 7 and 8.
The total number of iterations is log2 n. Thus, the overall complexity of the matching
algorithm is O(n3 log n).
In order to further reduce the complexity, we should reduce the number of edges in the
bipartite graph. We consider the following idea: Instead of computing all O(n2) edge weights
for all node pairs in the bipartite graph, we do a precomputation and consider a ﬁxed set
of only n log n edges, and compute the weights only for these edges as possible mappings in
the bipartite graph over all iterations. To do this, we run the ﬁrst phase of the algorithm
over all n2 node pairs once, using only the degrees as evidence (thus yielding a complexity
of n2 to build the bipartite graph), and then take the n log n edges with highest weights as
the edges that can be present in the bipartite graph for all phases. This would reduce the
number of edges in the bipartite graph to n log n as opposed to n2 in the last phase. Thus, the
complexity in step 7 becomes O(n2 log n) which is the cost of building the bipartite graph, the
complexity of step 8 becomes also O(n2 log n), and the complexity of the algorithm becomes
O(n2 log2 n), due to its log2 n phases.
The intuition behind this choice is as follows. Notice that node degrees are well-behaved
under the sampling process, i.e., the sampled degree is a binomial with parameter s. Thus,
our candidate set of edges contains the n log n node pairs (instead of all n2 pairs) with most
similar degrees, so that there is a higher probability that correctly mapped pairs exist within
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this set. Due to the skewed degree distribution of real networks, we conjecture that this
method yields similar matching error, enabling us to apply the algorithm to graphs of larger
size.
Finally, there have been some works in the literature on reducing the complexity of maxi-
mum weighted bipartite matching problem [23, 29, 34]. More speciﬁcally, [23] shows that the
maximum weight matching can be done in O(k
√
n logW ), where k is the number of edges in
the bipartite graph, and W is the maximum weight, if all weights are normalized to integers.
Applying them to our method and using the technique above would reduce the complexity
further to O(n
√
n log2 n logW ).
4.3.2 Normalization of Likelihoods
In practice, we consider a slightly modiﬁed version of matching likelihoods derived above,
where the likelihoods are normalized. At each phase, after computing a likelihood r(u1i, u2j),
we normalize it by the square root of the sum of the likelihoods for all pairs such that u1i ∈ V1
and u2j ∈ V2. In other words,
r′(u1i, u2j) =
r(u1i, u2j)√∑
∀u2k∈V2
r(u1i, u2k)
∑
∀u1k∈V1
r(u1k, u2j)
,
and r′(u1i, u2j) are the weights used in the bipartite matching and anchor selection (steps 8
and 9 of algorithm). The intuition behind this normalization is the following. Recall that
we assume independence for pair-wise matching of node pairs, which allows us to use the
weighted bipartite matching problem. However, this assumption leads to an overestimation
of the joint node pairs likelihood. Intuitively, the joint likelihood of several pairs is likely
to be smaller than the product of the likelihood of the pairs. The normalization procedure
compensates this eﬀect by reducing the value for the likelihoods. Furthermore, experimental
results show that this normalization yields signiﬁcantly better results in matching all node
pairs.
As one example, consider the following scenario. At each iteration, for a certain node u1i,
it is possible that its correct mapping is not present in V τ2 , although it might have a relative
high likelihood of being mapped to some other node in V τ2 , due to the likelihoods’ boost as
a result of independence assumption. Normalizing by the sum of the probabilities over all
nodes in V2 would give a lower likelihood to such a node and could avoid its being mapped
to a node in V τ2 that could be correctly mapped to another node in V
τ
1 . As another example,
assume two nodes u1i and u1j in V
τ
1 , u1i with high likelihoods to a large number of nodes in
V τ2 (due to the independence assumption), and u1j with low likelihoods to most nodes and
a high likelihood to only a few nodes in V τ2 . Intuitively, u1j is more distinguishable than
u1i, though without normalization, a wrong mapping would be more likely. Note that both
arguments hold for nodes in V τ2 as well, due to the symmetry of the problem. We compensate
for these issues by using the normalization factor introduced above.
4.4 Experiments
We assess the performance of our algorithm using real data and two diﬀerent scenarios. First,
we consider a real graph G and use the edge sampling model with probabilities s1 and s2 to
instantiate G1 and G2, which are then matched. Next, we consider two similar graphs G1
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and G2 from real data, which are then matched. Note that sampling was not used in the
latter and parameters will have to be estimated using G1 and G2 directly. To measure the
performance we deﬁne the matching error as the number of incorrectly mapped nodes divided
by the total number of nodes.
Figure 4.2: Matching error vs. number of mapped nodes for diﬀerent edge overlaps (7 real-
izations) using EPFL E-mail network as underlying graph.
4.4.1 Matching Two Sampled Graphs from EPFL E-mail Network
We consider a dataset of e-mail messages collected at the mail server of EPFL. The dataset
includes logs of e-mail exchanges among users on a weekly basis and we consider only ex-
changes among EPFL users (i.e., internal EPFL network). We construct the e-mail network
(graph) by associating each user to a node and placing an edge between two nodes if there is
at least one reciprocal e-mail exchange between the two users. We consider a period of ﬁve
consecutive weeks and only nodes that appeared in every week, yielding a graph with 2024
nodes and 25603 edges.
Using the graph generated as the underlying graph G, we apply edge sampling to obtain
G1 and G2. For simplicity, we assume s1 = s2 = s and present our results for diﬀerent values
of s2, which corresponds to the probability that an edge in G appears in both G1 and G2 (edge
overlap). For each s, we repeat the sampling process to obtain diﬀerent realizations of G1 and
G2. To compute the likelihoods, we use the empirical degree and distance distributions of
G for pi(y). Moreover, as we know s, the conditional distribution qi(x, y) is computed using
the degree and distance models presented in Section 4.2.3. Figure 4.2 depicts the matching
error as the algorithm progresses. Each plot corresponds to a ﬁxed value of s2 and each curve
corresponds to one realization of G1 and G2. The results indicate that the performance of the
algorithm at the end (after all nodes are matched) is consistently poor and good for small and
large values of s2 (s2 = 0.49, s2 = 0.81), respectively. The curves also indicate an interesting
aspect of the approach: although the error might be high during the ﬁrst iterations (due to
incorrect anchors), the algorithm reconsiders such pairs as it progresses and achieves a smaller
error at the end. To some extent, our approach does not depend on correctly identifying initial
anchors and is therefore robust to initial errors. Figure 4.3 shows the average ﬁnal matching
error (over 20 realizations) versus the edge overlap s2. As shown, the error is relatively high
for small overlap s2 = 0.49 since the structure of G is signiﬁcantly destroyed. However, the
error drops sharply when we increase s2, reaching 6% for s2 = 0.81. We can also notice the
larger conﬁdence intervals for mid-range s2, indicating that in such regimes the matching
error strongly depends on the realization.
Finally, we show how well our Bayesian method diﬀerentiates between the likelihood of
mapped nodes and the likelihood of all pairs of nodes in the candidate set. Figure 4.4 depicts
the CCDF of likelihoods r(u1i, u2j) for (a) all n
2 pairs of nodes in V1 × V2 (bottom curve),
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Figure 4.3: Average matching error as a function of edge overlap: curve corresponds to two
sampled graphs from a real EPFL E-mail Network (error averaged over 20 realizations).
and (b) all n pairs of nodes mapped through bipartite matching (top curve). The likelihoods
are those of the last phase of the algorithm, when it ﬁnishes. The clear distinction between
these two plots demonstrates the superiority of our method: Most node pairs have very small
likelihoods, whereas a small subset of nodes exhibit higher likelihoods, among which are the
ones that are matched. For instance, 60% of the mapped node pairs have a likelihood greater
than 0.8, whereas the probability of such likelihood over all nodes is slightly above 0.001!
In other words, the likelihoods derived through our Bayesian method establish a plausible
metric for the probability of two nodes being a correct match. This is the key reason why the
maximum bipartite matching resolves the matching problem with minimal error.
4.4.2 Matching Two Snapshots from EPFL E-mail Network
We now attempt to match two real snapshots G1 and G2 without considering any ﬁxed
underlying graph G. We construct G1 by considering the set of common nodes over a window
of 10 weeks and all edges among them. The graph G2 is constructed in the same manner
by also considering a period of 10 weeks but with a time shift of t weeks relative to G1. For
example, t = 3 means that G1 and G2 overlap 7 weeks, thus giving O = 7/(10 + 3) = 54%
time overlap. Note that time overlap translates to edge overlap. In particular, we estimate
the parameters s1 and s2 based on the number of edges in G1, G2, and their intersection. We
also compute the empirical degree and distance distributions for the (unknown) underlying
graph by superposing the distributions in G1 and G2 (see Section 4.4.3 for more details).
Finally, we apply our algorithm to match G1 and G2. Figure 4.5 depicts the matching error
as a function of edge overlap between G1 and G2. Each point in the curve corresponds to a
diﬀerent time overlap O, as indicated. Note that for small edge overlap (equivalently, small
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Figure 4.4: CCDF for likelihoods of matched vs. all node pairs.
O), the error is large, as there is little common structure between the graphs. However, the
error rate drops sharply as the edge overlap increases: for 75% and 82% overlap (O = 54%,
O = 66%), the error is 13% and 6%, respectively, and for 90% overlap (O = 82%), remarkably
almost all nodes are correctly matched.
We now construct G1 by considering the set of common nodes over a window of 20 weeks
and all edges among them. The graph G2 is constructed in the same manner by also con-
sidering a period of 20 weeks but with a time shift of t weeks relative to G1. We repeat
this experiment for diﬀerent time overlaps as in the previous experiments, each exhibiting a
diﬀerent edge overlap.
Figure 4.6 depicts the matching error as a function of edge overlap between G1 and G2.
Again, we observe an interesting behavior: for small overlap the error is large, and it drops
signiﬁcantly after some threshold. The result is remarkable in the sense that for less than
70% edge overlap (O = 48%), we can already match around 50% of the nodes, and for a 75%
edge overlap (O = 60% only), the error rate drops to as low as 4%!
Further experiments suggest that this phase transition behavior is universal in our method,
and indicates that even if the overlap is not too large, we can still achieve considerably low
matching errors between two graphs given a minimum amount of overlap (as low as 75% in
this experiment). The experiments above indicate the applicability of our method for real
data even when the underlying graph is not known.
4.4.3 Estimation of Parameters and Priors
As explained in Section 4.4.2, applying the matching algorithm requires computing the likeli-
hoods which in turn requires the estimation of (i) the prior degree and distance distributions
of the underlying graph in order to compute qi(x, y) (See Section 4.2.3), and (ii) the sampling
parameters s1 and s2. When directly using the edge sampling model (as in Section 4.4.1),
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Figure 4.5: Matching error as a function of edge overlap: curve corresponds to two real EPFL
E-mail Networks generated with overlapping time windows.
these parameters are known. However, for real graphs, e.g., two snapshots of a network as in
Section 4.4.2, we need to estimate these parameters.
We estimate the underlying degree and distance distributions (pi(y)), considering the
distributions over the superposition of G1 and G2. In other words, we use the empirical degree
(or distance) distribution of G1 and G2, and compute the underlying degree (or distance)
distribution through aggregating the two distributions. This is indeed a crude approximation.
However, our experiments show that the algorithm works quite well under this assumption.
For the sampling parameters, we can write e1 = es1 and e2 = es2, where e, e1 and e2 are
the expected number of edges in G, G1 and G2 respectively. Also, eI = es1s2 corresponds to
the expected number of edges in the intersection of edges of G1 and G2. Estimating e1, e2
and eI as the actual number of edges in G1, G2, and their intersection (assuming the number
of edges in the intersection is known), we can estimate s1 and s2 using the equations above.
Note that for an accurate estimation, we require knowledge of the number of edges common
to both graphs, eI .
Although in practice we can have an estimation of the ratio s1/s2 = e1/e2, the number of
common edges eI might still be unknown; thus the need to estimate s1 (or s2) in a diﬀerent
way, and to compute the other value using the ratio above. One idea is to arbitrarily pick
a large value (e.g., > 0.85) for s1 (or s2), independent of the graph structures. We did
experiments on both sampled graphs and real graphs of two snapshots. Our ﬁndings suggest
that for the choice of a large similarity parameter s, although it might not accurately match
the real s, we still obtain a matching error comparable to the error if the real s was used. For
instance, if the real s is 0.8, and we insert s = 0.9, the change in the matching error would be
less than 15-20%. Also, when matching two snapshots of a network, the interesting observation
is that the error might even decrease when we do not use the actual s! One explanation is that
we make the assumption that the superposition of G1 and G2 corresponds to the underlying
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Figure 4.6: Matching error as a function of edge overlap: curve corresponds to two real EPFL
E-mail Networks generated with overlapping time windows.
graph, whereas this might be a crude assumption. In short, we believe that for similarity
parameters larger than some threshold, our algorithm behaves quite well independent of the
choice of this parameter. Of course in case the two graphs are too dissimilar, the matching
algorithm fails to ﬁnd a mapping with small error, as also shown in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2,
and this is independent of the choice of the actual s (which is small), or a large s.
Using the estimations above, the matching algorithm can be applied to real networks for
matching structurally similar graphs. The applications could vary: matching dictionaries
of diﬀerent languages, de-anonymizing a social network using a correlated publicly available
network, matching users’ data e.g., e-mail and phone data within a company, etc.
4.5 Summary
We proposed a Bayesian method for approximate graph matching where the two graphs are
independent outcomes of some sampling process. Based on this approach we devise an iter-
ative algorithm where evidence used to compute the likelihood of a correct match increases
over the iterations by using previously mapped nodes. Using degree and distances as node
attributes and assuming an edge sampling model, we apply our algorithm to real data. Our
results indicate that accurate matching (less than 10% error) is feasible under reasonable edge
overlap (greater than 75%).
Publication [85]
Pedram Pedarsani, Daniel R. Figueiredo and Matthias Grossglauser. An Iterative Bayesian
Method for Seedless Graph Matching. Submitted to 2013 SIAM International Confer-
ence on Data Mining, SDM ’13, Austin, TX, USA.
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4.A Appendix
Sampling Method for Computing Likelihood
We comment on the sampling method proposed in Section 4.2.2 to compute the matching
likelihood. We hereby restate the matching likelihood:
P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m] =∑
b=(0,1)m
m∏
i=1
(P [Mi = bi]) · P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m,M1, . . . ,Mm]. (4.16)
The sum is over 2m possible choices of the bit vectors of size m. Notice that P (M = b) =∏m
i=1 (P [Mi = bi]) corresponds to the probability of the vector of indicators [M1, ...,Mm], and
the second term in the sum is a function of this vector. Thus, we can rewrite (4.16) as,
P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m] =∑
b=(0,1)m
P [M = m]P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m,M = b]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(M)
. (4.17)
This corresponds to the expectation of the random variable P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m].
Using this observation, instead of computing the sum over over all 2m terms, since the priors
P (Mi = bi) are known, we propose taking constant number of samples (c) from the prior
distribution on M . Denote M (t) as the t-th sampled vector. We compute f(M (t)) for each
sample, and estimate (4.16) as the sample average over all samples. In other words,
P [U1 = U2|X1, . . . ,Xℓ+m] ≃ 1
c
c∑
t=1
f(M (t)). (4.18)
Note that as c → ∞, due to the law of large numbers, (4.18) converges to the expected
value at the right-hand side. Thus, more samples yields more accurate estimation for the
likelihood. This reduces the complexity of computing the likelihood to O(m), where m is the
size of the anchor set, since we assume c to be constant (and equal to 50 in experimental
evaluations).
Part II
Evolution of Social Networks
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5 Network Densification
5.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, investigations in diﬀerent ﬁelds have focused on studying and under-
standing networks that arise in their respective domains, ranging from biological to social to
technological networks. Many of these networks exhibit common topological features, such as
a heavy-tailed degree distribution and the small world eﬀect1.
Most of the work on such complex networks has focused on static scenarios, where a single
snapshot of the network is considered for investigation. More recently, the focus has moved to
dynamic scenarios, where the network evolves with time. Indeed, most real networks evolve
over time, as edges and nodes can be added or deleted from the system. In this context,
a recently observed feature is densification, which occurs when the number of edges grows
faster than the number of nodes. More precisely, the average degree of the network grows with
time. This surprising phenomenon is empirically validated by the recent work of Leskovec et
al. [63], where densiﬁcation is observed in six large datasets. Even more surprising is the fact
that the observed densiﬁcation exhibited a very speciﬁc and precise relationship, namely, a
power law of the form m(t) ∼ n(t)α, where m(t) and n(t) denote the number of edges and
nodes of the network at time t and α is a constant greater than 1. We refer to power-law
densiﬁcation with exponent α as α-densiﬁcation.
Leskovec et al. [63] propose a mathematical model for network growth, called forest ﬁre
model, that results in α-densiﬁcation. A key element of their model is the fact that newly
created nodes establish more edges than nodes that were created earlier. They show that this
model can lead to a power-law densiﬁcation over time.
Densiﬁcation is a surprising feature. It implies that the average node degree grows without
bound, which is counter intuitive in many real settings. For example, does it make sense that
an individual’s number of social ties depends on the size of the total population of the planet?
Even more counter-intuitive is the notion that densiﬁcation can lead to a decrease of the
network diameter (or of the average distance) as the network grows. Does it make sense
that the average distance between Internet domains decreases as the Internet grows? Despite
these intuitive doubts, the evidence from several disparate datasets is convincing and solid.
We believe therefore that reconciling the observed phenomenon with domain intuition is a
promising area of research.
Our contribution is a novel explanation for the observed densiﬁcation in real networks.
Our explanation posits that densiﬁcation can arise as a feature of a common procedure to
observe - or measure - dynamic networks, rather than as a feature of the network itself. To
sharpen this explanation, we show in this work that densiﬁcation can actually arise even
when observing a fixed network that is gradually discovered through a sampling process.
This sampling process captures the usual way of observing dynamic networks, as described
1A network is considered a small world if it exhibits a high clustering coefficient and short pair-wise distances.
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in Chapter 1. We argue that the network growth is a direct consequence of the sampling
process, i.e., the gradual discovery of this underlying network, rather than a property of the
network itself.
To support this claim, we use the edge sampling model proposed in Chapter 1. We consider
two variants of this model, which capture two common procedures for the observation of real
networks. The ﬁrst variant is the accumulation model, where we assume that the observed
network is the result of all the edges discovered since the beginning of the observation. As
time evolves, the observed network grows and “converges” to the hidden full network. The
second variant is the modulation model, where we assume that independent snapshots are
obtained at diﬀerent times, which we can view as samples of the hidden full network. We
study these two variants to reﬂect diﬀerent measurement methodologies used in the studies of
network evolution, and we show that both variants can lead to densiﬁcation in the observed
network. How the sampled networks densify depends both on the structural properties of the
underlying network and on the sampling process itself.
Using a simpliﬁed instantiation of the edge sampling model, we establish analytical results
indicating that the number of nodes and edges discovered indeed densify over time. In par-
ticular, we prove that densiﬁcation is present for all time instances greater than a threshold,
and we derive a range (as a function of number of discovered nodes) over which densiﬁcation
arises. We also prove that densiﬁcation converges to a power law as time increases, with an
exponent that is inversely proportional to the probability mass of degree one nodes. More
importantly, we prove that a network densiﬁes if and only if its degree distribution is a power-
law. Finally, we apply our model to real network data and show that it can fairly capture
the densiﬁcation observed in practice. Our results indicate that edge sampling is a plausible
alternative explanation for the network densiﬁcation.
As stated above, the key basis of our model lies in the way many real networks are observed:
edges of an underlying graph are observed directly, with nodes being observed indirectly. We
do not claim that all networks densify because of edge sampling; nor we do that all real
networks densify. However, we do believe that edge sampling can be a plausible explanation
for the observed densiﬁcation of some networks, where the observation of edges leads to the
discovery of nodes from the underlying graph. In other words, we explain densiﬁcation as a
feature of the statistical estimation instead of a feature of the real network. In [63] Leskovec
et al. propose network growth as a plausible model to explain densiﬁcation.
We close this section by commenting on the diﬀerence between degree power laws, a widely
researched feature of many real networks, and power-law densiﬁcation. Degree power laws
have often been linked to the ”rich get richer” phenomenon. This refers to the fact that
rich (e.g., large degree) nodes tend to become richer (i.e., even larger degrees) as the network
grows in size, giving rise to power law degree distributions. This is the main idea, for example,
behind the preferential attachment models [47, 10], used for explaining how a single snapshot
of the network is formed. This degree distribution is usually ﬁxed, despite models that allow
the graph to grow over time. However, power law densiﬁcation refers to the relationship
between number of nodes and edges as the network evolves (i.e., in diﬀerent snapshots of the
network). In other words, power-law degree distribution is the property of a single snapshot
of the network, whereas power-law densiﬁcation refers to the relationship between number of
edges and nodes for a sequence of networks (e.g., because the network is growing). Notice
that in classic graph models the average degree is assumed to be constant over time (i.e.,
the number of edges grows linearly in the number of nodes), thus no densiﬁcation is present
(though featuring power law degree distribution). So it is important to note that the two
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are orthogonal, in the sense that each can exist independently. For example, a sequence of
dn-regular graphs G(n, dn) with dn = n
α−1 (α > 1) does not exhibit a degree power law, as
every snapshot has constant degree over the ensemble of nodes; however, it does exhibit α-
densiﬁcation. Nevertheless, a sequence of random graphs whose degree distribution is drawn
from a distribution D with power-law tail (and with E[D] < ∞) does exhibit degree power
law, but not densiﬁcation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 shows a concrete ex-
ample of network densiﬁcation and the problem statement. Section 5.3 presents the Edge
Sampling model, its theoretical properties and numerical evaluations. Sections 5.6 presents
an evaluation of the proposed model when applied to real network data. Section 5.7 brieﬂy
discusses the related work. Finally, Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 Motivation
In order to explain and illustrate the concept of densiﬁcation, we present an example of a real
network that densiﬁes over time. In particular, we consider an e-mail network. In this directed
graph, nodes represent e-mail addresses and edges represent message exchanges. The network
evolves in time through the observation of new messages that are exchanged, as described
below.
Let mij(t) denote a message sent from e-mail address i to e-mail address j at time t.
Moreover, let M [t1, t2] denote the set of all messages sent in the interval [t1, t2].
Let G[t1, t2] = (V [t1, t2], E[t1, t2]) be a directed graph deﬁned as follows. Let E[t1, t2] =⋃
m∈M [t1,t2]
e(m), where e(mij(t)) = {(i, j)}. Thus, E[t1, t2] denotes the set of directed edges
that appear in the graph in the interval [t1, t2]. Similarly, let V [t1, t2] =
⋃
m∈M [t1,t2]
v(m),
where v(mij(t)) = {i, j}. Thus, V [t1, t2] denotes the set of nodes that appear in the graph in
the interval [t1, t2].
We consider a dataset of e-mail messages collected at the mail server of EPFL for a period
of 89 weeks. The dataset is aggregated by week, such that timestamps are in the timescale
of weeks (i.e., all messages sent in a particular week have the same timestamp). To ﬁlter out
bogus messages (spam, mailing lists, wrong addresses, etc), only e-mails to or from registered
EPFL personnel were considered, as well as only e-mail addresses that both sent and received
a message at least once in the observed interval of time. The ﬁltered dataset contains a total
of 23, 679, 417 e-mail messages.
From this point, we usem(t) to denote the number of edges and n(t) to denote the number
of nodes, as a function of time. Following the procedure describe above, we construct the
e-mail network by growing it one week at a time, computing G[1, t], where t = 1, . . . , 89.
Thus, for each week t, we have a value for the number of edges m(t) = |E[1, t]| and the
number of nodes n(t) = |V [1, t]| in the graph. Figure 5.1 plots the number of nodes versus
the number of edges for all values of t in log-log scale. The result clearly shows a densiﬁcation
of the network, as the number of edges increases much faster than the number of nodes. In
particular, the number of nodes goes from n(1) = 45, 782 to n(197) = 431, 200, while the
number of edges grows from m(1) = 115, 898 to m(197) = 3, 945, 937. Moreover, we can
observe a fairly precise linear relationship between logm(t) and log n(t), which indicates that
the two variables are related through a power law of the type m(t) ∼ n(t)α. Let αˆ be the
slope of the line obtained by performing a linear regression of the points in the plot. Thus,
for the data shown in Figure 5.1 we have that αˆ = 1.57.
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of the number of nodes n(t) versus the number of edges m(t) over time
for EPFL e-mail network.
As stated earlier, Leskovec et al. [63] have also observed power-law relationships between
the number of edges and nodes for various real networks, including an e-mail network. The
fact that power laws seem to be ubiquitous relationship between the number edges and nodes
of an evolving network motivates us to search for alternative explanations for densiﬁcation.
It is important to notice how the e-mail network was grown in the example above. Indeed,
the network is grown one message at a time, revealing edges at each step, and nodes are
discovered through these edges. We believe that many real networks are also grown in this
same way, that is, through the observation of edges. For example, in the World-Wide Web
network, web documents (nodes) are discovered through the observation of hyperlinks in the
documents (edges). In the Internet AS-level graph, ASes (nodes) are inferred through the
observation BGP announcements (edges). In the IMDB actors to movies networks, actors and
movies (nodes) are discovered when an actor plays in a movie (edges). Thus, the process of
growing the network through the observation of edges (or edge sampling) seems fairly universal
and is the key motivation for the model we introduce next.
5.3 Model
In this section, we use the edge sampling model, and elaborate on how it can well explain
the densiﬁcation behavior. We use this model to derive diﬀerent properties of densifying
graphs, and validate our results both theoretically and empirically. We elaborate the model
by considering speciﬁc properties of the underlying graph and speciﬁc properties for the
sampling of edges.
In particular, let G = (V,E) be the underlying graph with n = |V | denoting the total
number of vertices and m = |E| denoting the total number of edges in the graph. Let f¯(k)
denote the empirical degree distribution of G. We obtain a single sample Gs = (Vs, Es) of the
graph by sampling its edges independently with probability s. We deﬁne the set Es ⊂ E to
denote the set of edges that have fired in the realization when the sampling parameter is s,
hence discovered. Similarly, deﬁne the set Vs =
⋃
e∈Es
γ(e) ⊂ V to denote the set of vertices
that have been discovered, where γ(e) is a function that returns the set of vertices adjacent
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to the edge e, that is, γ ((u, v)) = {u, v}. Thus, |Es| and |Vs| are the number of edges and
vertices, respectively, that are discovered when the sampling parameter is s. In the following,
we determine both E[|Es|] and E[|Vs|], that is, the expectation of these random variables.
For the ease of expression, from this point we use the following notations:
n(s) = E[|Vs|] (5.1)
m(s) = E[|Es|] (5.2)
Since all edges are discovered with same probability s, we can write:
m(s) = ms (5.3)
Let d¯ denote the expected degree of the underlying graph. It can be shown that m = nd¯/2.
Thus, we can rewrite equation (5.3) as follows:
m(s) = nd¯s/2 (5.4)
Let q denote the probability that a node is discovered by the process when the sampling
parameter is s. This means that at least one edge adjacent to the node ﬁred. This probability
is the complement of the node not being discovered, which means that none of the edges
adjacent to the node ﬁred when edges ﬁre with probability s. Thus, conditioning on the node
degree and sampling of the adjacent edges, we have:
q =
∞∑
k=0
f¯(k)
[
1− (1− s)k
]
(5.5)
Similarly to m(s), we can then write n(s) as follows:
n(s) = nq (5.6)
We can establish limiting results for both m(s) and n(s) as s goes to 1. In particular, we
can show that:
m(s→ 1) = lim
s→1
m(s) = nd¯/2 (5.7)
n(s→ 1) = lim
s→1
n(s) = n(1− f¯(0)) (5.8)
Thus, s = 1 reveals all the edges of G, but only its non-isolated nodes (i.e., nodes with positive
degree).
As stated earlier, our ultimate goal is to establish a relationship between m(s) and n(s).
In particular, can the edge sampling model lead to densiﬁcation on the number of edges and
nodes discovered? We start by deﬁning two terms: densiﬁcation and α-densiﬁcation. The
former means that the number of edges and nodes discovered are related super-linearly, but
not necessarily through a power law relationship. The latter means that densiﬁcation follows
a power law relationship of the form m(s) ∼ n(s)α for an approximately constant α > 1. It is
usually understood that this relationship should span several orders of magnitude over n(s)
to be unambiguous; we do not make this requirement explicit in the deﬁnition.
As we soon show, the edge sampling model can lead to densiﬁcation, and under some con-
ditions to α-densiﬁcation. This indicates that densiﬁcation can arise based on how we observe
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the ﬁxed underlying graph, without requiring any dynamic growth process that modiﬁes its
structure.
We investigate the relationship between m(s) and n(s) by deﬁning α(s), as follows:
α(s) =
∂ log (m(s))
∂ log (n(s))
=
(
∂ log (m(s))
∂s
)(
∂ log (n(s))
∂s
)−1
(5.9)
Thus, α(s) denotes the instantaneous slope of the n(s) versus m(s) plot in log-log scale.
Densiﬁcation then means that α(s) > 1 for several order of magnitude on n(s), while α-
densiﬁcation means that α(s) is larger than 1 and is approximately constant for several orders
of magnitude on n(s).
Using equations (5.4) and (5.6), we can derive α(s) analytically by applying its deﬁnition,
which is given in equation (5.9). In particular, we have:
α(s) =
(1− s) (1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − s)k)
s
∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − s)k
(5.10)
We can obtain both a lower bound and an upper bound for α(s). In particular we show
that for s > 1/2, the following holds:
1 ≤ α(s) ≤ 1
f¯(1)
. (5.11)
The proofs are found in Appendix 5.A.
We can also establish two limiting results for α(s). Let α(s→ 1) be the limit of α(s) when
s goes to 1. Similarly, let α(s→ 0) be the limit of α(s) when s goes to zero. We show that:
α(s→ 1) = lim
s→1
α(s) =
1− f¯(0)
f¯(1)
(5.12)
α(s→ 0) = lim
s→0
α(s) = 1 (5.13)
Once again, the proofs are found in Appendix 5.A.
The above result can be intuitively understood as follows. As s grows to 1, where the
probability that an edge ﬁres is quite large, the probability that a node of degree two or higher
has been revealed is very close to one. The asymptotic slope of the n(s)/m(s) curve when
almost all nodes have been discovered is then dominated by the discovery of the remaining
edges and nodes of degree one, which occur at the same rate. As s shrinks to 0, where very
few edges ﬁre and therefore very few nodes are discovered, it is very likely that when an edge
ﬁres it will reveal two undiscovered nodes. Thus, the number of edges and nodes will grow
linearly.
To support this last ﬁnding, we can establish yet another result for the case s is small,
near zero. In particular, when s is small we have that 1 − (1 − s)d ≃ ds. Therefore, q ≃ sd¯.
And ﬁnally,
n(s) ≃ nd¯s (5.14)
Using equations (5.4) and (5.14) and applying it to equation (5.9), we obtain α(s) = 1.
Therefore, when s is suﬃciently small, the discovery process through sampling does not yield
densiﬁcation.
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It is interesting to note that the instantaneous slope of edge-node curve, α(s), in the
asymptotic regimes analyzed above (i.e., when s is near 0 or near 1), does not depend on the
degree distribution, which might seem counter-intuitive. However, these results say nothing
about the behavior of the n(s)/m(s) curve for non-extreme values of the sampling parameter.
In what follows, we estimate α(s) for a range of values s when the degree of the underlying
graph follows a speciﬁc distribution.
5.3.1 Densification Regimes and the Value of Cutoff
In this section, we ﬁrst elaborate the transition of diﬀerent phases by changing the sampling
parameter s as we sweep the edge-node curve. Thus we hereby clarify the diﬀerent regimes
for the densiﬁcation behavior, focusing on the regime where densiﬁcation holds. More specif-
ically, we introduce three regimes over the evolution of edge-node curve: transient regime,
densiﬁcation regime and saturation regime. This is well depicted in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: The number of nodes discovered (n(s)) versus the number of edges discovered
(m(s)) in log-log scale, resulting in diﬀerent regimes as the sampling parameter s is changed.
As discussed before and shown in Equations (5.12) and (5.13), the limiting behavior of
α(s) is only a function of lags zero and one of the degree distribution of the underlying graph,
and not the tail behavior. Thus, as we start growing s from zero, the edge-node curve in
log-scale follows a linear relationship with slope 1 (transient regime). As s goes beyond a
certain threshold, which we name it as cutoff, densiﬁcation starts (densiﬁcation regime). The
slope of edge-node curve depends on the degree distribution of the underlying graph. As we
will soon show, α-densiﬁcation (i.e., α(s) being constant) is observed over several orders of
magnitude of n(s) in case of power-law degree distribution. Finally, as s gets close to 1, α(s)
grows to α(s→ 1) (saturation regime), resulting in the saturation of edges and nodes with a
high exponent.
Thus the regime of interest is the middle, where densiﬁcation emerges. Here we derive the
exact value of cutoﬀ (starting point for densiﬁcation) as a function of the parameters of the
degree distribution, and validate our results numerically in Section 5.5.
60 Chapter 5. Network Densification
To do so, we introduce an approximation for the densiﬁcation regime that plays a key role
in our theoretical results that follow. Given the sampling parameter s, the probability that a
node with degree d is discovered is given by 1− (1 − s)d. Note that this probability is close
to 1 for large enough d. Moreover, when the node degree follows a power-law (such as for
Zipf distribution), nodes with large enough degree can exist with non-negligible probability.
This explains the following approximation for the probability that a node is discovered. If a
node has degree greater than 1/s, then with probability one it is discovered, otherwise with
probability zero it is discovered. Thus, we let 1/s deﬁne a large enough degree. As before, let
q denote the probability that a node is discovered. Using the approximation above, we have:
q ≃ P (D > 1/s) (5.15)
where D is a random variable with distribution f(k) denoting the node degree. Note that in
our notation, f(k) corresponds to the degree distribution for random variable D as the degree,
whereas f¯(k) denotes the empirical degree distribution of the underlying graph. Similarly,
E[D] and d¯ correspond to the average degree in each case, respectively.
Now notice that out of the d edges incident to a given node with degree d, the expected
number of edges that will ﬁre is given by ds. The above approximation is equivalent to saying
that a node will be discovered if this expectation is greater than 1, but it will remain unknown
to the discovery process otherwise.
Note that the above approximation is appropriate only for the densification regime, i.e. as
densiﬁcation starts when nodes are being discovered through edges, whereas in the transient
regime edges and nodes are discovered linearly (as shown in Section 5.3). We use this idea
for ﬁnding the cutoﬀ. In other words, we examine for which values of s the approximation
holds, which is the key in ﬁnding the cutoﬀ value.
Let us assume dmax to be the maximum degree in the underlying graph. Observe that the
approximation holds only for s > 1/dmax, where dmax is the maximum degree of the graph.
Indeed, for s < 1/dmax, the right-hand side of (5.15) will be zero, thus no such approximation
will be valid. This observation suggests that the cutoﬀ occurs at the threshold value of
s = 1/dmax, which we call s
∗, above which densiﬁcation is present. So the transition from no
densiﬁcation to densiﬁcation occurs at the cutoﬀ value of:
s∗ ≃ 1
dmax
. (5.16)
Note that the result holds for any distribution of the underlying graph. Furthermore, we
can derive the approximate values of m(s) and n(s) for this value of s∗. This can be done as
follows:
m(s)∗ = ms∗ = nE[D]s∗/2 =
1
2
(
n
dmax
)
E[D] (5.17)
n(s)∗ = n
dmax∑
k=1
f(k)
[
1− (1− s∗)k
]
≃ n
dmax∑
k=1
f(k) [kp∗] =
(
n
dmax
)
E[D], (5.18)
where (5.18) follows since s∗ is small and approximately 1/dmax.
5.4. Conditions for Power-Law Densification 61
The above result states that densiﬁcation (or α-densiﬁcation for certain cases, as shown
below) emerges when the average number of discovered nodes exceeds the average degree
of the graph (when the maximum degree in close to the total number of nodes). This is
indeed conﬁrmed by the numerical results in Section 5.5. In the next section, we focus
on the densiﬁcation regime and derive the condition for the underlying graph for which α-
densiﬁcation is present.
5.4 Conditions for Power-Law Densification
Now that we deﬁned the diﬀerent regimes in the sampling model, and derived the cutoﬀ
value, we should comment on the densiﬁcation regime, and the dependence of the densiﬁcation
behavior on the underlying graph. As shown in Section 5.3, the instantaneous slope of edge-
node curve in log-log scale is a function of the sampling parameter s. However, we hereby
investigate whether α-densiﬁcation is present for certain cases. Notice that α-densiﬁcation
corresponds to a constant densiﬁcation exponent α over the densiﬁcation regime, i.e. α(s)
not depending on s.
5.4.1 Necessary Condition for Power-Law Densification
So far, we found the value of cutoﬀ above which densiﬁcation starts. In this section, we an-
swer the following important question: Under what conditions do we see α-densification? We
show in the following that to observe α-densiﬁcation in the densiﬁcation regime, the degree
distribution of the underlying graph should be of a certain form which can be well approxi-
mated by a power-law. In other words, we will show that a power-law degree distribution is
a necessary condition to see α-densiﬁcation. Our argument uses approximation (5.15) used
in Section 5.3.1.
The approximation is valid only for s > 1/dmax, since the maximum degree cannot exceed
dmax. Now remember that the average number of edges and nodes at every sampling instance
is expressed by (5.3) and (5.6) as follows:
m(s) = ms
n(s) = nq (5.19)
Since m and n are constants, in order to have a power-law relationship between the number of
edges and nodes (i.e. to see α-densiﬁcation), we should have s ∼ qα, where α is the constant
densiﬁcation exponent larger than 1. We set γ − 1 = α−1, and write the probability of node
discovery as:
q = csγ−1, 1 < γ < 2 (5.20)
for some constant c. Now, as before, let f(k) denote the degree distribution of the underlying
graph. Combining (5.15) and (5.20) yields:
q ≃ P (D > 1/s) =
dmax∑
k=1/s
f(k) = csγ−1. (5.21)
To observe α-densiﬁcation, this equality should hold for the values of s above the cutoﬀ 1/dmax
- as obtained in Section 5.3.1 -, so that the edge-node curve is swept over several orders of
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magnitude. Knowing that k can take integer values for the discrete distribution, we start by
evaluating (5.21) for diﬀerent values of s, starting from s = 1/dmax. We can write:
s =
1
dmax
=⇒
dmax∑
k=dmax
f(k) = f(dmax) = c
(
1
dγ−1max
)
s =
1
(dmax − 1) =⇒
dmax∑
k=dmax−1
f(k) = f(dmax) + f(dmax − 1) = c
(
1
(dmax − 1)γ−1
)
=⇒ f(dmax − 1) = c
(
1
(dmax − 1)γ−1 −
1
dγ−1max
)
s =
1
(dmax − 2) =⇒
dmax∑
k=dmax−2
f(k) = f(dmax) + f(dmax − 1) + f(dmax − 2) = c
(
1
(dmax − 2)γ−1
)
=⇒ f(dmax − 2) = c
(
1
(dmax − 2)γ−1 −
1
(dmax − 1)γ−1
)
...
And in general f(k) can be expressed as:
f(k) =
{
c
(
1
kγ−1 − 1(k+1)γ−1
)
, 1 ≤ k < dmax
c
(
1
kγ−1
)
, k = dmax
(5.22)
Thus the family of distributions giving rise to α-densiﬁcation have the form of (5.22). We
now further simplify this result for 1 ≤ k < dmax as follows:
f(k) = c
(
1
kγ−1
− 1
(k + 1)γ−1
)
= c
(k + 1)γ−1 − kγ−1
kγ−1(k + 1)γ−1
(a)≃ c(γ − 1)k
γ−2
kγ−1(k + 1)γ−1
≃ c(γ − 1)
kγ
,
(5.23)
where (a) follows for k suﬃciently large. Indeed, the above result shows that the family of
networks exhibiting a power-law densiﬁcation have a degree distribution close to a power-law
(of the form ck−γ). Note that the resulting PDF corresponds to the family of power-law
distributions with the power exponent γ lying between 1 and 2. Indeed, the above argument
suggests that in order to observe α-densiﬁcation, the underlying graph should have a degree
distribution in the form of a power law with degree exponent between 1 and 2. This is well
in line with the fact that many real network topologies exhibit a heavy-tailed node degree
distribution [14, 6].
In the following, assuming a power-law degree for the underlying graph, we show that
α-densiﬁcation emerges, and establish the relationship between the degree exponent and den-
siﬁcation exponent.
5.4.2 Sufficient Condition for Power-Law Densification
Having proved the power-law degree as a necessary condition for α-densiﬁcation, we assume
such a degree distribution for the underlying graph, show that it leads to α-densiﬁcation (and
thus is a suﬃcient condition for α-densiﬁcation), and establish a relationship between the
degree exponent and the densiﬁcation exponent.
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To elaborate on this, we will consider a Zipf distribution to model the degree of the ﬁxed
underlying graph G. Thus,
f(k) = c
1
kγ
, k = 1, . . . , dmax (5.24)
where γ is the Zipf parameter, and c is a normalization factor with dmax corresponding to
the maximum degree in the underlying graph G. Note that as dmax grows large, the Zipf
distribution approximates a power-law. Moreover, it can be shown that for very large dmax
the distribution has inﬁnite mean and variance for γ < 2, ﬁnite mean and inﬁnite variance
for 2 ≤ γ < 3, and ﬁnite mean and variance for γ ≥ 3.
We have
1 =
dmax∑
k=1
ck−γ ∼
∫ dmax
k=1
ck−γ dk =⇒ c = γ − 1
1− d1−γmax
≃ γ − 1,
when γ > 1 and dmax is large.
We again use the approximation (5.15), and try to verify the relationship m(s) ∼ n(s)α,
and derive the exponent α as a function of the parameters of the distribution. For the number
of discovered nodes, using the approximation (5.15), we can write
q ≃ P (D > 1/s) ≃
∫ dmax
k=1/s
ck−γ dk
=
c
γ − 1(s
γ−1 − dmax1−γ) = s
γ−1 − dmax1−γ
1− dmax1−γ
. (5.25)
Observe that if sγ−1 ≫ dmax1−γ , i.e. s ≫ 1/dmax, the right-hand side of (5.25) can be
approximated as sγ−1, where as this does not hold if s < 1/dmax.
2
Thus, for n large, we obtain
m(s) = ms
n(s) = nsγ−1.
Since m and n are ﬁxed, we have m(s) ∼ n(s)α for all s > 1/dmax, with
α =
1
γ − 1 , 1 < γ < 2 (5.26)
This result shows that a power-law degree distribution is a suﬃcient condition for power-
law densiﬁcation. Furthermore, it establishes a direct relationship between the exponent of the
degree distribution (γ) of the underlying graph and the α-densiﬁcation exponent. Notice that
the obtained exponent is constant, not depending on s, and only dependent on the parameter
of the distribution. As we will soon show through numerical evaluations, this relationship is
indeed a good approximation for the densiﬁcation exponent α.
Notice that approximation (5.15) is too crude for γ > 2, as in this case s becomes larger
than q (i.e., the the probability of edge discovery gets larger than the probability of node dis-
covery, see (5.25)). For γ > 2, we conjecture that α is close to 1, in particular for increasingly
2Again, we derive the cutoff value of s∗ = 1/dmax for the specific case of power-law degree distribution. We
derived this result for any distribution in Section 5.3.1.
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larger values of γ. We will investigate this issue numerically in the next section. Thus, when
γ > 2 the edge sampling model does not yield densiﬁcation. This was also previously shown
in Section 5.4 as a necessary condition for α-densiﬁcation.
For Zipf distribution, the average degree can be easily approximated as
E[D] ≃ γ − 1
2− γ (d
2−γ
max − 1). (5.27)
Using this, the cutoﬀ values n(s∗) andm(s∗) can well be approximated using (5.17) and (5.18).
Thus, considering (5.26) and (5.27), we can observe that as the degree exponent increases,
densiﬁcation exponents decreases, while the range over which we see α-densiﬁcation becomes
larger (since E(D) and thus the value of cutoﬀ becomes smaller). This is also validated by
numerical results in Section 5.5.
To summarize, we introduced the diﬀerent regimes over the change of sampling parameter,
calculated the value of cutoﬀ for densiﬁcation, and illustrated that for the case of power-law
degree distribution we observe α-densiﬁcation with the exponent α derived as a function of
the degree exponent. More speciﬁcally, we showed that a power-law degree distribution for
the underlying graph with exponent between 1 and 2 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for exhibiting α-densiﬁcation. Furthermore, we obtained the relationship between the degree
exponent and the densiﬁcation exponents (α = 1γ−1).
5.5 Numerical Evaluations
In this section we conduct numerical evaluations of the edge sampling model presented above.
We assume that the node degree of the underlying graph follows a Zipf distribution, given by
equation ((5.24)), with γ denoting the exponent. Moreover, we assume that the underlying
graph has n = 107 nodes. Note that in this case, dmax ≃ n.
Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of m(s) and n(s) over diﬀerent values for the sampling
parameter s in log-scale, computed using equations (5.4) and (5.6), for a Zipf distribution
with γ = 1.5. The curves exhibit an interesting behavior. As shown in Figure 5.3, at ﬁrst,
while s is small, the number of nodes discovered grows faster than the number of edges
discovered. This occurs because in this range, almost every edge discovery results in the
discovery of two nodes, which leads to a constant slope in edge-node curve. This is in line
with our claim before, i.e. no densiﬁcation when s is close to zero. Also notice the value of s
where the number of edges exceeds the number of nodes and densiﬁcation starts: the cutoﬀ
value for sampling parameter closely matches our theoretical result of s∗ = 1/dmax = 10
−7.
As s increases beyond the cutoﬀ, the number of nodes discovered grows much slower than the
number of edges. This occurs because in this range almost all nodes have been discovered
while edges continue to be discovered. Finally, as s approaches 1, the discovery process starts
saturating.
Figure 5.4 depicts the expected number of nodes discovered versus the expected number
of edges discovered using the same sampling parameter for Zipf distributions with diﬀerent
degree exponents. Notice that the plot is in log-log scale, thus, densiﬁcation is present when
the derivative (i.e., slope) of the curve is greater than 1 for a wide range of scales on n(s).
Moreover, if this derivative is approximately constant for a wide range of scales on n(s), then
the relationship between m(s) and n(s) is a power law of the type m(s) ∼ n(s)α, where α
is the slope of this straight line. Indeed, the curves for the Zipf distribution with γ < 2 in
Figure 5.4 show α-densiﬁcation, as indicated by the theoretical analysis.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of the number of nodes (n(s)) and the number of edges (m(s)) discovered
over change of sampling parameter for an underlying graph with a Zipf degree distribution
(n = 107, γ = 1.5).
Figure 5.4 also illustrates the diﬀerent regimes for α. In particular, when s is small enough,
we have α close to 1. As s increases beyond the cutoﬀ value of s∗, i.e. when the number
of discovered nodes exceeds n(s)∗, we have α greater than 1 and approximately constant.
Moreover, as we increase γ, the range over which densiﬁcation is present (i.e., α greater than
1) decreases (for a ﬁxed n), however, a higher α-densiﬁcation exponent is achieved (as proved
in Section 5.3.1). For γ = 1.5, α-densiﬁcation spans three decades, while for γ = 1.8 it spans
ﬁve decades. Finally, for γ = 2.5, we observe a slope close to 1 for the entire range of values
for s, i.e. no densiﬁcation is present, as expected.
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Figure 5.4: The number of nodes discovered (n(s)) versus the number of edges discovered
(m(s)) by the same sampling parameter for Zipf degree distributions (n = 107, γ = 1.5,
γ = 1.8, γ = 2.5).
For comparison, we estimate the densiﬁcation exponent after the threshold by using linear
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regression of the data points in this interesting regime, denoted by αˆ (as shown in Figure 5.4).
We observe that the estimated slope found through numerical evaluations is close to our
previous result, i.e. 1γ−1 . For example, for γ = 1.5, we have that αˆ = 2, which is equal to
our theoretical approximation of 1/(γ − 1), and for γ = 1.8, αˆ = 1.3, which is again close to
our prediction (1.25). Moreover, the value of cutoﬀ, i.e., n(s)∗ can be computed theoretically
using (5.17), which will be approximated by E[D] in this case since the maximum degree is
assumed to be equal to n. Using (5.27), we obtain two values of 3.16× 103 and 96 for γ = 1.5
and 1.8 respectively. As seen in the plot (as dashed lines), the cutoﬀ values closely match the
numerical results.
Also, the ﬁnal slope in the plot (not shown here) is close to the limiting theoretical slope,
α(s → 1), for diﬀerent values of γ. It is interesting to observe that α(s → 1) –which is the
asymptotic slope– is not far from αˆ. Indeed, this indicates that graphs where nodes follow a
heavy-tailed distribution tend to saturate slowly, because they have many low-degree nodes.
This results in an α-densiﬁcation exponent that is not far from 1/f(1).
We should again emphasize that the interesting regime is when the edges and nodes are
being discovered, while we are away from both early transient and late saturation phases.
In this range, we observe a constant densiﬁcation exponent over a wide range of n(s). For
a small sampling parameter, no densiﬁcation is observed, whereas for large s we reach the
asymptotic slope of α(s→ 1).
Figure 5.5 depicts the evolution of α(s) for Zipf distribution with diﬀerent values of γ,
computed using equations (5.10). We ﬁrst observe that densiﬁcation occurs for all sampling
parameters (α(s) > 1 for all 0 < s < 1). More surprisingly, we observe that α(s) quickly
converges to a nearly constant value as s increases, and ﬁnally reaches α(s→ 1). If this conver-
gence occurs orders of magnitude before saturation of the discovery process, then the model
yields an α-densiﬁcation. Finally, although α(s → 1) depends only on f(1) (see equation
(5.12)), the underlying degree distribution plays a role on determining if the edge sampling
model will yield α-densiﬁcation.
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Figure 5.5: The densiﬁcation exponent α(s) as a function of time for Zipf degree distributions
(n = 107, γ = 1.2, γ = 1.5, γ = 1.8, γ = 2.5).
In order to support our claim, Figure 5.6 depicts the relationship between the estimated
densiﬁcation exponent αˆ and the degree exponent γ. As before, αˆ was computed through
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Figure 5.6: Relationship between the densiﬁcation exponent (α) and the degree exponent (γ)
for an underlying graph with a Zipf degree distribution (n = 107)
Table 5.1: Comparison of diﬀerent parameters for diﬀerent degree distributions
γ s∗ E[D](≃ n(s)∗) α(s→ 1) 1/(γ − 1) αˆ
1.5 1E-7 3161 2.6 2 2
1.8 1E-7 96 1.9 1.25 1.3
2.5 1E-7 3 1.3 – 1
a linear regression of the points in the interesting regime (i.e., densiﬁcation regime). As
illustrated in the ﬁgure, as γ increases large, speciﬁcally when γ is greater than 2, αˆ approaches
1. This supports our conjecture that α-densiﬁcation occurs when 1 < γ < 2.
A summary of the approximated values of cutoﬀ, average degree, and the asymptotic/
expected/estimated slope is shown in table 5.5. A basic comparison validates our theoretical
results, and the accuracy of the obtained values for the densiﬁcation behavior and cutoﬀ.
Basically, the estimated densiﬁcation exponent αˆ (through linear regression) is quite close to
the predicted exponent from theory (α = 1/(γ − 1)). Moreoever, comparing the theoretical
values of cutoﬀ (s∗ and n(s)∗) with the numerical results in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 well assesses
the goodness of our theoretical approximations in Section 5.3.
Finally, we examine the robustness of edge sampling model through truncating the degree
distribution from left and/or right. We show that the exponent for α-densiﬁcation is only a
function of the degree exponent of the underlying graph, and truncating the distribution does
not aﬀect the observed exponent α. In other words, we claim that densiﬁcation behavior in
the regime of interest does not depend on the maximum or minimum degree (or in general,
individual lags) of the underlying graph, and the same densiﬁcation exponent will be present
as far as the degree γ is preserved. In order to do this, we truncate the distribution from left
and right (resulting in lower maximum degree and higher minimum degree) without changing
the behavior in the middle. Two scenarios are considered: In the ﬁrst case, after truncation
we rescale the distribution to distribute the mass over all points. In the second case, all the
mass (either from the truncation point up to n for maximum degree, or from 1 to truncation
point for minimum degree) is put at the truncation point.
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Figure 5.7 depicts the edge-node curve of the same Zipf distributions (before saturation
point), but truncated at left and right at the values of 5 and 8×106 respectively, i.e., dmin = 5
and dmax = 8× 106 (instead of the default values of 1 and n = 107).
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Figure 5.7: The number of nodes discovered (n(s)) versus the number of edges discovered
(m(s)) for truncated Zipf degree distribution with γ = 1.5 (n = 107)
As shown in the ﬁgure, we observe two parallel lines for two cases of rescaling the distri-
bution after truncation or putting the mass at truncation points. Furthermore, this slope is
equal to the original densiﬁcation exponent α = 1γ−1 . Thus, the edge sampling model is robust
in the sense that the densiﬁcation behavior remains the same when truncating the distribu-
tion, while keeping the same degree exponent. However, as can be observed in Figure 5.7, the
cutoﬀ point (and thus the densiﬁcation regime) will be diﬀerent, because the average degree
and the maximum degree are diﬀerent in the two truncation processes. Also note that the left
lag has an eﬀect on the saturation regime, where moving the lag farther above zero results
in an inﬁnite densiﬁcation exponent at saturation (i.e., α(s→ 1) =∞, since f(1) = 0). This
was previously conﬁrmed by theoretical results as well (but not shown here in the plot). The
same result holds for other values of γ.
In summary, the edge sampling model has a single parameter s that varies between zero
and one and is used to sweep the edge-node curve. As s approaches zero, the slope of the
curve approaches 1, thus no densiﬁcation is present. However, for suﬃciently large s, it is
possible that the curve follows a power-law, thus exhibiting α-densiﬁcation. Moreover, this
cutoﬀ point for a suﬃciently large s depends on the the average degree and maximum degree
of the underlying graph. In particular, for a power-law degree distribution, a larger skew (i.e.,
smaller γ) requires a larger cutoﬀ (i.e., a larger s). However, a larger skew also means that
the densiﬁcation exponent will be larger (since α = 1/(γ − 1)). If the degree distribution is
not skewed enough (i.e., if γ > 2), then no cutoﬀ exists, meaning that the slope is always 1,
and thus, no densiﬁcation is present. Finally, the densiﬁcation exponent is a function of the
tail exponent of the distribution, and is robust to truncation through rescaling and putting
mass at cut points.
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5.5.1 Observation Models
In the previous section we evaluate the edge sampling model numerically, which has a single
parameter, namely, the edge sampling probability, s. Before applying the model to real data,
we comment on the relationship between how datasets of real networks are gathered, and also
on the choice of the parameter s. In particular, considering how these datasets are obtained,
we believe that the parameter s varies for either of the following reasons:
Accumulation In this interpretation of the sampling model, knowledge about the edges and
nodes of the underlying graph is accumulated over time. This captures studies where
new edges (and consequently nodes) are added to an evolving graph; this is the case, for
example, in arXiv citation graph, or IMDB actors-to-movies graph (analyzed in [63]).
Thus, the key parameter of this model is time, which will determine the probability that
edges and nodes are discovered, i.e. s = f(t). As time grows from zero to inﬁnity, the
sampling parameter varies from zero to one, resulting in the gradual discovery of edges
and nodes.
We assume that any edge e is associated with an independent renewal process of rate λ,
started in steady state. We deﬁne then FF (t, λ) to be the inter-sampling time cumulative
distribution for an edge with a sampling rate of λ. Moreover, the sampling rate of an
edge is also a random variable with cumulative distribution FR(λ), identical for all edges
of G. We will also assume that sampling rates are chosen independently and that edges
are also sampled independently of each other.
Modulation In this interpretation of the model, a fixed time window is considered. In
other words, the sampling parameter s, is a function of a global sampling rate, which
determines the rate with which the edges ﬁre within a given ﬁxed length time window.
Diﬀerent time windows can have diﬀerent intensities with respect to the edge sampling
rates. The motivation behind this interpretation is that in the analysis of real data
we often consider ﬁxed windows of time over the dataset, as opposed to an increasing
time interval. However, diﬀerent windows of time may have diﬀerent sampling rates.
For example, consider the study of e-mail networks and a time window of one month.
It is natural that diﬀerent months will have diﬀerent intensities of e-mail exchange.
For example, a vacation month will surely have a lower sampling rate than an end-of-
semester month, in the e-mail network of a large university.
As before, we introduce an inter-sampling time distribution. However, here we deﬁne
a modulating intensity parameter Λ; it inﬂuences the edge sampling rates. So we have
s = f(λ). In particular, the edge sampling rate will be given by
λ = Λλo (5.28)
where λo is a random variable that follows the original edge sampling rate cumulative
distribution, FR(λ). Note that the actual edge sampling rate distribution is simply the
original edge sampling rate distribution scaled by a constant Λ.
Notice that we are only giving diﬀerent interpretations to s. In particular, we let s be
controlled either by t or by Λ, which will be the case when we apply the edge sampling model
to real datasets.
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5.6 Real Data Experiments and Variations of the Model
In this section, we apply the edge sampling model to two datasets of real network data.
The goal is to illustrate that the sampling model can capture and thus partially explain,
the observed densiﬁcation when considering data from these networks. In order to do this,
we consider the two variations of the model, i.e. accumulation and modulation. Thus, the
sampling parameter s will be a function of time or intensity, respectively, and is determined
through the choice of this function, as described below.
Unfortunately, we do not have the real underlying graph to drive the edge sampling
process. We also have no knowledge of the edge sampling probability s, which can be char-
acterized by the edge sampling rates and the inter-sampling time distribution. Therefore, in
order to apply the model we propose, we will use the actual dataset to derive estimates for
these unknown parameters.
The underlying graph G = (V,E) we consider is given by the accumulated graph over the
entire dataset, i.e.,
G[0, tf ] = (V [0, tf ], E[0, tf ]),
where tf is the length of the available dataset. Thus, we will assume that the degree distribu-
tion of the underlying graph is given by the empirical degree distribution of G[0, tf ], namely
f¯(k).
Concerning the edge sampling process, we will assume that the edge sampling rate for
each edge is given by its average over the entire dataset (or its average over a time window,
for the case of modulation). Thus, for each edge e ∈ E, we deﬁne λe = |Mij [0, tf ]|/tf , where
edge e = (i, j) and Mij [0, tf ] is the set of samples of the edge (i, j) available in the dataset in
the period [0, tf ] (same argument valid for a ﬁxed time window). Finally, we assume that the
inter-sampling times of an edge e ∈ E is exponentially distributed with an associated rate λ,
i.e. the sampling parameter s will be a function of time and rate. Thus,
FF (t, λ) = s(t, λ) = 1− e−λt. (5.29)
To apply the sampling model to real data, we will consider various versions of the model,
from the most parsimonious model to the most detailed use of information from real data.
In all cases, the goal is to ﬁnd the edge-node curve, to investigate whether a power-law
relationship exists between the number of edges and nodes, and to compare the estimated
exponent with that of the real data to verify the edge sampling model. We suggest the
following experiments:
Simple Edge Sampling Model - Accumulation This is the simplest case where the only
parameters we use from the data are the empirical degree distribution of the underlying
graph, f¯(k), with n nodes and m edges, and the total number of exchanged messages
in [0, tf ]. For the rate, we assume all edges have the same rate equal to the overall
average message rate per edge, i.e. λ = |M [0, tf ]|/tf/m. Thus by ﬁxing λ and changing
t from 0 to tf , we derive the edge sampling probability for each t using (5.29). We can
then derive diﬀerent points in edge-node curve for each value of s using the following
equations:
m(s) = nd¯s/2
n(s) = n
∞∑
k=0
f¯(k)
[
1− (1− s)k
]
. (5.30)
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Note that here s is a function of t, and λ is ﬁxed (s(t) = 1− e−λt).
Simple Edge Sampling Model - Modulation In this case, we consider a ﬁxed time win-
dow (thus t is ﬁxed to 1). The parameters we use from data include the empirical degree
distribution of the underlying graph f¯(k), and the number of exchanged messages at
each window of time, i.e., |M [t, t]| (which would yield the total number of messages
|M [0, tf ]| as well). Then, for each time window, we estimate an average message rate,
same for all edges, using the edge sampling intensity of that window, i.e. Λt = |M [t, t]|/Λ,
where Λ = |M [0, tf ]|/tf is the overall average message rate (per time window). Thus
the average message rate per edge for each time window will be λ = Λt/m, ﬁxed for all
edges in time-stamp t, and we can again use the empirical degree distribution f¯(k) and
equations (5.29) and (5.30) to derive the points in edge-node curve. Note that here s is
a function of λ and t is ﬁxed to 1 (s(λ) = 1− e−λt).
Edge Sampling Using Rate Distribution Here we use both empirical degree distribu-
tion f¯(k) and the rate distribution fR(λ) of the underlying accumulated graph. So, we
are using more detailed information from the data: the rate distribution. More speciﬁ-
cally, rather than considering the average number of exchanged messages (overall or per
time window), we assume that we know the empirical edge-sampling rate distribution,
i.e., the distribution of the number of messages Mij exchanged over the whole period
of [0, tf ]. Then, for each time instance t, we ﬁnd m(s) and n(s) by using the degree
distribution and equations (5.30), knowing that here s can be derived by unconditioning
on λ as follows:
s =
∫ ∞
0
(1 − e−λt)fR(λ) dλ (5.31)
Now for the case of accumulation, by changing the parameter t (and thus s), we can
derive the edge-node curve using equations (5.30) and (5.31). Note that for the modu-
lation case, we must have for each time window a diﬀerent rate distribution, and we set
t to 1. The rest of the argument is the same as above, only that diﬀerent points on the
edge-node curve are obtained for diﬀerent rate distributions for each time window.
Edge Sampling Using Exact Structure In this case, we use the exact structure of the
underlying accumulated graph, i.e. again more information of the underlying graph. In
other words, instead of using the degree/rate distribution of the edges, we consider every
edge and calculate its empirical rate λe (proportional to the sum of all the messages
the edge has exchanged over the period of the dataset). We iterate over all edges and
nodes of the underlying graph, and sum up their probability of being sampled using
their exact rates to obtain the total number of edges and nodes. This way we derive
the edge-node curve by varying either time instant t (and ﬁxing λe for each edge), i.e.,
accumulation, or ﬁnding λe of each edge for each time window (and ﬁxing t to 1), i.e.,
modulation. This can be summarized as follows:
m(t) =
∑
e∈E
(1− eλet)
n(t) =
∑
v∈V
(1− eλvt), (5.32)
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where λv corresponds to the rate of node v, equal to the sum of the rates of its incident
edges, i.e.
λv =
∑
e∈N (v)
λe, (5.33)
with N (v) denoting the neighborhood of node v.
Again note that for accumulation, the parameter t will be changed, whereas λe is ﬁxed
for each edge (but diﬀerent for all edges), and for modulation, t is ﬁxed and λe’s change
for every time window.
In this dissertation, we show the results for the ﬁrst two experiments, i.e., simple edge
sampling model, by using accumulation and modulation, and we show how well the edge
sampling model works for modeling the densiﬁcation behavior. We leave further experiments
on the model to future work. We use an EPFL e-mail dataset for accumulation and modulation
models, and Autonomous Systems data only for modulation.
5.6.1 Simple Accumulation Model
We will consider an EPFL e-mail dataset described in Section 5.2. Recall that this dataset
leads to α-densiﬁcation, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Using the same dataset, we obtain
the necessary parameters to construct the edge sampling model, as described above. The
underlying graph is formed through the accumulation of edges and nodes over a 89-week
period, and the same overall average message rate (per edge) is applied for all edges. Finally,
we numerically compute n(t) and m(t) for this speciﬁc model. As with the original dataset,
t is measured in weeks and varies from 1 to 89.
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Figure 5.8: The edge sampling model applied to the EPFL e-mail network dataset.
The results produced by the model are shown in Figure 5.8. The plot clearly indicates
that the edge sampling process leads to the densiﬁcation of the number of edges versus nodes
that are discovered over time. Moreover, the densiﬁcation produced by the model seems to
follow a power law, with αˆ = 1.8 (recall that αˆ is the slope of the line obtained through a
linear regression over the points in the plot). Surprisingly, this exponent closely matches the
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actual data (αˆ = 1.57, see Figure 5.1), which indicates that the edge sampling process is a
very plausible explanation for the observed densiﬁcation.
To assess the goodness of the ﬁtted slope, we consider the conﬁdence interval for the slope
of the line obtained through linear regression in Figure 5.1. Using simple statistical tools,
we obtain the 95% conﬁdence interval for the slope of the ﬁtted line. For EPFL e-mail data
set, we ﬁnd a conﬁdence interval of (1.55, 1.57) with the slope being αˆ = 1.57. Thus, the
estimated slope is well above 1 with high probability, which shows a clear densiﬁcation as the
network grows. The same is true when the edge sampling model is applied to real data, thus
resulting in a slope of suﬃciently larger than 1 with small error.
5.6.2 Simple Modulation Model
In this section we will apply the edge sampling model over a ﬁxed window of time (proposed
in Section 5.5.1 as modulation) to real data. Recall that the basis for this model is that real
data is often provided in snapshots over a ﬁxed window of time. Moreover, even when this is
not the case, data analysis often considers data only over a ﬁxed window of time, varying the
position of the window over the dataset.
EPFL E-mail Dataset
We start by presenting the results for the actual EPFL e-mail dataset. Recall that the EPFL
e-mail dataset is provided in snapshots of weeks (i.e., all messages that were sent/received
during a given week). Thus, for each week t = 1, . . . , 89, we can deﬁne the graph G[t, t] =
(V [t, t], E[t, t]), which is deﬁned using only messages exchanged during that week. For each
graph, we let n(t) = |V [t, t]| denote the number of nodes and m(t) = |E[t, t]| denote the
number of edges. Diﬀerently from before, notice that n(t) and m(t) correspond to the number
of nodes and edges respectively, seen on week t only.
Figure 5.9 shows the plot of n(t) versus m(t) for t = 1, . . . , 89 for the actual EPFL e-mail
dataset. Interestingly, we again observe densiﬁcation despite the fact that information about
the graph is not accumulated over time. Thus, densiﬁcation arises here for reasons other than
accumulation over time, as each point corresponds to exactly one week. Moreover, there is
no trend between time and the points in the plot. Although the points do not form a straight
line, there is a clear increasing trend among them. When ﬁtted to a straight line, we obtain
a slope of αˆ = 1.89, as illustrated in the ﬁgure.
As before, we ﬁnd the conﬁdence interval for the estimated slope, which in this case is
(1.65, 2.12). Although the intervals do not express tight bounds, we can still claim that with
high probability we observe a clear densiﬁcation.
In order to apply the simple edge sampling model through modulation, we again need
to determine its parameters. Besides the underlying graph and the sampling process, we
also need to determine the edge sampling intensity. We will estimate as before the actual
underlying graph and sampling process, by considering the graph accumulated over the entire
dataset and the average rate of messages per edge. We still need to determine, however, the
edge sampling intensity for each ﬁxed time window.
Let Λt denote the edge sampling intensity of week t. We deﬁne Λt = |M [t, t]|/Λ, where
M [t, t] is the set of messages in the dataset during week t and Λ is the overall average message
rate (per week). In particular, we deﬁne Λ = |M [1, 89]|/89. Thus, Λt measures the average
intensity of the edge sampling rate of week t in relationship to the overall average edge
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Figure 5.9: Densiﬁcation of EPFL e-mail dataset using a ﬁxed time window (1 week).
sampling rate. In other words, the sampling parameter s will be a function of the modulating
intensity parameter in this case.
We can now apply the edge sampling model with a ﬁxed time window. Notice that
each week t corresponds to a diﬀerent time window with edge sampling intensity Λt. Figure
5.10 shows the expected number of nodes n(Λt) versus the expected number of edges m(Λt)
discovered for each week t. It is clear that the model yields densiﬁcation when considering
the diﬀerent weeks. Moreover, there is strong linear dependence between n(Λt) and m(Λt)
indicating a power law relationship. Finally, a straight line ﬁtted to the data yields the slope
αˆ = 1.5, which is fairly close to the actual dataset, with a conﬁdence interval far above 1. This
supports the claim that the proposed edge sampling model captures the discovery process of
edges and nodes.
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Figure 5.10: The edge sampling model with ﬁxed time window applied to EPFL e-mail dataset
(1 week).
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AS Graph Dataset
In this section we consider another dataset of network data that is publicly available, the
AS graph. The Internet today is composed of several thousands Autonomous Systems (ASs)
that interconnect with each other providing global connectivity. Most of ASs are owned and
operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) such as AT&T or MCI, and other ASs belong
to smaller businesses or universities. The interconnection of ASs forms a graph, which is
known as the AS graph.
Information about the AS graph is provided daily through snapshots generated from an
aggregate of information about the network. However, for a myriad of reasons, these daily
snapshots provide only an estimate of the real AS graph. Moreover, the real AS graph
constantly changes, as both ASs and their interconnections are added and deleted over time.
We consider a dataset of the AS graph formed by 735 daily snapshots. As for the EPFL
e-mail dataset, each snapshot deﬁnes a graph G[t, t] = (V [t, t], E[t, t]) formed by all nodes and
edges that appear in day t. For each day t, we thus have a number of nodes n(t) = |V [t, t]|
and a number of edges e(t) = |E[t, t]|.
Figure 5.11 shows the result of plotting n(t) versus e(t) in log-log scale for all days.
Although the number of nodes and edges vary little from one day to another, the plot still
strongly indicates a power law densiﬁcation with αˆ = 1.09.
To assess the goodness of this ﬁt, we calculate the conﬁdence interval for the slope, which
yields the interval (1.08, 1.1). Thus although αˆ is close to 1, with high probability it will be
a value above 1, resulting in densiﬁcation.
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Figure 5.11: Densiﬁcation of the AS graph dataset using a ﬁxed time window (1 day).
We will apply the edge sampling model with ﬁxed time window to the AS graph dataset.
Notice that since each snapshot provides full view of the AS graph, the edge sampling model
where information is accumulated over time is not suitable for this dataset. However, in order
to apply the ﬁxed time window model we need to estimate its parameters from this dataset.
We execute the same procedure used for EPFL e-mail dataset, estimating the ﬁxed underlying
graph and the edge sampling rates using the accumulated graph3. We also determine in the
3In the AS graph dataset, for each snapshot, each edge has either rate 1 (i.e., edge is present in the AS
graph) or 0 (i.e., edge is not present).
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same manner, for each daily snapshot, the edge sampling intensity.
Figure 5.12 shows the result obtained with the model for the various sampling intensi-
ties Λt. Once again, we observe densiﬁcation on the number of nodes and edges discovered
when considering each ﬁxed time window. Moreover, there is a roughly linear trend in this
relationship, indicating a power law densiﬁcation, with αˆ = 2, as illustrated in the plot.
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Figure 5.12: The edge sampling model with ﬁxed time window applied to the AS graph
dataset 1 day).
Although the slope of the ﬁtted line (αˆ) yielded by the model is not very close to that
of the actual data, we still believe the model is representative of how nodes and edges are
revealed in this dataset, and we observe a clear densifying behavior.
There can be diﬀerent reasons the model does not match the data accurately. First, the
real underlying graph is unknown, and it also changes in time. In order to apply the model to
real data and do the simulations, we made the assumption of having the degree distribution of
the ﬁnal accumulative graph for the underlying graph. As seen before, the degree distribution
of the underlying graph is a key factor in the densiﬁcation behavior and the observed exponent.
Thus, this assumption surely aﬀects the result when edge sampling is applied to real data.
Furthermore, in applying the model to ﬁxed time windows, we estimated an average intensity
through ﬁnding the ratio of total number of messages in a ﬁxed window and the total number
of messages in the ﬁnal accumulative graph. How accurate this estimation is still needs to
be investigated on more datasets. In general, the mismatch with data is mostly due to the
fact that the simple edge sampling model uses minimal information from data, and the use
of more detailed information such as rate distribution or exact structure would increase the
accuracy.
We also applied the proposed models to the exact structure of the underlying graph (where
the underlying graph is given by the ﬁnal cumulative graph), as opposed to considering only
the empirical degree distribution (i.e., the last experiment suggested in the beginning of Sec-
tion 5.6). Using the edge sampling model with exponential inter-sampling time distribution,
we observe that results from the model match real data very accurately for both cases of
accumulation and modulation. This further strengthens our claim that densiﬁcation arises
regardless of the process used for sampling the edges.
We have considered a couple other datasets analyzed by Leskovec et al. [63], namely the
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IMDB actors-to-movies bipartite graph and arXiv citation graph. However, these datasets
are not good examples to which the proposed edge sampling model can be applied. To be
more precise, in the citation graph, nodes (i.e., papers) in the graph appear ﬁrst, and edges
(i.e., citations) appear afterwards, when a given paper cites another. Thus, in this dataset,
new nodes are not revealed through sampling the edges of the graph. In the IMDB dataset,
movies and actors correspond to the two diﬀerent types of nodes of a bipartite graph. An
edge between a given pair of nodes is present when a given actor plays a role in a given movie.
Thus, each edge is sampled only once (i.e., when an actor plays in a new movie), as the
edge will never be sampled again, giving rise to a constant edge sampling rate for all edges.
For these reasons, in this work, we do not consider these datasets in the framework of the
proposed edge sampling model, and leave experiments on more datasets to future work.
5.7 Related Work
Network (or graph) densiﬁcation is a phenomenon that was recently observed by Leskovec et
al. in various datasets of real-data over time [61, 63]. In particular, they empirically observe
that the number of edges grows much faster than the number of nodes in these graphs. More
surprising, for all datasets considered is that this relationship seemed to follow a power law
of the type
m(t) ∝ n(t)α,
where m(t) and n(t) denote the number of edges and nodes of the graph at time t, and α is
called the densiﬁcation exponent, a constant greater than 1. Under this relationship, known
as the densification power law, the average node degree grows with time, thus the graph
densiﬁes.
Most of the graphs considered in their work were generated by accumulating the data
available in the datasets over time. However, they also considered the case where the graph
is generated by considering only ﬁxed windows of time. This is the case for the AS graph and
the e-mail network. For the e-mail network, they observe that the densiﬁcation exponent is
larger for the ﬁxed time window case, which is consistent with our observations.
Besides providing empirical evidence of network densiﬁcation, Leskovec et al. also provide
mathematical models that can capture and partially explain this phenomenon [61, 63]. The
intuition behind their models is that densiﬁcation occurs due to the growth of the network.
Basically, nodes arriving at a later point tend to establish more edges than nodes arrived
earlier. The proposed Forest Fire Model is based on this intuition and is a model for network
growth, where nodes and edges are added to the graph over time. They also prove that this
model leads to the densiﬁcation of the network over time. Leskovec et al. also investigate
other growth models for networks, showing how properties such as power law densiﬁcation
can arise, in particular when using the model of Kronecker Graphs [57, 54].
An observation similar to the ﬁndings of Leskovec et al. concerning network densiﬁcation
was also previously made by Dorogovtsev and Mendes [22]. They empirically observed that
the graph formed by the World Wide Web was densifying over time, naming this phenomenon
accelerated growth. They also propose a model to capture this phenomenon where the average
node degree grows as a power law in time.
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5.8 Summary
In this work we investigate the recently observed phenomenon known as densification, where
the number of edges of a network grows much faster than the number of nodes. We provide,
in particular, a novel explanation for this phenomenon when considering some real datasets.
The key idea is that densiﬁcation arises naturally from the process used to reveal the edges
and nodes of the unknown underlying graph. For most datasets, this process is based on the
discovery of edges that are then used to discover nodes. Based on this idea, we propose the
edge sampling model, where edges from a ﬁxed underlying graph are sampled by changing a
sampling parameter s, leading to their discovery and to the discovery of adjacent nodes.
By assuming a heavy-tailed degree distribution for the underlying graph, we prove prop-
erties concerning the densiﬁcation of the number of edges and nodes discovered over diﬀerent
values for the sampling parameter. In particular, we show that a power law relationship,
which we call α-densiﬁcation, can arise over a wide range of scales with exponent given by
1
γ−1 , where γ is the power-law exponent of the node degree distribution of the underlying
graph. We also prove limiting results for densiﬁcation exponent as s approaches both ex-
tremes (i.e., 0 and 1), and show that densiﬁcation can be present and it is bounded for all
0 < s < 1.
Furthermore, we show that a graph densiﬁes if and only if its underlying degree distribution
is of the form of a power-law. This is the case for a wide range of real-world graphs and suggests
that densiﬁcation can be observed in most real networks.
We also comment on the relationship of empirical network studies with the edge sampling
model, and speciﬁcally, on what factors aﬀect the sampling probability s. We introduce two
observation models, namely accumulation and modulation. In the ﬁrst variation, edges and
nodes are discovered and accumulated over time; in the second variation, time is ﬁxed but
the edge sampling intensity for a given time window is allowed to vary.
Finally, we consider datasets of real graphs, namely the EPFL e-mail network and the
Internet AS graph, both of which show densiﬁcation over time. We apply the two variations
of our model to these datasets and the results obtained indicate that the edge sampling model
is indeed a plausible alternative explanation for the observed densiﬁcation phenomenon.
Publication [84]
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5.A Appendix
Here we ﬁnd upper and lower bounds for equation (5.10), i.e.
α(p) =
(1− p) (1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k)
p
∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
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We ﬁrst consider the upper bound. For p > 1/2, we have 1− p < p. Thus we can write
(1− p) (1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k)
p
∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
(a)
≤ 1− p∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
=
1
f¯(1) + f¯(2)(1 − p) + · · · ≤
1
f¯(1)
where (a) follows as the second term in the numerator is P (v), and thus less than 1.
Now we consider the lower bound. We can rewrite α(t) as
α(t) =
(
1− p∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
(
1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k
p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
. (5.34)
Assuming f¯(0) = 0 (which is the case for Zipf distribution), and using
∑
k f¯(k) = 1, we
have,
Q =
f¯(1)(1 − p) + f¯(2)(1 − p) + f¯(3)(1 − p) + · · ·
f¯(1)(1 − p) + f¯(2) · 2e(1− p)2 + · · · (5.35)
Comparing the coeﬃcients of f¯(k) in the numerator and denominator of (5.35) for all k > 1,
we have,
(1− p) ≥ k(1− p)k, k = 2, 3, . . . if ln 1
1− p ≥
ln(k)
k − 1 . (5.36)
Since ln(k)k−1 is a decreasing function of k, the condition p ≥ 1/2 (derived by substituting k = 2)
suﬃces to have each term in the numerator equal or greater than the corresponding term in
the denominator, i.e.
f¯(k)(1 − p) ≥ f¯(k)k(1 − p)k, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . if p ≥ 1/2, (5.37)
which results in Q ≥ 1. Note that for k = 1 the two corresponding terms are equal, thus
satisfying (5.37).
Following the same approach for T , we have,
T =
1−
Y︷ ︸︸ ︷(
f¯(1)(1 − p) + f¯(2)(1 − p)2 + · · · )
1− (f¯(1)(1 − p) + f¯(2)(1 − p) + · · · )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
. (5.38)
Comparing the coeﬃcients of f¯(k), k = 1, 2, . . . in Y and Z, we observe,
f¯(k)(1 − p)k ≤ f¯(k)(1 − p), k = 1, 2 . . . , (5.39)
which results in Z ≤ Y , yielding T ≥ 1. Thus,
α(t) = Q · T ≥ 1, if p ≥ 1/2, (5.40)
which proves the lower bound in equation (5.11).
Putting all together, we proved that for p ≥ 1/2,
1 ≤ α(p) ≤ 1
f¯(1)
. (5.41)
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Next, we prove the two limiting results for α(p) as deﬁned in equation (5.10). Deﬁne
α(p→ 0) to be the limit of α(p) when p goes to zero. Thus,
α(p→ 0) = lim
p→0
α(p)
= lim
p→0
(1− p) (1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k)
p
∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
= lim
p→0
1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − pk + · · · )
p
∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − pk · · · )
= 1
where we used Taylor’s expansion for (1− p)k.
Now deﬁne α(p→ 1) to be the limit of α(p) when p goes to 1. Thus,
α(p→ 1) = lim
p→1
α(p)
= lim
p→1
(1− p) (1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k)
p
∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
= lim
p→1
1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k
p
· (1− p)∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k
= lim
p→1
1−∑k f¯(k)(1 − p)k
p
· 1∑
k f¯(k)k(1 − p)k−1
(b)
=
(
1− f¯(0)) ( 1
f¯(1)
)
=
1− f¯(0)
f¯(1)
(5.42)
where (b) follows because in the ﬁrst term of the product, the denominator goes to one and
all terms in the sum go to zero except for k = 0; in the second term of the product, all terms
in the sum go to zero except for k = 1.
Note that when f¯(0) = 0, equation (5.42) simpliﬁes to 1
f¯(1)
. This simpliﬁcation applies
in the case of the Zipf distribution, where f¯(0) = 0 independent of its parameter s and n.
Moreover, for the Zipf distribution, we have that f¯(1) = 1/A, where A is the normalization
factor of the distribution, which is given by
A =
n∑
i=1
1/is = 1 +
1
2s
+
1
3s
+ · · · + 1
ns
. (5.43)
Thus, for the Zipf distribution, we have that α(p→ 1) = 1/f¯(1) = A.
Part III
Preserving Privacy in
Recommender Systems
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6 Preserving Privacy in Collabora-
tive Filtering
In recommender systems, usually, a central server needs to have access to users’ proﬁles in
order to generate useful recommendations. Having this access, however, undermines the users’
privacy. The more information is revealed to the server on the user-item relations, the lower
the users’ privacy is. Yet, hiding part of the proﬁles to increase the privacy comes at the cost
of recommendation accuracy or diﬃculty of implementing the method. In this chapter, we
propose a distributed mechanism for users to augment their proﬁles in a way that obfuscates
the user-item connection to an untrusted server, with minimum loss on the accuracy of the
recommender system. We rely on the central server to generate the recommendations. How-
ever, each user stores his proﬁle oﬄine, modiﬁes it by partly merging it with the proﬁle of
similar users through direct contact with them, and only then periodically uploads his proﬁle
to the server. We propose a metric to measure privacy at the system level, using graph match-
ing concepts. Applying our method to the Netﬂix prize dataset, we show the eﬀectiveness of
the algorithm in solving the tradeoﬀ between privacy and accuracy in recommender systems
in an applicable way.
6.1 Introduction
Recommendation systems are widely used to help users, overwhelmed by the huge number of
options available to them, to ﬁnd items that they might like. The items can be of any type:
books, movies, web pages, restaurants, sightseeing places, online news, and even lifestyles.
By collecting information about users’ preferences for diﬀerent items, a recommender system
creates user profiles. The preferences of a user in the past can help the recommender system
to predict other items that might also be of interest to the user in the future. Collaborative
ﬁltering (CF), as one of the main categories of recommender systems, relies on the similarities
of users’ tastes: if two users have similar preferences for certain items, each user probably
enjoys the items of interest to the other. Thus, the more each user gives information about his
interests, the more meaningful the recommendations will be. This is the basis of CF systems.
In order to run the process of recommending items to users, recommender servers need
to have access to users’ proﬁles. Therefore, the proﬁles are usually stored on repositories to
which collaborative ﬁltering algorithms can have access. In such systems, the users do not
have technical measures to limit the amount of information on their proﬁles to the server,
that might not be necessary for generating recommendations. In other words, users have to
put their proﬁles online (i.e., on the server) and trust the server (and the service providers)
to keep the users’ proﬁles private. The information available to the server hurts the privacy
of the users on two levels.
First, if a user’s real identity is available to the server, the server can associate the user’s
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proﬁle, which contains his private information, to his real identity (e.g., Amazon knows the
real identities and postal addresses of those who have purchased products and can link them
with the proﬁle of those users). This is an obvious privacy breach, considering that a user
does not want the link between his real identity and his proﬁle to be revealed, yet he wants
to use the service. This threat becomes more obvious when users share their opinion about
the locations they regularly visit, e.g., restaurants, libraries, coﬀee shops, or sport centers [3].
Second, even if the real identity of a user is not known to the server, it can try to de-
anonymize the user’s identity by correlating the information contained in the user’s proﬁle
and some information obtained from other databases [77].
Obviously, hiding information from the server helps to thwart these threats. Nevertheless,
users want to receive accurate recommendations. Hence, the tradeoﬀ between privacy and
accuracy appears. The more accurate information the server has about users’ proﬁles, the
more meaningful the server’s recommendations are, but the lower the users’ privacy will be.
Moving from centralized approaches to distributed collaborative ﬁltering algorithms solves
the privacy issues to a great extent [13, 69]. Yet, distributed CF algorithms are not as accurate
as their centralized versions that have complete information about users’ proﬁles. Moreover,
they are not as practical as the centralized CF systems. The users’ cooperation is needed
not only to protect their privacy but also to make the system run properly. Making use
of sophisticated cryptographic tools [18] might be another approach to solving the problem.
However, these approaches are usually not practical and therefore remain unused. The security
of these systems depends on that of their key establishment and key management. Considering
that the perfect implementation of these schemes is hard to achieve in practice, they are not
well received. Therefore, ﬁnding a more practical solution that does not trade much system
accuracy in order to gain privacy for the users is an unsolved problem and yet crucial for
users of CF systems.
In this chapter, we propose a method that provides a compromise for the tradeoﬀ between
privacy on the one hand and accuracy and practicality on the other hand. In other words,
our method increases the privacy in a practical way with a negligible eﬀect on the recommen-
dation accuracy. To this end, we still rely on the central server to generate recommendations.
Additionally, we employ a distributed communication between users in order to improve their
privacy. In our model, each user has two versions of his proﬁle: the online (on the server)
and the oﬄine (located on the user’s side), where the online proﬁle is frequently synchronized
with the oﬄine version. Basically, the actual proﬁle of a user is a subset of his oﬄine proﬁle.
Users’ oﬄine proﬁles are aggregated in order to obfuscate the actual items rated by each
user. As we will show, the hybrid nature of our approach helps users to gain privacy from
distributed aggregation and to reach a level of accuracy comparable to the one achieved with
a centralized CF.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we deﬁne our
notations and basic elements of a CF and state the problem, i.e., privacy preserving in the
presence of an untrusted server. In Section 6.3, we provide an overview of the solution
and elaborate our approach. In Section 6.4, we deﬁne evaluation metrics for privacy and
recommendation accuracy. In Section 6.5, we validate the eﬃciency of our method by applying
it to the real data set from the Netﬂix prize competition. Finally, in Sections 6.6 and 6.7, we
review the related work and conclude.
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6.2 Problem Statement
6.2.1 Definitions and Notations
Formally, a collaborative ﬁltering (CF) algorithm deals with a set of users and a set of items.
In our setting, the non-empty set of users in the system is denoted by U , where |U| = N .
We also represent the non-empty set of items by I, where |I| = M . Let ru,i(t) be the
rating of user u to item i at time t, where ru,i(t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · rmax} and rmax is the maximum
valid rating. The set of items rated by user u up to time t is denoted by Iu(t) ⊆ I. The
profile of user u at time t is deﬁned as {(i, ru,i(t)) s.t. i ∈ Iu(t)} which is the set of items
coupled with their ratings rated by the user until t. We denote by fi(t) the rating frequency
of item i at time t which is the fraction of users that have rated item i up to time t (i.e.,
fi(t) = |{u ∈ U s.t. i ∈ Iu(t)}|/N). To simplify the presentation, we sometimes omit the time
index if it is clear from the context.
Collaborative ﬁltering algorithms attempt to make predictions on the ratings of a particu-
lar user by collecting taste information from other users. CF algorithms fall into two general
classes: model-based and memory-based methods [17]. Model-based algorithms learn a prob-
abilistic model from the underlying data using statistical techniques, then they use the model
to make predictions. Memory-based methods ﬁnd similar users or items in the dataset in
order to predict the items that a user might like and recommend them to him. This approach
is based on the assumption that similar users prefer similar items, or that the preferred items
of a user are similar. Memory-based CF methods can be further divided into two groups:
user-based and item-based [96]. User-based methods, which are the focus of this work, are
heuristics to predict a rating of a user to an item by combining the ratings of users who are
most similar to the target user (so called, the user’s neighbors). The Pearson’s correlation
coeﬃcient, as a popular measure [42], estimates the similarity wu,v between two users u and
v, as follows.
wu,v =
∑
i∈(Iu∩Iv)
(ru,i − ru)(rv,i − rv)√∑
i∈(Iu∩Iv)(ru,i − ru)2 ·
∑
i∈(Iu∩Iv)(rv,i − rv)2
(6.1)
where, ru is the mean of ratings assigned by user u.
In order to predict the rating of user u to item i, ﬁrst, the similarity of u to all other users
is computed and then the nearest neighbors of u, denoted by set Nu, are determined. The
set Nu contains |Nu| users who are, based on (6.1), the most similar users to u. Next, the
prediction of ru,i, denoted by rˆu,i, is done by combining the ratings of neighbors of u to item
i [42, 90], as follows.
rˆu,i = ru +
∑
v∈Nu
wu,v(rv,i − rv)∑
v∈Nu
wu,v
(6.2)
Finally, the items that have a high potential of interest to the user (i.e., are predicted to
have high and positive ratings) are recommended to him.
6.2.2 Problem Definition
We consider the scenario where a collaborative ﬁltering algorithm (described in Section 6.2.1)
is implemented on a server and users give information about their proﬁles to the server in
order to receive recommendations. We deﬁne the problem as ﬁnding a mechanism by which
the users can adapt their proﬁles (available to the server) to the privacy level they expect
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from the system. The solution must have minimum eﬀect on the system’s accuracy. We
assume the server to be untrusted, and we evaluate the level of privacy in the system with
respect to that. Yet, the information revealed among users themselves, if there is any need
for communication, must be under the users’ control (i.e., what information is given and to
whom). Intuitively, the system privacy is high if the server is not able to construct the users’
proﬁles based on the information available to it.
6.3 Proposed Method
In this section, we ﬁrst give an overview of our solution in Section 6.3.1, and we deﬁne a
few new concepts that we need to describe our scheme. Next, in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 we
formally model the problem and our proposed solution.
6.3.1 Sketch of the Solution
We assume there is a central recommender system where users’ proﬁles are stored and from
which the users receive recommendations. We call a user’s proﬁle stored on the server his
online profile. We assume that a user can have a local repository where he stores his own
proﬁle; we call these locally stored proﬁles the oﬄine profiles. The server does not have access
to the users’ oﬄine proﬁles and the recommendations are produced based on the online proﬁles
available to the server. Each user independently synchronizes his online proﬁle with his oﬄine
proﬁle. Therefore, from time to time, the changes that have been made to the oﬄine proﬁle,
since the last synchronization, will be applied to the online version, all at once. Obviously,
the recently rated items are among these changes. In addition to these actual ratings, users
add other items to their proﬁles, which are not originally rated by them; instead, they are
received from other users with whom they communicate.
Users communicate with each other through diﬀerent media such as face-to-face commu-
nication in a meeting, communicating over cellular networks, instant messaging through the
Internet, communicating via a social network, or exchanging e-mails. We refer to any such
communication as contact between two users. A user arbitrarily selects his peers and certain
information about the users’ oﬄine proﬁles is exchanged between them at each contact. Based
on this information, they add a subset of the other user’s items to their own proﬁles. The
exchanged information between users, the number of items that are added to their proﬁle and
the items (plus their associated ratings) that are selected for the aggregation depend on the
aggregation function they use.
From the server’s point of view, each user adds a batch of new items (plus the ratings) to
his online proﬁle at each synchronization. It is not known to the server which of these items
have been actually rated by the user. In other words, the user’s actual proﬁle is hidden from
the server; hence, there is privacy for the user. This, of course, comes at a cost: a drop in the
recommendation accuracy. In the next sections, we answer the following questions, in order
to ﬁnd the appropriate aggregation functions: How many items should be aggregated in each
contact? What items are better candidates for aggregation? What is the eﬀect of contact
rate on the privacy and accuracy?
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Figure 6.1: Aggregation of users’ oﬄine proﬁles after a contact. A contact occurs between
users u and v at time t, with Ioffu (t) = {i1, i2, i4, i6} and Ioffv (t) = {i3, i4, i5, i7}. User u gives
{i2, i4, i6}, which is a subset of his proﬁle, to v. User v also gives {i3, i5} to u. Additional
edges (dashed lines) appear after the aggregation, and the oﬄine graph is evolved through
aggregating the new added edges. After the aggregation, Ioffu (t+) = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6} and
Ioffu (t+) = {i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7}.
6.3.2 The Model
We model users’ proﬁles by a bipartite graph, where nodes denote the users and items, and
weighted edges correspond to the ratings of the users to the items.
Let Gt(U, V,E) be a bipartite weighted graph, where the vertex set U = U corresponds to
the users, the vertex set V = I corresponds to the items, and the edge set E(t) corresponds to
the users’ rating for the items until time t. Thus, an edge (u, i) ∈ E(t) exists when user u ∈ U
has rated item i ∈ V at some time before t. Each edge (u, i) has an associated weight ru,i(t)
denoting the rating of user u assigned to item i. In such a setting, a user’s proﬁle or Iu(t) will
be the set of nodes adjacent to node u. We call Gt the actual graph, because it represents the
actual users’ ratings of the items, i.e., in the case that there is no privacy preserving method
in use.
Using our method, there will be two other graphs in the system. One should represent
the users’ online proﬁles and the other should model the users’ oﬄine proﬁles.
Let us denote the oﬄine graph by Gofft (U, V,E
off ). This conceptual graph, which is stored
in a distributed manner, is formed by the aggregation of edges through users’ contacts and by
rating new items over time until t. The edges that are added to the oﬄine graph can appear
either as a result of actual ratings by the users, or through aggregation by contacting other
users. Hence, the actual graph Gt is embedded and hidden in G
off
t . We also denote Ioffu (t)
to be the user’s oﬄine proﬁle at t. By deﬁnition, for every user u at any time t we have
Iu(t) ⊆ Ioffu (t). Note that Ioffu (t) \ Iu(t) is the set of items (plus their ratings) that are added
through aggregation to a user’s oﬄine proﬁle.
In our model, the online graph is denoted by Gont (U, V,E
on) and Ionu (t) represents the
online proﬁle of user u. The online graph gets updated over time when users synchronize
their online proﬁles with their oﬄine versions. As a result, at any time, there might be some
edges in graphGofft that have not yet been added to the graphG
on
t . Therefore, Ionu (t) ⊆ Ioffu (t),
for every user u at any time t.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the eﬀects of aggregation on the oﬄine proﬁles of two users after their
contact. Assume two users u and v contact each other at time t, with oﬄine proﬁles Ioffu (t)
and Ioffv (t) before the contact. We also denote Ioffu (t+) and Ioffv (t+) to be their oﬄine proﬁles
after contact. As it is shown, each user (e.g., u) gives a subset of his own proﬁle to his peer
(e.g., v) to be aggregated to the peer’s previous proﬁle. The way they select the mentioned
subset is explained in the next section. Note that the added edges preserve their weights
(ratings). In the case the receiver is given an item that is already in his oﬄine proﬁle, he
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of the oﬄine (left column) and online (right column) graphs over time
(t1 < t2 < t3 < t4). Circles represent the items and the users are shown by the squares.
We focus on the proﬁles of user u, distinguished by the black square. In the left column,
the solid lines are the actual ratings of the users, and the dashed lines are the additional
ratings aggregated to the users’ oﬄine proﬁles. Proﬁles Ioffu and Ionu are synchronized at
time t1. Graph G
on
t stays unchanged, regarding user u, until the next synchronization time t4.
Graph Gofft is accumulated through addition of both actual rating edges (solid lines) and also
the aggregated edges (dashed lines). User u rates a new item at t2 and aggregates some other
items at t3. The solid lines in the right column (i.e., the online graph) indicate that the server
is unable to distinguish between the actual and dummy (i.e., those added through aggregation)
ratings. The grey lines belong to other users’ proﬁle that are evolving independently of each
other.
updates its rating, if it is not an actual rating.
We assume each user, on average, contacts n users per time unit and the contact peers are
selected arbitrarily from U . The process of contacting other users and updating the oﬄine
proﬁles continues for all users over time, in parallel with the process of actually rating new
items. Thus, graph Gofft will be accumulated. More formally, for t1 < t2, Ioffu (t1) ⊆ Ioffu (t2),
i.e., the resulting bipartite graph Gofft2 has the same vertex sets as G
off
t1 , and E
off(t1) ⊆ Eoff(t2).
Each user occasionally synchronizes his oﬄine and online proﬁles at arbitrary time in-
stants. Thus, the online graph on the server changes dynamically over time. Figure 6.2 shows
this evolution.
We emphasize that each time a user synchronizes his online proﬁle with the oﬄine version,
the server is incapable of distinguishing between the new edges that belong to the user’s actual
proﬁle and the edges added through aggregation. Moreover, users who contact each other have
access only to information derived from the oﬄine proﬁles of their peers and cannot pinpoint
the actual items of each others’ oﬄine proﬁles. Hence, a user’s privacy is protected not only
against the server but also against the other users.
In order to prevent a user being confused about his own rated items, the process of
aggregation and also the aggregated items (i.e., his oﬄine proﬁle minus his actual proﬁle) can
be made transparent to the user. Hence, a user can add, remove, or modify his actual ratings
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without any confusion, although he is able to ﬁnd out what the extra items are in his proﬁle.
Looking from the server’s side, the server is not aware of the items that are actually rated
by the user, and generates recommendations based on their online proﬁles. Therefore, the
server passes the top items that might be of interest to a user without ﬁltering out the items
already existing in his proﬁle. Instead, the process of ﬁltering is done at the user’s side, in a
transparent way, i.e., the server recommends a set of highly recommended items to the user
and it is the user application that avoids recommending the items that are previously rated
by the user himself. This prevents a user from missing a recommendable item because it is
in his proﬁle but not actually rated by the user.
6.3.3 Profile Aggregation
As described in the previous section, the process of updating graph Gofft is accomplished
through an aggregation process where users contact each other and update their oﬄine proﬁles
by adding a subset of their peer’s rated items to their own proﬁle. Consider a contact between
users u and v at time t. We denote Iaggv (t) (named the aggregated items from v) as the subset
of items (plus their ratings) in the oﬄine proﬁle of user v, which are added to the oﬄine
proﬁle of user u. Considering Ioffu (t+) as the oﬄine proﬁle of u after the aggregation, the
following equation holds:
Ioffu (t+) = Ioffu (t) ∪ Iaggv (t). (6.3)
The same argument holds for the inverse case (updated proﬁle of v). Note that the added
edges keep the same rating value after being added to a user’s proﬁle, i.e., assuming item i is
added to the oﬄine proﬁle of user u after his contact with user v, we have:
roffu,i(t
+) = roffv,i(t), i ∈ Iaggv (t), i /∈ Iu(t). (6.4)
But, if the candidate item already exists in u’s actual proﬁle, i.e., i ∈ Iaggv (t)∩Iu(t), the rate
stays unchanged.
In order to choose the candidate items for aggregation, we should consider two issues:
1) The number of items to be aggregated (|Iaggv (t)|), and 2) which subset of Ioffv (t) (with
cardinality |Iaggv (t)|) to choose. We provide answers to these questions by introducing diﬀerent
types of aggregation.
In this work, we introduce two kinds of possible aggregation processes, focusing on our
key idea: aggregation based on the similarity of the users who contact each other. We believe
that this approach yields the best performance of the system for preserving both privacy and
accuracy.
Similarity-Based Aggregation
In this case, at each contact, the similarity of the two users is calculated using (6.1). Each
user then gives a proportion - equal to the similarity value - of his items in his oﬄine proﬁle
to the other user for aggregation, i.e., if we assume a contact between users u and v at time t,
using (6.3) we have,
|Ioffu (t+)| ≤ |Ioffu (t)|+ ⌊simu,v · |Ioffv (t)|⌋, (6.5)
where |Ioffu (t+)| denotes the size of u’s oﬄine proﬁle after aggregation, and |Ioffu (t)| and
|Ioffv (t)| denote the size of u and v’s proﬁles before aggregation, respectively. Note that
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|Iaggv (t)| = ⌊simu,v · |Ioffv (t)|⌋, and the equality holds when Ioffu (t) ∩ Ioffv (t) = φ. We denote
simu,v as the similarity between users u and v (value between 0 and 1) is computed as follows:
simu,v =
{
wu,v if wu,v > 0
0 otherwise
(6.6)
In other words, the two users only accept the aggregated items when there is a positive
similarity between them, otherwise no aggregation occurs.
Although our main focus is on the protection of the users’ privacy against the untrusted
server and not against each other, we still can employ some tools to protect users’ privacy
from each other. Users, who contact each other, need to reveal their proﬁles to each other in
order to compute the similarity value. The level of privacy can be improved by using methods
that compute similarity between two proﬁles without revealing their content. Lathia et al.[53]
propose an interesting concordance measure to estimate the similarity between two users in
a distributed system without revealing their proﬁles to each other. This method can be used
when one user contacts another user in whom he has little trust.
To answer the question of “which subset of Ioffv (t) to choose”, we notice that the items in
Iaggv (t) can be chosen through diﬀerent methods. We hereby suggest two ways:
• Similarity-based Minimum Rating Frequency
(SMRF) One way to choose the set Iaggv (t) is to sort the elements of Ioffv (t) by their
rating frequency, and select the ﬁrst ⌊simu,v · |Ioffv (t)|⌋ elements with minimum rating
frequency. In other words, we choose the subset of the user’s rated items that have been
least rated by the users in the system (i.e., in the online graph). We assume that the
server makes the current rating frequency of items, foni (t), available to the users.
• Similarity-based Random Selection (SRS) In this case, the ⌊simu,v · |Ioffv (t)|⌋
candidate items are selected uniformly at random from the set of items in Ioffv (t).
We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of these aggregation functions and compare them in Sec-
tion 6.5.
Fixed Random-Selection Aggregation
Aside from choosing the aggregated items based on the similarity of users, we consider another
simple type of aggregation: fixed random selection, where each user gives a fixed proportion
of his rated items to the other user, i.e.,
|Ioffu (t+)| ≤ |Ioffu (t)|+ ⌊k · |Ioffv (t)|⌋, (6.7)
where, k is a constant value between 0 and 1. Note that here |Iaggv (t)| = ⌊k · |Ioffv (t)|⌋, and
the aggregated items are chosen uniformly at random.
• Union is an example of this aggregation, where each user gives all of his rated items to
the other user, i.e.,
Ioffu (t+) = Ioffu (t) ∪ Ioffv (t). (6.8)
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6.4 Evaluation Metrics
In this section, we describe our deﬁnition of privacy and recommendation accuracy. Following
the deﬁnitions, we formalize our metrics for evaluating the proposed method in terms of the
privacy gain and the accuracy loss.
6.4.1 Privacy Measurement
We deﬁne the lack of privacy as the amount of information the server has about the actual
proﬁle of the users. In other words, it reﬂects how accurately the server can guess the actual
proﬁle of the users (modeled asGt) using the online graphG
on
t , and how valuable the estimated
proﬁles are, in terms of identifying the users and distinguishing between them. To deﬁne the
privacy, we focus more on the users-items connection rather than on the ratings the users
assign to the items (for an adversary who tracks a user it is more interesting to know to which
places the user has been, rather than knowing the user’s opinion about those places).
To evaluate the privacy provided by our method, based on the above-mentioned privacy
deﬁnition, we deﬁne a privacy metric considering the graphs Gt and G
on
t . We emphasize that
privacy is preserved in our model through additional edges that exist in the online graph, but
not in the actual graph. Thus, we compute to what extent the structures of graphs Gt and
Gont are similar, as a higher structural diﬀerence accounts for higher privacy. This falls into
the subject of approximate graph matching introduced in Chapter 1, where the structures of
two graphs are compared with the goal of matching the correspondent nodes based on the
structures. In our problem, as the node set of the two graphs are the same, the structural
diﬀerence can be viewed as the diﬀerence between the correspondent edges.
Following the above discussion, we introduce the same error measure for edge-inconsistency
as used in Chapter 3. We consider only the structures of two given graphs G1(V,E1) and
G2(V,E2), where V denotes the node set (the same for both graphs), and E1 and E2 denote
diﬀerent edge sets. The matching error ∆ is deﬁned as the number of edges that exist in one
graph with their correspondent edges not existing in the other graph:
∆ =
∑
(u,i)∈E1
1{(u,i)/∈E2} +
∑
(u,i)∈E2
1{(u,i)/∈E1}, (6.9)
where 1{A} denotes the indicator function on A, and (u, i) denotes an edge between nodes u
and i in either of the two graphs.
In our setting, graphs Gt and G
on
t correspond to G1 and G2 respectively, with their node
set divided into two sets V and U to exhibit the bipartite property of users and items. The
privacy metric is equivalent to the matching error ∆, as ∆ counts the number of diﬀerences
in the corresponding edges of two graphs, and higher structural diﬀerence results in higher
privacy. In our case, the ﬁrst summation in (6.9) is zero, because Gont is an accumulated
version of Gt. Consider our own notations, where Ionu and Iu stand for the items associated
with user u in his online and actual graphs, respectively. Counting the edges by iterating over
the user set U , the matching error can be written as:
∆ =
∑
u
∑
i∈Ionu
1{i/∈Iu}. (6.10)
However, Narayanan and Shmatikov [77] show that an item with a high rating frequency
contains less information about those who have rated the item than an item with a low rating
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frequency (e.g., it is more valuable, in identifying a user, to know that a user has purchased
“The Color of Pomegranates” than the fact that he purchased a Harry Potter DVD). Their
result shows that the higher the rating frequency of an item is, the more important this item is
for identifying users associated with that item, thus the more valuable it is in system privacy
preservation. If an adversary (the one who wants to break users’ privacy) falsely believes that
someone has rated an item with a low rating frequency, then the user’s privacy is much higher
than the case where the item has a high rating frequency.
Hence, we use the rating frequency fi in (6.10) to weight the items. We then normalize
it per user by dividing it by its maximum value for each user. This also guarantees a value
between 0 and 1 for the system privacy. Thus, privacy in the current work can be deﬁned
as the normalized weighted edge-diﬀerence function over the node pairs of the two graphs.
Rewriting (6.10), this can be expressed as follows. For the sake of simplicity, we omit the
time index.
privacy =
1
N
·
∑
u
∑i∈(Ionu \Iu)
(
1
fi
)
∑
i∈Ionu
( 1fi )
 (6.11)
To put is simply, looking at the bipartite graph, for each user we compute the weighted
diﬀerence of his rated items in graphs Gt and G
on
t , with the weights being the inverse of the
item’s rating frequency. The overall system privacy is then computed as the normalized sum
of all such terms for all users. Such a metric captures both the server’s chance for successfully
guessing the users’ actual proﬁles and the importance of the proﬁles in identifying the users
(using the rating frequency).
Let us have a deeper look at how the privacy metric can be interpreted. The closer is
the privacy degree of a system to 1, the harder is for the adversary to distinguish the actual
proﬁles of the users in their online proﬁles. Moreover, it becomes harder for the adversary to
distinguish between users and de-anonymize their proﬁles [77]. As it approaches 1, the privacy
growth becomes slower by adding more items to the proﬁle of users, whereas its growth is
faster for small privacy values. The privacy becomes 1 if the actual graph is inﬁnitely small
compared to the online graph and it is 0 if they are the same. It is important to note that this
metric is not designed to compare the privacy of two systems with diﬀerent settings, rather
to reﬂect the privacy gain inside a system.
Note that there are some items in a user’s oﬄine proﬁle whose rating changes due to 1)
being rated later by the user himself, 2) being received again from contacting users. The
ﬁrst subset is not distinguishable from the second and their ratio intuitively follows (6.11).
Therefore, we do not re-evaluate the eﬀect of this factor on the users’ privacy.
6.4.2 Recommendation Accuracy
Modifying the users’ actual proﬁles in order to increase their privacy level might impose some
error on the accuracy of the recommendation system. We measure the cost of running our
method as the diﬀerence between the recommendation error in our system and the system
with no privacy. In both cases we compute the recommendation error based on RMSE. Let
Îu denote the set of predicted items in the recommender system for user u. The system error
for any graph G is computed as follows (the same for graph Gon).
RMSE(G) =
√∑
u
∑
i∈Îu
(ru,i − rˆu,i)2∑
u |Îu|
(6.12)
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Finally, the cost of using our method is computed as the percentage of the accuracy loss,
i.e., the additionally imposed error, formalized as follows.
accuracy loss =
RMSE(Gon)−RMSE(G)
RMSE(G)
(6.13)
6.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we validate the eﬀectiveness of our model and the mechanisms we proposed
in Section 6.3. First, we describe the data set that we used for the experiments and explain
our simulation model. Next, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent aggregation functions
used in our mechanism based on the metrics described in Section 6.4.
In each experiment, we used a subset of the Netﬂix data set, released for Netﬂix prize [2],
containing 300 randomly chosen proﬁles with ratings between early 2001 and late 2006. The
ratings are on a scale from 1 to 5 (integral) stars.
To evaluate the recommendation accuracy, we used 10% of the actual ratings of each
user as the testing set and the remaining 90% as the training set. For each experiment, we
evaluated the privacy achievement and also the accuracy of the system for diﬀerent values of
users’ contact rates. The contacts between users were selected uniformly at random, both for
the contacting peers and their time of contact. We evaluated the privacy and accuracy of an
aggregation function with respect to the average users’ contact rate. We made the evaluation
at the end of each experiment (December 2006). The contact rate value determines the
average number of users a given user has contact with per year. Besides, in all experiments
the number of neighbors of each user, needed for generating recommendations, was selected
to be 30 (i.e., |Nu| = 30 for any user u). Outcome of various experiments are averaged to
obtain the ﬁnal results. In this setting, we implemented the following aggregation functions.
• Similarity-based minimum rating frequency (SMRF)
• Similarity-based random selection (SRS)
• Union aggregation
The Union function provides the maximum privacy that can be achieved using our method.
Therefore, it acts as a benchmark to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the similarity-based aggre-
gation functions.
Figures 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) illustrate the privacy preservation level and accuracy loss, re-
spectively, for diﬀerent aggregation functions, calculated using Equations (6.11) and (6.13).
Using these results, one can easily observe the privacy-accuracy trade-oﬀ for diﬀerent mech-
anisms, and select the appropriate type of aggregation. The eﬀect of contact rate on the
privacy level and accuracy loss is also shown.
As depicted in Figure 6.3(a), using Union aggregation the system privacy level quickly
approaches the maximum value of 1 as the average contact rate increases. Moreover, when
this aggregation is used, the users’ proﬁles (oﬄine and therefore online) become more ﬂat as
time goes on (i.e., users’ proﬁles become more similar). This leads to a considerable decrease
in system accuracy, compared to other aggregation functions (Figure 6.3(b) shows a fast
increase in accuracy loss for Union function). Contrarily, Figure 6.3(b) shows that the other
two methods SRS and SMRF result in a slight decline in the system accuracy, in comparison
with Union aggregation, for diﬀerent values of contact rate.
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The eﬃciency of our mechanism becomes more visible when we notice that a small number
of contacts per user substantially increases the privacy level and imposes minor costs in terms
of accuracy. For instance, notice that using the SMRF (SRS) aggregation function, number
of 6 contacts per year per user results in a 0.64 (0.48) degree increment in system privacy
with an accuracy loss of less than 2% (1%).
We observe that although the SRS method causes a smaller accuracy loss, the major
increase in system privacy for SMRF distinguishes it as a good alternative mechanism. This
is due to the fact that sorting the aggregated candidates by minimum rating frequency makes
the users more indistinguishable for the server. However, SRS is the most practical aggregation
function, as it is not dependent on any system parameter or any kind of information from the
server. Another advantage of SRS over SMRF is the stability of its accuracy loss for diﬀerent
contact rate values.
In general, experimental results validate our proposed mechanism in preserving privacy in
a distributed way. The results show that similarity-based aggregation achieves decent results
in terms of higher system privacy with a negligible eﬀect on accuracy loss for small average
contact rates. When users have information about the rating frequency of items, giving the
items with minimum rating frequency increases the privacy. This is because it increases the
number of users who have rated sensitive items of a user (i.e., the items that help identifying
the user). Yet, if such information is not available for users, the SRS aggregation can be used,
which provides a bit less privacy but imposes a lower accuracy loss. SRS is also more stable (in
terms of the accuracy loss) for diﬀerent contact rate values. The key factor of similarity-based
aggregation functions is that they preserve the similarity between users almost unchanged,
compared to the case where there is no privacy protection mechanism in use.
6.6 Related Work
Several techniques have been proposed to preserve the privacy of users in recommender sys-
tems. Perturbing users’ ratings, using cryptographic tools such as homomorphic cryptogra-
phy, and storing users’ proﬁles in a distributed manner are the main categories for privacy
preservation in collaborative ﬁltering systems.
Polat and Du [88] propose a randomized perturbation technique to preserve privacy in
collaborative ﬁltering. Users’ ratings are modiﬁed by adding random noise to them in order
to prevent the central server from deriving the users’ actual ratings. The challenge is to ﬁnd a
perturbation algorithm that imposes the smallest error on the recommendation process. The
users enjoy a high level of privacy if the server is not able to estimate the actual ratings they
assigned to the items. However, the items rated by the users are revealed in the proposed
technique, regardless of the perturbation level. This is despite the fact that keeping the
connection between users and items is more crucial (in order to preserve users’ privacy) than
disguising the ratings assigned to those connections. Revealing the places visited by the users
to the server enables it to track users over space and time, whether they liked those places or
not.
Using homomorphic cryptography in the public server in order to hide the operations
of the recommender system is proposed by Canny [18, 19]. In the proposed method, users
create communities and each user searches for recommendations from the most appropriate
community with the hope of receiving more valuable recommendations, rather than asking
from those who have similar proﬁles. Each community of users can compute a public aggregate
6.6. Related Work 95
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Average Yearly Contact Rate of Users
Sy
st
em
 P
riv
ac
y
 
 
UNION
SMRF
SRS
(a) Privacy gain for different users’ contact rate
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Average Yearly Contact Rate of Users
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 L
os
s
 
 
UNION
SMRF
SRS
(b) Accuracy loss for different users’ contact rate
Figure 6.3: Performance of diﬀerent aggregation functions with respect to the achieved privacy
and drop in system accuracy.
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of their proﬁles, which does not expose the individuals’ proﬁles. Homomorphic cryptography
allows the users to hide the aggregation operation from the server, although it is performed
by the server itself. Participation of users in the distributed system to provide privacy for
others was assumed to happen in this work, which might not be the case in reality. Moreover,
the implementation of such a cryptographic scheme, especially its required key management,
is diﬃcult to achieve, considering the status of the current usage of cryptographic systems in
the Internet. Similar ideas are proposed in [4] where homomorphic cryptography is used to
hide similarity measurement from server’s eyes.
Storing users’ proﬁles on their own side and running the recommender system in a dis-
tributed manner, without relying on any server, is another option. Miller et al.[69] propose
transmitting only the similarity measures over the network and keeping users’ proﬁles secret
on their side to preserve their privacy. Berkovsky et al.[13] propose a distributed P2P system
to avoid storing users’ proﬁles on a single server. Although these methods eliminate the main
source of threat against users’ privacy, they need high cooperation among users to generate
meaningful recommendations. Every user pays the price of using this method, regardless of
his interest in protecting his privacy.
Lathia et al.[53] propose a concordance measure to estimate the similarity between two
users in a distributed system without revealing their actual proﬁles to each other. A randomly
generated temporal proﬁle is shared between two users, and both of them compute the number
of concordant, discordant and tied pairs of ratings between their own proﬁle and the temporal
proﬁle. Exchanging the results, they are able to estimate the similarity between their proﬁles.
Hence, they keep the items they have rated as well as the rating values private. In this
method, users need to reveal their proﬁles for generating recommendations. Therefore, this
method provides privacy only for measuring similarity, not for a collaborative ﬁltering system
as a whole. Two users who do not trust each other, in our proposed method, can use Lathia’s
method to estimate their similarity.
Finally, the concept of approximate graph matching – from which the idea of privacy metric
in this work was inspired – has been widely studied in literature. We refer to Section 2.2 for
a more in-depth discussion of the related work in this ﬁeld.
6.7 Summary
In this work, we proposed a novel method for privacy preservation in collaborative ﬁltering
recommendation systems. We addressed the problem of protecting the users’ privacy in the
presence of an untrusted central server, where the server has access to users’ proﬁles. To
avoid privacy violation, we proposed a mechanism where users store locally an oﬄine proﬁle
on their own side, hidden from the server, and an online proﬁle on the server from which the
server generates the recommendations. The online proﬁles of diﬀerent users are frequently
synchronized with their oﬄine versions in an independent and distributed way. Using a graph
theoretic approach, we developed a model where each user arbitrarily contacts other users
over time, and modiﬁes his own oﬄine proﬁle through a process known as aggregation. To
evaluate the privacy of the system, we applied our model to the Netﬂix prize data set to
investigate the privacy-accuracy tradeoﬀ for diﬀerent aggregation types. Through experi-
ments, we showed that such a mechanism can lead to a high level of privacy through a proper
choice of aggregation functions, while having a marginal negative eﬀect on the accuracy of the
recommendation system. The results illustrate that similarity-based aggregation functions,
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where users receive items from other users proportional to the similarity between them, yield
a considerable privacy level at a very low accuracy loss.
As future work, our mechanism can be implemented in a realistic setting in which users
contact each other based on their friendship (e.g., in social networks) or their physical vicinity
(e.g., using wireless peer-to-peer communication). In such a setting, various practical issues
such as the eﬀect of the privacy preserving mechanism on the overhead of users’ proﬁles and
their maintenance, and the acceptability of the system in a real world scenario can be inves-
tigated. Moreover, the robustness of the algorithm to sophisticated adversarial attacks and
its relation to the proposed metric are worth studying.
Publication [97]
R. Shokri, P. Pedarsani, G. Theodorakopoulos and J.-P. Hubaux. Preserving Privacy in
Collaborative Filtering through Distributed Aggregation of Oﬄine Profiles. In
Proceedings of ACM International Conference on Recommender Systems, RecSys ’09, pages
157-164, 2009.

Conclusion
With the rapid growth of social networks and the increasing availability of network data,
the study of such networks has gained particular attention in the recent years. In this work,
we have studied two aspects of social and complex networks. First, we have looked into
the privacy issue in social networks. Network owners and social network operators release
extensive amounts of data to the public for research and marketing purposes. In most cases,
they apply anonymization techniques in order to protect the privacy of users in the released
data. We have investigated how the availability of side information threatens the identiﬁcation
of users in anonymized network data. Furthermore, we have introduced a privacy-preserving
mechanism for social recommender systems. Second, we have investigated network evolution
and the dynamics of social networks. It has been recently observed that social networks tend
to become denser over time. We have proposed a novel explanation for the growth of social
networks and their densiﬁcation.
In Part I, we study network de-anonymization and how to infer user identities from
anonymized network data. In Chapter 2, we deﬁne our approach to the de-anonymization
problem. We assume the only information available to the attacker is an anonymized target
network (an unlabeled graph), and an auxiliary network that is derived from some publicly
available resource and is structurally similar to the anonymized graph. We introduce the de-
anonymization problem as a graph matching problem, where the goal is to ﬁnd the mapping
between the nodes of two overlapping graphs by using only their structures. This is referred
to as approximate graph matching. We review the literature on network de-anonymization
and approximate graph matching at the end of this chapter.
In Chapter 3, we push further the theoretical aspect of the matching problem. We
ﬁrst introduce a new probabilistic model for the structural similarity of two graphs. We
assume that each graph is a sample from an underlying generator graph and that a sampling
probability (or similarity parameter) controls the amount of similarity between the graphs. We
introduce a sampling process that samples every edge in the graph with the same probability s,
independent of all other edges. Applying this process twice on the generator graph, we obtain
two correlated (edge-)overlapping graphs that are structurally similar but not identical. Using
this model and introducing a G(n, p) random graph model for the underlying graph, we
establish conditions on the network parameters and on the similarity under which an attacker
with inﬁnite computational power can perfectly match the nodes with high probability as the
graph size grows large. More speciﬁcally, we derive a lower-bound for the similarity of two
networks above which perfect matching is feasible, and we show that the bound is indeed a
mild condition on the scaling of the average degree with the number of nodes, which is the
case for many real networks. Our theoretical results imply that de-anonymization is easy in
the presence of some minimal side information: the structural similarity to a known network.
In Chapter 4, we look into the algorithmic perspective of approximate graph matching:
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how to match two structurally similar large graphs in an eﬃcient way. Relying on the same
probabilistic model for the similarity of two graphs, we propose a novel iterative algorithm for
graph matching. At each phase of the algorithm, we consider a set of candidate nodes to be
mapped; for every node in this set, we deﬁne a ﬁngerprint including a set of node attributes,
namely its degree and its distances to previously mapped nodes in the corresponding graph.
Using these ﬁngerprints and introducing models for node distances and degrees after sampling,
we develop a clean Bayesian framework to compute the likelihood of two nodes being a correct
match. Using all pair-wise likelihoods, we transform the matching problem to a maximum
weighted bipartite matching problem at each phase. Unlike some recently proposed methods,
our algorithm relies on no initial seed set and uses only the network structures to build the
map incrementally. Furthermore, we show the eﬃciency of our algorithm to match a high
percentage of nodes by applying it to real data.
Part II, including Chapter 5, contains our contribution for the second direction of
this thesis: network dynamics. We study the evolution of social networks and a recently
observed phenomenon in social networks known as densification: the super-linear growth of
the number of edges versus nodes as the network evolves, and thus the increase of the average
degree over time. Observing how network data is gathered and used in practice, we introduce
an observation process, where the edges of a ﬁxed underlying graph are sampled, and nodes
are revealed only indirectly through the edges. We show that this model leads to densiﬁcation,
both theoretically and experimentally. We also establish conditions for densiﬁcation, and show
a direct relationship between a power-law degree distribution and power-law densiﬁcation,
which is veriﬁed well in practice. Our results imply that densiﬁcation, rather than an inherent
property of social and complex networks, is due to an observation bias and results from the
way we observe real networks.
Finally, in Part III and Chapter 6 we elaborate on our additional work on privacy in
recommendation systems. We consider a collaborative ﬁltering recommender system, and
a scenario in which users intend to preserve their privacy by hiding their proﬁles from an
untrusted recommander server while receiving accurate recommendations. We propose a
model where each user modiﬁes his/her proﬁle before revealing it to the server. In a process
called aggregation, each user contacts other random users at arbitrary points in time, and
reveals an aggregated proﬁle to the server. Our experiments on real data show that our
method yields high-level privacy for users at a low accuracy loss.
Future Research Directions
The results of this thesis indicate that it is possible to break user privacy by using the
simplest side information attained from an auxiliary source. Although most of our works in
this direction are based on a speciﬁc similarity model, the results imply the need for designing
smarter and more eﬃcient methods of publishing user data in order to protect users’ privacy.
Our work can be extended in various directions.
• The theoretical approach for ﬁnding the conditions for graph matching used edge sam-
pling to model the similarity of two networks. Currently, we are working on solving the
same problem for node sampling, where every node is sampled with some probability,
independently of all other nodes. Next, to generalize our approach, a breakthrough in
this direction would be the combination of edge and node sampling, which would give
the most general model for the similarity of two networks. Furthermore, the choice of
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a random graph as the generator can be extended to more realistic types of graphs,
although the mathematical tractability could be an obstacle to generalizing the results
in this regards.
• Our matching algorithm is distinguished from other methods in the literature because it
uses no a priori information (no initial seeds) other than graph structures. This suggests
that even though the algorithm complexity might hinder the matching of the graphs of
tens of millions of nodes, it can still be used for matching a subset of nodes over a few
iterations, ﬁxing them as seeds, and then using the seeds with an existing propagation
algorithm as in [78] to match all nodes.
• We applied our matching algorithm to a dataset of EPFL e-mail exchanges. The al-
gorithm can be applied to other real datasets of interest and used not only for de-
anonymization but also for other application purposes. An interesting example is
matching documents from two diﬀerent languages, e.g., cross-referencing dictionaries,
or matching Wikipedia pages from diﬀerent languages.
• Based on our results, keeping a network anonymous is diﬃcult, knowing that adversaries
can access various side information from other sources. Our method suggests that any
kind of structural information can be used as node attributes and might leak some
information about the node. A promising research direction could be how to perturb
the structure of the graph in order to keep it private while preserving global statistics for
graph properties; thus the released data could still be useful for research purposes. More
fundamentally, we could study how to release network data and guarantee no leak in
user identities. There have been several works in the database community on the notion
of diﬀerential privacy for minimizing the chance of identifying records in the database
[24, 25]; in graph literature, there are also some preliminary works on diﬀerential private
release of network data while maintaining some structural information for public or
research use [39, 70]. However, this is still an immature area with strong potential for
research.
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